EASTERN ENIGMA
MR. STALIN, the Dictator of Russia, is dead. Mr. Gottwald, the Dictator of Czechoslovakia, is dead. President Tito, the virtual Dictator of Yugoslavia, is enjoying unusual honours in London. Mr. Malenkov is preaching peace and co-operation- in Moscow. Russian jet- fighters have shot down a British bomber over Western Germany, and another has fired on an American machine off Kamchatka. The Russian member of the United Nations Security Council has vetoed the candidate whom nine other members of the Council favoured for the post of Secretary- General of the United Nations. General Chuikov, the Soviet High Commissioner in Germany, has suddenly cleared a block of lorries deliberately held up at a check-point on a road between Eastern and Western Germany, and announced the imminent resumption of through traffic on a canal that has been closed for months on the plea that some lock-gates needed repair. From such facts what conclusions- are to be drawn regarding Russia's external policy now that Mr. Stalin is no more ? It might be safer to draw no conclusions at all. The new regime at Moscow is barely a fortnight old, and it would be a great mistake to attribute favourable signs, like General Chuikov's action in Berlin, or unfavourable signs like the aggression by MiGs, to orders from the centre. They are much more likely to be the work of persons enjoying limited local authority in Germany. At the same time it would be equally wrong to assume that, in spite of the advent of a new admini- stration, nothing is changed in Moscow. The speech delivered by Mr. Malenkov before the Supreme Soviet on Sunday went further in the matter of peace-declarations than his oration at Mr. Stalin's funeral six days earlier. The assertion that there were no controversial issues, including those between Russia and the United States, which could not be solved by peaceful means was specific and unqualified, and the theme of peace has been emphasised almost daily by the official Pravda and Izvestia.
What, it is necessary to ask, does it all mean ? The disclo- sures as to the strength of the Russian navy, made by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons on Monday might seem inconsistent enough with these reiterations of peaceful intentions. But that point need not be pressed. Though what Mr. Thomas had to say about Russian cruisers and Russian submarines was startling enough, these vessels have not suddenly leapt into being with Mr. Malenkov's suc- cession to power. So far as their existence represents any one man's policy it is Mr. Stalin's, and it provides no answer at all to the question whether in this and other matters Mr. Malenkov's policy is different from his. For that answer, whether it is a welcome or unwelcome one, we shall clearly have to wait. Mr. Stalin's hold over his countrymen was never so strong as in his death, and the one sure way for Mr. Malenkov to incur unpopularity and hostility would be to appear to tread a different road from his great predecessor. If he has any idea of doing that he will certainly not do it yet. All that a world with eyes fixed in perplexity and anxiety on Moscow can hope for are a few secondary, and perhaps subtle, indications of a slight change of direction here and there. A rather less intransigent attitude might be adopted at the United Nations—as in some small degree it is being. Belated willing- ness to consider a treaty with Austria might be signified. Some kind of contacts between Russians and the rest of the world might be tolerated. Foreign trade, on which Mr. Molotov laid stress in his funeral speech, could be facilitated. And Soviet opposition to the election of Mr. Lester Pearson as Secretary-General of the United Nations could be withdrawn. But all those issues, it may be contended, are trivial com- pared with the war in Korea. What everyone wants to know beyond everything else is the attitude of the Soviet Inner Cabinet in regard to that. It is; but here patieice is essential. That Russia is behind the Korean war is undoubted. But Russia is not fighting in it. That is China's role. It is Chinese who are being killed, and who for the present are ordained by Mao Tse-tung to be killed. That cannot be stopped in a day, and it will only be stopped when Mao Tse-tung so decides. No doubt his decision will -be affected by wishes expressed at Moscow, but how much no one can say. If there is any aspect of Soviet foreign policy on which fresh light has been cast since Stalin's death it is the intense desire to stand well with Peking. Friendship between the Russian and Chinese people has been emphasised by every means and at every opportunity. More than one interpretation can be put on such manifestations. China is Russia's only ally of equal status. Poland is well enough, but with a Russian General in command of her armed forces she is undisguisedly subsidiary, The future of Czechoslovakia after the disappearance of Gottwald, Slansky and Clementis from different causes problematic. Politically and militarily Hungary and Rumani are no better than third-rate. But China, with her vast territoriest her vast population and the plain indication that her rulers have ideas of their own, is a very different proposition. There can be no question of exerting pressure on her. If she is to go Russia's way she must do it of her own volition. In regard to Korea in particular the two Powers must act together.
And to concert action must take time. If there is to be a move towards peace, that will represent a fundamental change of policy on the part of both Powers. Revolutionary though they may both be, they will need to confer fully before that step is taken. Other States might do something, but not much, to influence them. Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles have made it amply clear that if Moscow and Peking want peace it is to be had for the asking. But something more than that is needed, Mr. Eden was compelled to say in the House of Commons on Tuesday that he would not consider the claim of Communist China to a seat on the Security Council while she is attacking United Nations troops in Korea. That contention is unanswer. able; but there is a converse side to it. If China were to make peace in Korea her claim to the Security Council seat would be incontestable, and if that could be made dear to her the prospects of peace in Korea would be materially advanced, Here the obstacle is at Washington, and Mr. Eden should dO his utmost, as no doubt he has done, to remove it.
That much is clear, but the situation bristles with unknown factors. If developments in Asia are unpredictable what is to be said of Russia's strength in Europe ? Some answer to that may be found in the course events take in Czecho; Slovakia. In Mr. Gottwald the last competent leader has gone, unless some strong man as yet unsuspected emerges, and the Czech people, who have always entertained particularly friendly feelings for the Yugoslays, see President Tito steadily strengthening his position both internally and externally—in the former field by means of progressive social reforms, in the latter by his alliance with Greece and Turkey and the increas- ingly cordial relations established with Great Britain. Tito was in a stronger position than Czechoslovakia is today to emancipate his country from Russian hegemony. It would need a revolutionary rising to do that, and there would he little ground for welcoming such a move. Russia would be in a position to crush it in a week, and even so local a breach of the peace might have alarming repercussions. So far as can be seen, there is no short road to freedom for Russia's • European satellites. But that does not mean that their condition is fixed for-ever. It is possible to believe that there is some sincerity in the Soviet leaders' protestations of their desire for peace. With all the oppressive rigour of the Russian regime, the responsibility for plunging a population of nearly two hundred millions in war is so tremendous as to daunt even Malenkov and Bulganin and Molotov. The direct way to peace, if they do want it, is clear. Peace in Korea, if they could persuade their Chinese allies to that, would mean far more than the cessation of war in that vexed peninsula. It would mean, among other things, that the ban on the export of strategic materials—very widely interpreted—to Russia could be lifted, and the trade-relations on which recent Soviet speeches have laid such stress be made as normal as those between Britain and France—a quite considerable factor in the stabilisation of peace. It would not be true to say that Mr. Malenkov has opened any doors as yet. But he has not closed any. It is something that the way to peace has at any rate not been made harder. It may yet be made easier.
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