The Sudan and the Zone
The Sudan elections have been a signal for both the British and the Egyptians to air their neuroses about signing an agree- ment with each other on the Canal Zone. The Egyptians, in whom the closing stages of the negotiations have induced a rash of second thoughts, are clearly hoping to delay the final decision at least until they know how the Sudan has, voted. They have made some extraordinary accusations about " secret " British plans to interfere with the electors, the most pertinent of which appear to be based on an address by Sir James Robert- son to the Royal Empire Society in June. Mr. Eden retaliated with some impressive evidence of Egyptian activities in the Sudan, two days before General Neguib set off on a visit to the border province of Nubia. Simultaneously, a babble of distress about the Government's intentions in the Zohe broke out on its own back benches. Undoubtedly any agreement with Egypt to evacuate the Canal Zone necessarily involves' risk. But the risk is that we may not be able to return when we need the base. This is serious, and it can only be accepted because of the far more serious and certain risks involved in staying in the Zone against the wishes and declared intentions of the entire Arab world, on which we depend not only for our military bases in the area but for our oil. But the risk that Mr. Julian Amery envisages is something rather different; he fears that by removing her soldiers from the Canal, Britain will remove the last physical trace of her power and authority in the eastern parts of her Commonwealth. But not Major Salem, nor Mr. Amery, nor the results of the Sudan elections can influence Mr. Eden's attitude to an agreement with Egypt which is, and must be, determined by the need to have both peace with the Arabs and access to a Middle Eastern base.
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