THE ULTIMATUM
Sta.—Robert Henriques's dissenting article poses a serious problem for any student of Sinai and Suez. His 1957 book One Hundred Hours to Suez was dedicated `to the people and Army of Israel': it Was discussed with the Israeli Foreign Office, and based on official information given him after the event. It was also censored by the Israeli Army (p. 32). But it was published in London. And in it he made posi- tive assertions of his own which must be set beside those in his article. Thus (the page numbers are from his book):
1. Page 45. 'A few whispered words between three statesmen would, I suppose, have constituted collu- sion. Personally I am convinced that the whispering did not in fact take place.'
Mr. Henriques now asserts that in mid-September, 1956, six weeks before Sinai and at least two and a half months before he released his book to the printers, he personally was asked by 'a [British] Cabinet Minister' to tell Mr. Ben-Gurion that 'if, when Britain went into Suez, Israel were to attack simultaneously, it would be very convenient for all concerned.' Quite apart from the comparison with his book, this is the gravest charge I have yet seen made in print against the Eden Government : not merely learning of an intended Israeli attack against Egypt and deciding to capitalise on it, but informing Israel of British war intentions and inviting her 'to commit a simultaneous act of aggression, in mid- September.
The circumstances are so extraordinary that, with respect to Mr. Henriques, I cannot take the story seriously. Here is a message, allegedly from HM Government to the Premier of a foreign State. of so grave an import that it should only be sent by the highest diplomatic channels--yet a private citizen is chosen spontaneously, during an incidental luncheon, to deliver news to Ben-Gurion and suggest a course of action to him which would precipitate one of the gravest international crises since the Second World War.
Surely Mr. Henriques can see, that the story gives new ammunition to S:r Anthony Eden's committed enemies? The thought that HMG's diplomatic busi- ness blight still he conducted in this way is fantastic, if true---which it may be: but 1 should want to see corroboration.
2. Page 45. 'There is an enormous weight of evi- dence to suggest that, if Israel had any idea in advance of the action that Britain and France were to take, it was only in vague terms . . . not to be relied upon . , . and it did not in any way influence Israel's action.'
Yet in his article, Mr. Henriques cites, as a basic. reason for 'the haste . . . the timing of October 29.' that 'Israel's excellent Intelligence Service knew all about the Franco-British plans, and Ben-Gurion was determined to have his victory over Egypt without sharing the credit.'
3. Page 63. 'There was no co-operation whatsoever between the Navies, Armies and Air Forces of Israel on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other.'
But now, in 'scotching' the factor of French Air Force help to Israel, Mr. Henriques goeS so far as to say that French fighters were flown out for metro- politan air cover, but allegedly remained 'inactive.' (Guardian and Reuters correspondents, among others, reported personally hearing 'French pilots in Tel Aviv describe their sorties during the Sinai attack.) Mr. Henriques now admits that there was French naval bombardment of Rafah---but 'without autho- rity.' He reprimands me for suggesting that he can- not tell artillery positions when he sees them; but simply referred to his book, in which he devoted several pages to describing Israeli assaults on Rafah and did not mention the French cruiser's shelling with or without authority. Yet he apparently even estimated the relative number of shells fired.
As to the French supply-drops into Sinai, Mr. Henriques is in effect claiming that French journalists in many French papers (France-Observatem Le Monde, Paris-Presse, to name a few) all fabricated their reports of conversations with French officers on Cyprus who described the supply-drops . . .water containers, jeeps, etc., from October 29 forward. About France. too, he writes: 'Categorically I can say that the French did not know what Israel was going to do.' Here Mr. Henriques is not merely going against all the evidence but is contradicting Foreign Minister Pineau who, to the French Assembly itself, said, `Wc knew the intentions of Israel.'
Finally, there is the first Israeli war bulletin, about which I am 'ridiculous' because, Mr, Henriques writes, 'Mitla is only twenty miles from the Canal.' In his book, correctly and giving a very different military position, he himself described Mitla as 'forty miles east of Suez' (p. 85).
But even this is not the point. That first bulletin did not even mention Mitla. It was significant because, at 2100 hrs. on October 29, it stated that Israel units `have taken up positions to the west of the Nakhl road junction on the approaches to the Suez Canal.' Yet at that time, Israel had precisely one paratroop battalion dug in at Mitla, forty Egyptian-held miles from the Canal : the main ground force being fully sixty miles east of Nakhl, a hundred miles from the Canal. As the Ultimatum was issued the next after- noon, demanding that Israeli troops 'withdrew' ten miles 'from the Canal' so that the combatants might be 'separated,' the main ground force had only just taken Nakhl. It was not until the early afternoon of October 31 that Israeli forces even began advancing westward from the Mitla position to the Canal forty miles away. By then, the RAF was bombing Egypt. Robert Henriques's own book title tells the whole story.
As to the relative sequence of Egyptian and Israeli arms purchases, Robert Henriques. in naming December, 1955, for the first Israeli Mystere orders, contradicts reports on both sides of the Atlantic (Hanson Baldwin. New York Times, and the Military Correspondent of The Times) in early October, 1955. Even these were late. If and when the relevant archives are released, Mr. Henriques will find that the first Mystere II orders were placed in November, 1954--even before the Gaza Raid. It was this raid, which took place precisely eleven days 'after the activist Mr. Ben-Gurion came out of thirteen months' retirement and took over the Defence Ministry—plus mounting knowledge of Israeli rearmament; plus intercepted British intelligence reports that Israel's mid-I955 intentions were for war; plus Western de- lays, refusals, and conditions on arms supplies- which impelled Egypt to take up a Soviet-bloc arms offer originally made but not then accepted in April. (In June Nasser warned US and British envoys that if Egypt could not get Western arms she would have to turn to the East.) As for John Connell's letter, I admire his exuber- ant polemical gifts, but feel exhaustion at the thought of trying seriously to argue on such splendidly splen- etic terms, I do of course share his hope that Sir Anthony • Eden's memoirs will tell all. But I very much doubt if this is legally, diplomatically, or politi- cally possible: not if the sort of information required is to explain away what we do know—let alone cor- roborate Robert Henriques's mid-September lun- cheon.---Yours faithfully, ERSKINE B. CHILDERS
Previous page
