TOPICS OF THE DAY.
VICTOR EMMANUEL AND COUNT CAVOUR.
TEE new position of the Italian question has been signalized by two notable events—the vote of the Turin Parliament, and the march of Victor Emmanuel into Naples as the leader of the Italian army of liberation. These two events, and their vast scope will be better appreciated six months hence than it is now, have been illustrated, most appropriately, Victor Emmanuel's march by a noble proclamation, and the vote at Turin, by Count Cavour's solid, comprehensive, and eloquent speech. Practically, Italy has taken a totally novel step—she is acting for herself. An Italian army is in motion, not for dynastic, but for national interests. Up to 1859, Austria was the Power which set forces in motion in Italy, and crushed a noble people under an alien rule. She crossed the Po, she threatened on the Ticino, she brought a pres- sure to bear upon Naples, she occupied the States of the Church. France also strove with her in ancient rivalry ; the German and the Gaul moulding Italy after their brute fashion. But Italy made progress, notwithstanding, towards a separate, independent, and united existence as a state. King Victor Emmanuel, BlIC- ceedina° a noble sire, defeated but not disgraced, did, as he boasts and as he has a right to boast, " strengthen freedom in an epoch not very favourable to freedom," at an epoch when despotic Aus- tria was triumphant in Hungary as well as Italy, and despotic France triumphant at Rome. He gave freedom to the press, to trade, to conscience, to education, when the press, when trade, when conscience, when education lay, as they now lie, fettered among surrounding nations. Guided by his father's example, advised by sage and patriotic :counsellors, he followed that course, through dark days and bright days, which " raised Piedmont to the rank of Standard- bearer and arm of Italy," and himself to that post of National Leader which he has so nobly won, and so well sustained. When War broke out in the East, firm to his purpose, he sent his troops to the Crimea, with the hearty consent of his people, that he might ".thereby acquire for Italy the right of participating in all acts :concerning the interests of Europe." Then came 1859. Happily for Italy it suited the policy of the French Emperor to help Pied- mont in striking a blow which should lessen the weight of Aus- :fiian power in the Peninsula, and curtail that monarchy of ter- ritory and of influence it had usurped. Side by side with French, Italian regiments vindicated their ancient renown, the "stan- dard " was firmly borne into the throng and tumult of battle, and the " arm" struck heavily upon the ranks of ancient foes. But Italy, as Italy, had not acted alone, hardly by or for herself. " Policy," as Victor Emmanuel truthfully records, " put an end to the war," just as policy had caused it to break out. Then it was that the people of Italy showed some consciousness of their real strength. Policy would have parcelled Italy out into a Con- federation. But the national spirit was too strong for policy. Nevertheless, to secure the union of provinces whose rulers had fled, rulers who could not return, Victor Emmanuel was obliged to pay for the aid he had received. It was a dark hour when the price was exacted. To support the principle of " national recon- struction," says the King, " I, for the good of Italy, made the sacrifice which cost my heart the dearest; I renounced two most noble provinces of the kingdom of my ancestors." May the gift not be more fatal to the giver, than it has proved to the receiver ! So far Italy and her aspiring champion had acted in conjunction with alien arms. She had gained much ; she had shown how fully prepared she was for freedom ; how orderly she could be under native rule ; and thereby she won unity, so far, and the respect of free Europe in its entirety. She showed her civil as well as her military virtues; she tested her strength in both ca- pacities, in government as well as in war ; and though the King lost provinces he was forced to surrender—there was a French army in Lombardy, as well as in Rome—two most noble provinces, Italy had won and deserved—her freedom. Victor Emmanuel had acted loyally towards those Italian princes, who were the slaves of foreign Powers—to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to the Tope, to Ferdinand of Naples and his son. But they chose the cause of the stranger from whom they had sprung, by whom their tottering thrones had been supported for half a century, and with the stranger they fell. . But something more than a great advance towards unity was included in the gain of 1859. The war ended with the declara- tion of the principle of non-intervention. Thenceforth, if there were Italian quarrels, Italians must restore order. Thenceforth, if that principle so solemnly proclaimed be observed, Italy was to act for herself. Following up this gain, the Turin Government has taken that new step in the history of the Italian movement which we have described. Speaking and fighting in the name of Victor Emmanuel, Garibaldi overran Sicily and Naples. A new danger arose—that fanatical politicians should. impel Garibaldi into headstrong courses, and divide Italy into sects, her curse from of old. " All Italians," says the King, !'turned to me that I might avert the danger. It was my duty to do it," he exclaims. With unfaltering energy, " because in the present emergency it would, be no moderation, no wisdom, but weakness and impru- dence' not to take with a strong hand, the direction of the na- tional movement for which I am responsible before Europe."- Vence this great fact in modern, Italian history—an Italian King with Italian troops alone, without the aid of the stranger, nay, as it would appear from the solemn lectures of the instructed jour-
nalists of France, in • despite of the stranger, has raised his standard and his arm, not, as he proudly boasts to impose his will on the people, but to see that they freely manifest that will, and to make it respected. This is the policy which is now in course of execution. But here we encounter a curious fact. If we were to judge by the language
of the semi-official press in Paris, and by the accumulation of French troops in Rome, we should believe that the French Em- peror became hostile to Italy, from the moment that she snapped,_ her leading strings and began to run alone. The Constitutionnel harps upon the " audacity," the "inconsistency,," of Piedmont, her violation of international law, her disregard of law, and so on,
just as if Piedmont were not an Italian but a German power, and we were in 1859. It has been well said that if France really went to war for an " idea," that idea must have been the right of Italy to choose her own institutions, and that it scarcely becomes a French journalist, inspired or uninspired, to lecture Piedmont for doing
her uttermost that Italy may realize the ideal of France. It is nonsense to talk of international law in the ease a outlawed Naples. But it so happens that international law has not been violated. Civil war arose in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the monarch was driven up into a corner, not by force, but by the defection of a-whole country, and two-thirds of a large army, and either party had a right to call in aid. King Francis called upon Europe, but Europe did not come ; the Neapolitans and Sicilians called upon the recognized sovereign of Italy to settle an Italian dispute, and lie has gone to fulfil his duties "as a King and as an Italian," and not, as the Constitutionnel asserts, " to impose any conditions whatever of a political character by an armed intervention." There is a broad distinction between the occupation of Rome by the French in 1849, and the progress of Victor Emmanuel into Naples in 1860. The, French did go to Rome to impose political conditions by an armed intervention, and they have remained there ever since for that purpose.
The speech of Count Cavour in the free Parliament of Turin is a worthy complement to the noble proclamation of Victor Em- manuel. Both prove that the head and arm of Italy are sound.
Accused of diplomatic trifling with truth, Count Cavour declares he thinks it best that Governments and Parliaments should speak out, for this is the age of publicity, and publicity creating opinion overthrows or consolidates nations as much as arms. Count Ca- your is of M. de Persigny's opinion—that it is best to be frank and candid, an opinion he could not prevail upon his friend and
Emperor to adopt in 1859. The Piedmontese statesman does speak out, and in spite of some passages in his career that we
would had never been, we are anxious to put faith in all he now says, the more especially as his words are accordant with facts. First, he repudiates the rumour that fresh cessions are to be made to France, and he repudiates it absolutely so far as relates to the past and the present. Then he turns to a noble use the suspicion that some such demand may be made, and. advances one daring argument to confront it.
Gentlemen," he said, " let us make the annealition, and the cession of any part of Italy will become impossible ; let us make the annexation, and
the precedent of the treaty of the 24th of March will never be quoted against
us ; for, gentlemen, the great principle of nationality, the corner-stone of our political edifice, can never be invoked for the cession of a portion of our territory ; it could not be invoked in consideration of immense sacrifices in men and money. Let the annexation be made, and this demand would no longer be made to a people of 5,000,000 ; but it would be made to the great Italian nation, a compact and strong mass of 22,000,000 free men."
We may place this spirited statement on record, and leave the question it touches to the future. In that future there are diffi- culties enough to try the strongest heads. Count Cavour did not pause in his out-speaking at this point. He was equally ex- plicit on the subject of Rome and Venetia. He broadly stated that the Italian Government would steadily " look upon the Eter- nal City, on which five-and-twenty centuries have accumulated all glorious memories, as destined to become the splendid capital of our Italian kingdom." He as broadly stated. that Venetia must follow the fate of Naples, and Sicily, and Rome, must cease to be German and become Italian. But how F It would be wrong he admits, to go to Rome while French troops are there. It would be impossible at present" to declare war against Austria ; " im- possible, because we are not yet organized ; impossible, because Europe is against it." Yet there is hope, nay certainty. Italy has been brought to her present advanced stage of unity by moral as much as by physical means ; and Count Cavour justly relies upon the future as he so thoroughly relied upon the past influ- ence of moral power. Convince Europe that Italy is strong and orderly, and Europe will aequiesci in the policy' which may re- lease Rome and Venice from a detestable yoke, whether that policy be enforced by arms or tritfroPh by diplomatic agencies. It is a profound truth that the miserable .condition of imprisoned Venetia will smite the consciences of men in "generous France righteous England, and noble Germany," and public opinion will array its forces in aid of the Italians, if the Italians proceed to release Venetia from bonds by wise measures and at the right moment. - The duty of Liberal Europe in regard to Italy is to prevent foreign intervention of any kind. Give the Italians time to de- velop and organize their strength ; time to continue the noble work they have taken in hand, and resolutely and dutifully ac- complished thus far. The Roman and Venstian questions will then solve themselves ; and woe unto any Power which shall talk of compensations then or sooner. Italy may, perhaps, be obliged to give an affirmative answer, but Europe will register the fact, and some day exact the penalty.
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