THE WELLINGTON PAPERS. * TILE supplementary papers contained in this, the

sixth volume of a very valuable series, relate to four distinct subjects ; and extend from 1806 to 1810. The first subject is the expedition to Den- mark in 1807, when Sir Arthur Wellesley commanded the reserve of the army, and, as these despatches show, did good service in the field. The despatches and memoranda in this section of the volume are nearly all now for the first time published. The minute student of the Life of Wellington will welcome the details 'which Show how their favourite bore himself on this the second field of continental warfare, but he will only find confirmation of 'old impressions, now deeply cut into the mind of this generation, at least of such part of it as is capable of having any opinion de- serving attention. We find him prompt, and business-like, -hos- tile to warlike operations for mere purposes of destruction, and uniformly considerate towards those who fell into his hands. He decidedly opposed to any scheme for disgracing or humiliating the Danes and his good sense saw the folly of Lord Castlereagh's hint that the British should obtain the cession of the whole of Zealand. In writing to Lord Cathcart, after returning home, Sir Arthur says that " Government feel very little anxiety to con- tinue in the occupation of Zealand, except to keep the French out; and if they thought they were secure of that, I believe they would prefer to see Zealand again in the hands of the Dame.' -Yet, as a servant of, the Crown, he was willing to discuss the best means of keeping possession, supposing that high-handed and objectionable step had been resolved upon. These little facts, il- lustrating the good sense of Wellington, abound in these volumes. Writing to Lord Cathcart during the siege of Copenhagen, he says, with characteristic bluntness, " I don't doubt their im- patience in England ; but I don't think they ever form in Eng- land an accurate estimate of the difficulties attending any.mili- tarp enterprise which they undertake "—a remark quite as applicable to the England of 1854 or 1860, as to the England of 1807.

The last paper in the first section is an interesting memoir on the Copenhagen campaign. One passage in it may be usefully extracted. In some of the projected plans for the defence of Lon- don; by works round the place, the lines are drawn through the immediate suburbs. We are not aware that the destruction of everything without the lines as soon as they are constructed, is contemplated by the projectors. If not, see what might happen, by;the light of what did happen at Copenhagen in 1807-

" The enemy having neglected to burn the suburbs, level the fences, and cut down the trees during the first days, he was prevented from doing it afterwards, by which means our troops were protected from the loss they would otherwise have sustained, for the enemy did not fail to throw shells and fire shot in every direction from every part of their line ; but excepting in.afew instances, they could not see the effect of their fire."

Every fortified place which allows suburbs to grow up around it runs this risk. And if it proved so fatal at Copenhagen, where there was only a front of three miles, what would it prove in Lon- don where there is a circumference of thirty or sixty ; the thirty- mile line being embedded in villas and villages, and the sixty-mile line being only less entangled in suburban property, but not free from it ? The destruction of that property would be left to the last moment, and then very probably it would not be destroyed.

The second part of these papers relates to projects for, the con- quest of New Spain and Manilla by Sepoya and Europeans ! Up- wards of twenty memoranda on this head, the first written in 1806, and the last in 1808, constituting a good thick pamphlet, are to be found in this volume. The whole are new, but their interest • Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field-Mar- shal•Arthur Duke of Wellington, IC.0. Edited, by his -Son, the Duke of Welling- ton, X.G. Volume VI. Published by Murray. is diminished by the fact that the expeditious they relate to were mere projects that came to. nothing, but projects which were, nevertheless, entertained seriously by the Governments of the day, and which might have been put in execution had not Na- poleon suddenly determined to annex the dominions of his ally, the King of Spain. Instead of operating in the Carracas or Mexico, or wasting.our resources in La Plata, we began that series of operations in the Peninsula which eventually expelled the French

from Spain and which made Arthur Wellesley—Duke of Welling- ton.

The two sections or chapters, however, which we have de- scribed, only cover some eighty pages, and this huge volume contains besides no fewer than 565' pages, 340 despatches and memoranda of Wellington's, and an unnumbered array of letters now published for the first time from various persons—among them the Marquis Wellesley, Mr. Henry Wellesley, Lord Liver- pool, • Mr. Villiers, and Marshal Beresford. This vast mass of documents is divided by the editor into tiro-parts. One relates to the campaign in Portugal, the other to the operations in the Pe- ninsula in 1809 and 1810. In the former, we have several new papers touching Wellesley's share in the Convention of Cintra ; papers that amply confirm the conviction long since arrived at, that he was not in any way responsible for the easy terms granted to the French. His honourable conduct in the whole affair comes out more brilliantly than ever. In the second section much light is thrown- upon the conlition of Spain by the publication of the letters of Henry Wellesley and the Marquis. By far the most valuable letters, however, are those of Lord Liverpool, since they show that he, at all events, gave the most ample support in his power to Lord Wellington. The obstructions came from' other quarters—from Perceval and from the Horse Guards. Hire is a private letter, written by Wellington to Colonel Torrens, which shows the kind of support he got from the Horse Guards- " My dear Torrens-1 have received your letter announcing the• appoint- .ment of —, —, and to this army. The first I have generally understood to be a madman; I believe it is your own opinion that the second is not very wise ; the third will, I believe, be an useful man. But-I should be glad to get rid of a few of the same description, with — and ---; and there are some in this army whom it is disreputable and quite unsafe to keep. Colonel —, whose memorial I enclose, who was sent away from for incapacity, and whom I was very glad to get rid of from hence last year, has lately come out again. I have been obliged to appoint him on the Staff because he is senior to others ; and I wished to keep him away, and prevent him from destroying a good regiment, by joining it ; and he re- mains at a distance till further orders, as perpetual President of General Courts-Martial.

" Then there is —, whose conduct is really scandalous. I am not able to bring him before a court-martial, as I should wish, but he is a disgrace to the army which can have such a Man as a Major-General.

" Really, When. I reflect upon the characters and attainments of some of the general officers of this army, and consider that these are the persons on whom I am to rely to lead columns against the French generals, and who are to carry my instructions into execution, I tremble; and, as Lord Ches- terfield said of the generals of his day, I only hope that when the enemy reads the list of their names, be trembles as I do.' — and will be a very nice-addition to this list --- ! However, I pray God and the Horse Guards to deliver me from 'General — and Colonel —.

" Believe me, WELLINGTON."

Butthat Wellington could be just as well as severe is shown by the following passage taken from a letter addressed to Mr. Wil- liam W. Pole, on the 31st, of July, 1810. After vindicating him- self from the charge of net attemptiug the relief of Ciudad Rod- rigo, Wellington refers to the action on the Con, fought by Robert Craufurd in spite of his General's desire and positive orders- " You will say," writes Wellington, "if this be the case why not accuse Craufurd ? I answer, because if I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man' who I believe has meant well, and whose error is one of judgment;and not of intention ' - and, indeed, I 'must add that although My errors, end those of others also, are visited heavily upon me, that is not the way in

which any, much less a British army, can he commanded." .

This is just and noble. Wellington- knew.- Craufurd to be a good officer, and he knew that his disobedience was constitutional and not intentional, and naturallyherwould: be hanged rather than accuse Craufurd.

Wellington's firmness, his tenacity in holding on to Portugal, is an old story ; but it is so admirable, and exhibits his judgment and moral courage in such a splendid light, that another glimpse of him in this attitude will be welcome. -In the autumn of 1809, he correctly. judged that the French could not for two or three months, at least, again invade Portugal. He judged that they ought to make the possession of-that country their first object,,when they got reinforcements, but he wrote to !Lord Liverpool, in No- vember, "I do not -think they will succeed` with :an army of seventy or even of eighty thousand men," if they did not make the attack within three months. That, proved to be true. The interval was employed in erecting the famous lines of Torres Vedras ; and the correspondence between Colonel Fletcher and Wellington' respecting those lines is among the most valuable of the contents of this volume.. Writing to Mr. Pole in September, after the fall of Almeida, he nye- " The enemy are exceedingly cautious; - they risk nothing ; and I think they are scarcely strong enough, even in their, own opinion, for the attain- ment of their object. We haye been now nearly in the same position since last January ; and, considering that, alnuist with a touch they have over- turned other, yowerful empires, our maintenance of this weakest country in

Etrioiticee so lobg is not discreditable, and'I hope yet to save it. •

" I have, however, terrible disadvantages to contend with. The army was' and indeed is still, the worst British army that was ever sent from England. Then, between -ourselves, the spirit of party and of the times prevails in some degree here as well as elsewhere. There is a despondency among some ; a want of confidence in their on exertions; ad extravagant notion of the power and resources of, the. French, and a distaste for the war in the Peninsula, which sentiments have been created and are kept up by

correspondence with England, even with Ministers and those connected with them.

" All this is uncomfortable. With the exception of Beresford, I have really no assistance ; I am left to myself, to my own exertions, to my own execution, the mode of execution, and even the superintendence of that mode • but still I don't despair. fam positively in no scrape; and if the country can be saved, we shall save it. Government have behaved with their usual weakness and folly about reinforcements, and I shall get none of those which have been promised me, but the Duke of Brunswick's infantry instead."

This does not appear to have been the fault of Lord Liverpool, who anxiously consulted Wellington in everything, reposed in him the fullest confidence, and gave him the amplest discretion—even to the detaining with the army of military Members of Parliament, if he wanted them. The whole correspondence is very honourable to Lord Liverpool.

We cannot shut this volume without extracting one passage which has a bearing upon our own military position, and that of another nation, and which expresses a truth all nations ought to take to heart. He is speaking of the Spaniards and Spanish Go- vernment in 1809— "There is no plan of a campaign, either for carrying on the war, or for continuing the contest ; and the efforts of the rulers appear to be directed, in the first instance, to keeping their own situations and, in the second, to exciting and keeping up in the country a kind of false enthusiasm, by which it is supposed that everything can be effected ; and they endeavour to effect both these objects by the undertaking of little operations with little means, by the circulation of false intelligence, by the exaggeration of little suc- cesses and the concealment of great disasters. In this consists the secret of the Government.

" As to the enthusiasm, about which so much noise has been made even in our own country, I am convinced the world has entirely mistaken its effects. I believe that it only creates confusion where order ought to pre- vail, and disobedience of orders and indiscipline among the troops upon sys- tem, instead of obedience and discipline ; and I fancy that, upon reflection, it will be discovered that what was deemed enthusiasm among the French, which enabled them successfully to resist all Europe at the commencement of the Revolution, was force acting through the medium of popular societies and assuming the name of enthusiasm, and that force, in a different shape, has completed the conquest of Europe and keeps the Continent in subjec- tion. Really, when is Spaniard has cried out vivat,' and has put every- thing in confusion in his district or village, he sits down quietly and thinks he has done his duty till the first French patrol arrives, when he shows his activity in packing up his goods and running away, and there is no autho- rity either to set them or keep them right. At the same time, they are cor- dial haters of the French ; and I thick that, whatever may be the result of the military contest in the Peninsula, much time will elapse before the French can establish a government in Spain, and still more time before they will derive such advantage from their influence in that country as they did before they invaded it."

With this extract so full of practical wisdom, and so applicable to our own time, we close our notice of a very instructive and valuable contribution to history, and the history of Wellington.