A GERMAN ACCOUNT OF THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN.*
COLONEL VOGT has attempted a somewhat difficult task, and one certainly beyond the limits of his information. Much of his book is built up on the war correspondence of English and Continental newspapers, and it consequently reproduces only too faithfully the mistakes which easily obtain circulation during the course of a war, and are so rarely corrected with sufficient emphasis afterwards. The war correspondent is a valuable institution, but the military historian should use him with caution. Colonel Vogt's account of the action at Alexandria bristles with inaccuracies. Fort Mersa el Kanat, " blown up by shells from the Invincible,' " was never once hit; no party landed at Marabout or Adjemi, and the latter work—not half finished—never fired a shot; while the guns of Fort Meks, stated to be disabled at 4.30 p.m., had all been spiked or disabled by gun-cotton by about 1.30 p.m. Colonel Vogt characterises the bombardment as premature, and in a sense this may be true ; but the subsequent course of events could hardly have been foreseen, while there were obvious political reasons for not waiting till a fleet 'of transports filled with British regiments lay behind the ironclads. It is, more- over, very doubtful if the landing of " a small force" im- mediately after the action would have sufficed to save the town and win a " military success." In any case, it is almost childish to state "it seems obvious that time was purposely afforded to the national party to organise a re- * The Egyptian War of 1832. By Lientenant-Colonel Hermann Vogt, of the German Army. A Translation. London: Regan Paul, Trench, and Co. sistaime, which it would afterwards be necessary to crush." Cr, has the translator got into a muddle over the word "purposely "? Colonel Vogt may very fairly criticise our insane partiality for muzzle-loaders, but no guns "again burst on board the ` Alexandra.' " A crack in the inner tube does not necessarily render a gun ubserviceable, and it is not necessary to take au serieux all the criticisms of " English Service papers."
Summing-up the forces arrayed against us, Colonel Vogt .states, " We are not alone in the professional world in thinking" that the expedition "should have mustered at least thirty thousand men." But our force did actually number thirty-two thousand, and in spite of the opinion of the • " retired officer staying in Cairo," we are now holding Egypt with less than a fifth of the force he considers necessary for the purpose.
After a slight sketch of Egypt and the Egyptians, Colonel Vogt devotes a chapter to the British Army, to which we turn with some expectancy. He is severe on the cost of our small Army, which he compares with that of Germany. But, even setting aside the great difference of conditions, the cost of a voluntarily enlisted force must be greater than that of a con- script army ; while, in these comparisons, the loss of producing power to the country which resorts to conscription is never set 'to the other side of the account. The training of our In- fantry is unquestionably indifferent, but that our Cavalry and Artillery are " slow " cannot be so easily admitted. Lord Wolseley will probably be amused to learn that his " envious
opponents wish to refer to his Irish descent, rather 'than to moral causes, the daring assurance of his character." Colonel Vogt condemns the conduct of affairs at Alexandria -prior to the descent on the Suez Canal, and the reconnaissances towards Kafr Dowar furnish him with a text for something like a sneer. It should be remembered, however, that the numerous correspondents had not much to write about, and that though they naturally magnified operations " which by 'Germans would be called a slight engagement of outposts," English officers were perfectly well aware of the relative import- ance of these little affairs. There is, moreover, some confusion as to Sir A. Alison's reconnaissance of August 5th, the only really serious attempt to approach the Egyptian position. The tele- gram quoted from the Temps, stating, " To-day the Egyptians did not answer the fire of the English," clearly refers to the day on which Colonel Vogt says it was sent—the 8th—and it is con- sequently absurd to say " this does not bear out the account of which the English papers made so much." Nor does it seem quite fair to describe our proceedings at this period as " aimless and halting," since, it having been most wisely decided to operate on the Ismailia-Cairo line, there was really nothing to be done but to hold on and wait for the trans- ports. Again, it is hardlyecorrect to say that "a consider- able amount of initiative was shown by the Egyptians." The latter might have harassed our outposts to death, but con- siderately forebore to do so, and their " initiative " was practic- ally limited to spade work, mostly by the forced labour of civilians. The correspondent of the Daily Telegraph must have peculiar views of coast defences, to have stated that "some of the works," at Aboukir, "are certainly as strong as the forts of Portsmouth." We wonder if the Germans will really believe this. The correspondent may be excused, as he had only seen the works from the deck of the Decoy,' but now that we know all about these works—it was possible for any one to ride over them during the latter half of September— it seems useless to quote conjectures formed at the time. Characterising the seizure of the Canal on August 20th as " a happy combination," Colonel Vogt quickly disposes of M. de Lesseps. "No General could or would allow himself to be deterred from his appointed task by any protests from private individuals." But will Germane generally endorse the view, " England can come to no other conclusion than that she ought to keep possession of this important maritime passage ; im- portant not only for herself, but for the whole world, as well for commercial as for military purposes "? The events on the Ismailia- Tel-el-Kebir line are briefly and not very carefully sketched. Thus, with regard to Salihyeh communicating with Kassassin by a"straight road "—perfectly straight, since, having got the right line, there was nothing to do but to keep straight on in order to get there—we are first told that " to garrison it would have weakened more important positions," but a little later on,
• ' in the double position of the Egyptians at Tel-el-Kebir and Salihyeli lay an immense tactical strength." Of course, we have the old story that the infantry were saved from destruction at Kassassin by Colonel Drury-Lnwe's cavalry ; this was to be expected. In blaming Lord Wolseley for losing time—" full four days "—after his landing, we think that Colonel Vogt does not fully realise the condition of things. To suppose, as he seems to do, that it would have been possible to land and rush straight at Tel-el-Kebir argues a want of appreciation of the difficulties of the country. Lord. Wolseley had not only to put an Army Corps on shore, but to use a little wharf, inferior to the pier of a Thames penny steamboat, as the base from which military stores of all kinds and every requisite of life, except water, had to be sent to the front. Moreover, the distance was full thirty miles of bare desert, some of it terribly bad marching-ground, while the heat was extreme. There were, in fact, conditions which no German army has yet been called upon to face, and short though the distance and small the numbers, measured by European standards, it is hardly correct to say "the pro- visioning of so small a force could have been easily managed." Later, however, Colonel Vogt seems to realise the difficulties more fully, but it is impossible to accept his estimate that three pack mules in a desert can carry as much as a cart on a European chaussee.
The battle of Tel-el-Kebir is described in the words of the correspondent of the Standard, who manages to get the High- land Brigade on the wrong side of the Sweet-water Canal- Colonel Vogt seems to think the attack something of a risk, but hints that Lord Wolseley may have wished to "silence all such voices" as that of the wise "officer of high rank at Alexandria," who, according to the Times, disapproved of the transfer of base to Ismailia, apparently preferring to place the flooded Nile, spanned only by bridges, which Arabi could have destroyed in a few hours, between the English forces and their objective, Cairo. Or perhaps " English gold" had " smoothed the way to success." Lord Wolseley's success is, however, admitted to be the " justification of his means," while the energy shown in following up the victory—to our mind, the greatest proof of military genius be has ever shown—is allowed to deserve " unmeasured praise." The narrative is now rapidly wound up, not without numerous errors, more or less im- portant. It is sufficient to notice one, probably derived from a study of the " Service papers " :—" All the machinery of the War Office has again proved unwieldy and unpracti- cal. Its influence, which obstructed and narrowed the free action of the Army, was scarcely counterbalanced by the inferiority of the enemy and the bravery of the British troops." Granted that the machinery of the War Office is so unwieldy as to render real Army reform almost hopeless, none the less is it true that in no war in which we have been engaged for many years has that unwieldiness been less felt, the free action of the Army less hampered, or the General more trusted and independent.
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