THE EVACUATION OF EGYPT.
IT is known that the Government intend to reduce the British garrison in Egypt to 3,000 men, and suspected that even this remainder will in January or February be with- drawn. There is consequently an outburst of writing on the subject, much of it so vague and some of it so absurd that it may be well to state concisely the arguments for and against evacuation. As our readers know, we are earnestly opposed to that grave step ; but nothing is ever gained by unjust denunciation.
In the first place, then, the Government are right in reducing the garrison. It is not right to burden the Egyptian Treasury more than can be helped, and the 3,000 men withdrawn will be just as available—so long as we hold Alexandria—at Malta or Gibraltar, as in Egypt itself. The Egyptians, moreover, whether friendly or hostile, are not political idiots, and will no more fire upon the remaining three thousand British soldiers than upon thirty thousand. They know quite enough of Euro- pean politics to be aware that if they do fire, England must conquer them, or cease to be a Power, and they will run no risk of the kind. Moreover, they would not have any certainty of even momentary success, for the three thou- sand Englishmen, holding the fortresses as they do, could beat the six thousand newly-disciplined Egyptians, and lay Cairo and Alexandria in ashes besides, without any extra- ordinary effort. No such risk will be run, and it is, therefore, only the expediency of total evacuation, and not of any reasonable reduction in the garrison, which has to be con- sidered. The Government, it is known, wishes for total evacuation, even if it has not decided upon it ; and its argu- ments run, we apprehend, very much in this way :' As we do not intend to annex, and indeed stand pledged that this de- scent shall not involve annexation, evacuation is only a question of time, and the argument for shortening the time is very strong. So long as we stay, the diplomatists of the Continent, who are accustomed to see occupation changed into acquisition —as in Bosnia—will not believe that the British Govern- ment is sincere, and will act in all questions in which that Government is concerned upon a misleading fallacy. The French do this already, and it is by no means certain that the Russians do not agree with the French ; while all Powers consider England as, to a certain extent, locked up in Egypt. By staying, therefore, we risk complications with these Powers and with the Sultan, which may become serious, and which, as we do not intend to annex, are needless additions to existing difficulties.' Precisely the same argu- ment affects the home position of the Government. The Ministry feels itself suspected by a body of supporters while it stays in Egypt, and as it does not intend to annex, regards this suspicion as a needless source of Parlia- mentary weakness. Speedy departure is, therefore, expedient ; and it is considered safe, for these reasons. The Khedives have always been able to govern Egypt without Europeans, and when we go, Tewfik Khedive will be in a position better, on the whole, than that of any predecessor. Instead of a dangerous army, purely native, and liable to be directed against him by its officers, he will have a Sepoy Army, controlled by officers who cannot mutiny, regularly paid, excellently disciplined, and quite sufficient to deal with local emeutes, either in Cairo or Alexandria. He has excellent English advisers, and every reason to attend to their advice. He can, therefore, go on governing as before the outbreak ; and it is better he should, so that he may feel his full responsibilities, and that his sub- jects may not suspect all future reforms to be the result of foreign pressure. Cceteris paribus, independence is always best, and if the Khedive can walk alone, he should do it ; while his capacity to do it can only be tested by experiment, and is likely to be greater now, while the recollection of the British descent is fresh, than later, when it has partially died away.
That is, we conceive, a fair statement of the argument, and it is undeniably strong, though on two points—essential points—it fails-to convince ourselves. We admit that annex- ation, as a consequence of this descent, is out of the question. We might not forfeit our honour, for Europe might give us a new commission ; but we should seem to do so, we should be held by every Frenchman and Italian to have done so, and we should set a very dangerous precedent. We also admit that if the Khedive can govern by himself, it is best that he should do so, and that he will never be fairly tested till the Redcoats have disappeared. But we do not believe either that he will govern in such a way as to redeem our pledges to the people, or that he can govern so as to maintain endurable order. The difference between total evacuation and a reduced garrison makes, to Egyptian imagi- nations, the whole difference in the position. While the British Flag flies over the Citadel of Cairo, even though guarded only by a regiment, the Egyptians consider England, to them the mightiest Power in the world, in possession of Egypt ; but the moment that flag is hauled down, tliey will think she has departed. As they cannot conceive that any Power, once in possession of their grand Valley, would retire voluntarily, they will believe that European complications have produced the withdrawal, and that they are again distant subjects of the Sultan only. The upper classes will recommence the old misgovernment, the villagers will look round for a deliverer from their usurers, the mobs of the cities will prepare to glut their hatred of the European adventurers—greatly intensified of late by blood-feuds—and the Army will expel its European officers. In other words, there will be an attempt at massacre, which the new Army will be either unable or unwilling to put down. Sir Evelyn Wood doubts this, evidently believing that the gentle justice of the European officer has won over the conscripts ; and if he is right, the Government may be right so far as the appre- hension of massacre is concerned, though they cannot be right in disregarding their own pledges to the people. But we fear he is wrong. No European resident in Cairo or Alexandria doubts that the mobs will attack the European adventurers, if they dare, and to restrain them the only bond will be the regard of the new soldiery for their European leaders. Can we trust that regard ? Sir Evelyn Wood says "Yes," for since the occupation no corporal punishment has been administered in the Egyptian Army ; but corporal punishment had been abolished in the Sepoy Army of India before the Mutiny, the Sepoy officers in some of the worst regiments loved and petted the men who murdered them ; and they had, moreover, led them for a century to victory, which the Anglo-Egyptian officers have not yet done. The dislike of the Asiatic for the European, which is almost instinctive and has a thousand justifications in his own eyes, is not extinguish- able by mere lenity, and the Egyptian Sepoy Army will be no more trustworthy without the visible presence of white soldiers than the equally well-treated Sepoy Army of India would be. The Egyptians, indeed, will be less trustworthy, for the Indian Sepoys are volunteers to a man, free to depart at a month's notice; while the Egyptian Sepoys are conscripts, often brought to Cairo in chains—they were so brought within the month—and not free to depart till years of service have been fulfilled. We expect, therefore, as the result of evacuation, sanguinary anarchy in Egypt, with all its results, of which one at least is absolutely inevitable. If we do not restore order instantly, finally, and with the strong hand, France or Italy will ; and neither Power is, like us, self-denying. We hold evacuation, therefore, under existing circumstances, to be an error of which we shall bitterly repent.
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