THE "TIMES" POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN. T HE Times reiterates its notion
of the trae policy to be followed in Afghanistan, day after day, with a wearying persistency, which suggests either a fixed idea in the minds of its conductors, or a knowledge of the determination at which the Government have arrived. In either case, it is necessary to examine the plan of action which is thus being pressed, and indeed forced, on the attention of the country. The idea of the Times is that, in spite of all that has occurred, and all that may occur, we should adhere to the Treaty of Gunda- muck. That Treaty, it contends, was an admirable achieve- ment of diplomacy. It gave us all we wanted, and no more. Under its provisions we secured the "scientific frontier" and the control of Afghan policy, without the burden of governing poverty-stricken countries. It was accepted by the British people as a final settlement of questions which had been dangerous for years ; and in spite of the temper of the Cabulees, its stipulations ought to be thoroughly carried out. We do not, it is said, withdraw our Agents from Damascus, or Beyrout, or Salonien, because their lives are occasionally threatened, or even taken, but insist on order being main- tained; and we ought to be just as pereistent and immovable in Afghanistan. We should, in fact, compel the Government of the country, and the citizens of the capital, to tolerate the presence of a resident Plenipotentiary, and go on with our settled policy, without considering their annoyance, or even their resistance. It is even suggested that when Cabal has been chastised, we should at once appoint another Envoy, as the Russians did when, forty years ago, their Plenipotentiary was murdered in Teheran.
There is a certain charm of stubbornness in that policy which makes it exceedingly dangerous. The English people like stubbornness, and will be very apt to believe that if their Government insists upon maintaining an Envoy in Cabul, even at so great a hazard, they must see reasons why an Envoy must necessarily be maintained. The national habit of con- fidence in the rulers of the day, the national self-distrust about foreign affairs, and the national indisposition to retreat, will therefore all alike tend to induce the country to accept such a suggestion, if it is ever made by responsible statesmen, while many reasons may combine to induce Ministers to make it. They are saved by it from the trouble of making a new plan, and from the humiliation of confessing that the old one has failed. They are relieved by it from certain fears of foreign complications—for there was, no doubt, some understanding with Russia which they do not want to violate—and they are enabled to put forward what Englishmen always desire, a definite and intelligible object for the war the country is called upon to wage. We are to thrash the Afghans until they agree to be a " friendly " and " independent " people, controlled in all foreign relations by a British Envoy, living under the protec- tion of a British guard. Or in other words, we are to enter the capital as conquerors, convince the rulers of Afghanistan, whoever they may be, that England is irresistible, and place an Envoy in a fortified Residency to conttol all business as before. That, or something indistinguishable from that, is what the Times is driving at, probably with the Government behind it ; and a more foolish policy could hardly be imagined. It is a device for obtaining a minimum of advantage at a maximum of risk. The Envoy so forced upon the Afghans could do nothing except through menaces, which could be just as easily forwarded from Lahore. If the Ameer agreed with him, the Ameer would be disobeyed by his people, who want to manage their own affairs, not to be submissive to Infidel guidance ; and if the Ameer disagreed, the Envoy would have no more power of coercion than the Viceroy at Calcutta. He could threaten that an army should enter Afghanistan, and so could the Viceroy. As for informa- tion, locked up in his fortified Residency, he could obtain none, except through native spies, who could be employed, and are employed, just as well without a Mission ; and as for the native party whom an Envoy often conciliates, how is he to form one, in a capital where his mere presence is felt as so deep an insult, that merely for inviting him the Ameer has lost his authority? He would be as useless as the Times' reporter was when O'Connell protected him from the mob, declared that he should hear every word said, and began his discourse in the most resonant of voices, in Irish. It is true he might con- verse with the Ameer, but we have just seen the advantage of that privilege, which, again, could be reduced to nothing by the Ameer making the real seat of Government, as the Czar does, far away from the capital. What advantage did Sir L. Cavagnari's presence in Cabul bring to the Empire ? We shall never have a more competent Envoy, or an Amcor more inclined to yield ; yet he could not guide the Prince, he could not concili- ate the people, and he never got any information even as to the feeling in the capital. He did not know half as much as Gholarn Hussein Khan, to whom nobody objected. On the other hand, the risk would be enormous. Unless the Envoy were always shut up in the Residency, like an ancient Baron in his castle, his life would always be in danger ; and as the assassin, living among a sympathising people, would never be fittingly punished, every assassination would involve an expe- dition. Germany or England could afford, we dare say, to expend a Consul a year at Salonica, the applicants for Con-
sulships, even in dangerous places, being endless ; but not even Germany or England could affoid an expedition to Constantinople after every assassination. It is because the Governments know that they can compel the Government of Turkey to avenge a Consul, that the Consular system is per- sisted in ; and this is exactly what would not be the case in Afghanistan. No Government in Cabul could be more directly interested in keeping a British Envoy alive than was that of Yakoob Khan ; and no Government could have failed more abjectly, or shown more conclusively that no treaty, and no promise of support, and no subsidy would weigh with its sub- jects against the delight of vengeance on the Infidel.
The Times, in order to defend the Treaty of Gundamuck, which died with Sir Louis Cavagnari, says there is danger, if we abandon it, of the Government being forced to com- mence a policy of annexation in Central Asia. Who forces it, except from within ? It may annex from a fanciful idea that if it does not, it will lose prestige at home ; but the annexation will be its own act. Every Tory in Eng- land is prepared to support the policy it may recommend, and the Liberals only hope that the recommendation will be moderate and reasonable. They will not attack it for pur- suing the policy of 1842, which gave us peace for a quarter of a century. They are not asking that India shall be ex- tended to the Hindoo Koosh, and are avowedly opposed to the re-establishment of an Envoy in Cabul. Who, then, is urging an extreme course ? The Times says everybody is, and with an obvious reference to the Spectator, declares that even warm advocates of Lord Lawrence's policy of masterly inactivity recommend the annexation of Candahar. We recommend nothing of the kind, except as an alternative if all reasonable counsels are rejected, to the annexation of Afghanistan. Our recommendation, couched in the plainest English we can com- mand, is to capture Cebu], to show in some striking way that we are masters of the city, and then to retire behind the true frontier, the Mountains of Solomon, and allow Russians, or Chinese, or Kirghises, or anybody else, to come up to them when they please. They can do 1113 no injury, if the people of India are faithful ; and if they prefer other masters, no force of ours will hold them down. It is because we know that an insular people, accustomed to live in a castle with a moat round it, and utterly unable to believe a land frontier safe, will not be reasonable, that we suggest as an alternative to a huge annexa- tion the smallest one which will give them the necessary sense of security. We believe the outpost will be utterly useless—no danger to India being real that is not internal.— that it will cost much treasure, and that it will dissipate much of the strength of the Indian garrison ; but we accept it as the least of the evils threatened by the madness of the Government, and the suspicious temper of the people. We are in the case of the garrison of "Garde Dolorous° " in Scott's "Betrothed." The Governor insists on meeting the Welsh in the plain. The wise counsel to meet them in the castle is rejected with scorn, and we, as a last resort, suggest meeting them out- side the castle, it is true, but on the defensible bridge between the plain and the castle glacis. And then the Times, in order to make the Government policy seem mild, suggests that even we, advocates of retreat, suggest fighting on the bridge. The assertion is most unfair, and so is the hint which runs through a great deal the Times has written —that there are reasons for the stipulations of the Treaty of dundamuck of which the public is not aware. That is perfectly conceivable, for this is a Government that loves burrowing. We may have secured concessions in Europe by threats in Afghanistan, m, which is much more probable, we may have secured advan- tages in Europe by retreat in Afghanistan. But then surely it is time that the arrangements which bind us should be known, that the people who provide the men who are to die, and the taxes which are to be wasted, should be informed of the object for which they are to sacrifice so much. The Government of India can do much with 5,000 men and a million a year. Why is it to expend that power and that treasure in forcing a knot of unwilling clans in Central Asia to allow an English officer to reside in an ostentatious position in their capital, at the risk of a costly and dangerous expedition every two or three years ?
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