MOSCOW AND AFTER
IF no decisions at all had been taken at Moscow the Prime Minister's visit to the Russian capital would have been well worth while. Geography makes Russia the most isolated of the three greatest Allied Powers. The Atlantic has long ceased to be an obstacle to personal contacts between British and American statesmen and soldiers, but Moscow is much less accessible from London and Washington than London and Washington are from one another. Mr. Churchill's visit was no response to an S.O.S. call. It was arranged and executed in a very different atmosphere. But no one can question the value of such a journey at such a time. It cemented the unity of the Allies. It removed from the Russian mind any possible suspicion that relations between Britain and Russia were any whit less cordial than relations between Britain and the United States. Such an assurance, at a moment when Russia's unexampled ordeal is intensifying to en almost intolerable climax, is of inestimable value. The Prime Minister has added one more to his innumerable services to the Allied cause.
But decisions, and decisions of the first moment, were of course taken at the Kremlin. Sir Alan Brooke and Sir Archibald Wavell and the other distinguished soldiers concerned did not go to Moscow at a moment like this to engage in academic discussions. There can be little doubt that what was agreed last week will determine all the immediate, and perhaps all the ultimate, developments of the war. Obviously the purpose of the decisions is an impenetrable secret, and to carry speculation about the possibilities beyond a certain point would be unprofitable. • It has been universally taken for granted that the main problem discussed was a Second Front in Europe, and it seemed conceivable for a moment on Wednesday that the landing at Dieppe was a first-fruit of the Moscow talks. That is dearly not so. The commando raid had its own sufficient raison d'être, as the official communiqué explained convincingly, and it must have been planned in every detail before ever Mr. Churchill reached the Kremlin. But it is a welcome assurance to the Russians, and a disturbing warning to the Germans, of the capacity of an Allied force, with tanks and other heavy equipment, to establish a footing on the coast of France. This time there was no attempt to maintain the footing. It was never part of the plan. Some day it may be, and the Germans will never know when or where. The advantages of imposing that uncertainty on them are manifest. _
Those advantages are achieved by the mere threat of the establish- ment of a Second Front. It is not necessarily to be concluded even yet that the actual establishment of such a front is the only way, or the best way, of bringing relief to Russia and furthering the general cause of the United Nations. Many considerations have to be weighed against each other. It is increasingly certain that the growing weight of the R.A.F.'s raids on Germany is disintegrating not merely her war-industries and her transport but her whole national life, for the housing problems cleated by the devastation of urban areas of eighty or a hundred acres by blast and fire are something for which no solution can be found, particularly when attacks are repeated, as they have been on Rostock and Osnabruck and other centres. Important information on this point has just been issued by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. And there is more to come ; before long the Americans will be raiding Germany on their own account, as the Russians are beginning to do in the East. But our resources are still limited, and it is manifest that a Second Front would make such demands on our bombers that to maintain the raids on Germany on anything like the present scale would be out of the question. The decision between alternative policies here is difficult and of profound importance.
One broad conclusion unquestionably emerged from the Moscow talks—it would indeed have emerged if there had been no talks at all—that help must be given to Russia in every form possible, in every region possible, and with all speed possible. Supplies must be increased and accelerated by both the northern and the Persian routes. The practicability of actual military assistance in the Caucasus must be explored, as no doubt it has been. Rommel must be so heavily engaged that reinforcements, at least of aircraft, must be diverted to his help front Germany's Russian front ; the changes of command in Egypt may bear on that. And frequent and intensive raids on France or Norway or the Low Countries must serve the important end of pinning down large enemy forces there, and at the same time preparing the way for a permanent landing if and when that step -is finally decided on. In some or all those fields the results of the Moscow conversations will before long be revealed. They will mean new risks, perhaps reverses, and heavy cost. Know- ledge of that may sober but not deter. Russians who read the epic story of the convoy that won through last week to Malta will be little tempted to doubt the resolve that animates their allies.
The Condition of India
The situation in India has shown little change in the past week, but what change there has been is in the right direction. The disturbances, which were never of alarming magnitude, have diminished, but there is plenty of inflammable material for agita- tors to work on, and it would be quite premature to assume that the danger is past. Meanwhile there is talk of negotiation, and some forms of negotiation would be welcome. If, for example, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Rajagopalachari and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru could get together, and, if they think it desirable, secure permis- sion to make contact with Mr. Gandhi in his place of detention, some result worth achieving might be achieved. But serious and reasonable apprehension prevails in non-Congress circles in India lest the Government of India, after taking firm action against the Congress Party with abundant justification, should, in spite of everything, make concessions with its leaders as a measure of ex- pediency. Too much encouragement is given to that policy in this country, as, for example, in a letter which we publish this week, partly out of respect for its author and partly from a desire that views from which we totally dissent should have a hearing. This is not the moment to treat Mr. Gandhi as uncrowned king of India. He has plainly been guilty of subversive action of the most dangerous kind, and firm and proper measures have been taken against him by the decision of a Council on which his own country- men held eleven places out of fourteen. To face that fundamental fact squarely is imperative.
The Middle East Command
A change of commanders in the field in the middle of important and critical operations induces some anxious thought as to the causes. Nothing is more difficult for the ordinary person, or even the ordinary soldier, than to assess the capacity of generals who have not proved their value beyond all question by actual successes in war. A peace-time record or a subordinate war-time record is not enough to assure us that a general has just that quality which makes for wise strategy, quick decisions, leadership, and in conse- quence victory. Most of us believe that on our side General Wavell and on the enemy side General Rommel possess that quality. Has General Auchinleck the necessary magic touch? Frankly, we do not know. He himself has not hesitated to displace such men as General Cunningham and General Ritchie when the operations they were conducting failed. Whether the particular failures which occurred when they were in command were due to their defects is no easier to judge than it is to assess the degree of responsibility which rested upon the Commander-in-Chief himself. Yet when once the decision has been taken to appoint a general to the High Command, it is no light matter to cause uneasiness among the troops by removing him, though he should unquestionably be removed if there are good grounds for doubting his fitness for the job. Fortunately, there can be no uneasiness about the appoint- ment of General Alexander as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. He is one of the few generals who has fully won his spurs in the severe test of war. His service at Dunkirk was remarkable, but it is his brilliant conduct of the operations against terrific odds in Burma that most inspires confidence. Satisfaction has been caused by the fur:her appointments of General Montgomery and General Lumsden to the Eighth Army and the XXXth Corps respectively.
Was the Censor Asleep ?
Fouling one's own nest, or rather one's country's nest, for the edification of readers in another country is an unsavoury business. The article in which Lord Strabolgi sees fit—presumably not with- out financial reward—to disparage and discredit the British Army in the pages of Collier's Magazine is well calculated, to judge by the extracts from it quoted in the Daily Telegraph, to provide in- valuable ammunition, as that paper's Washington correspondent predicts it will, for every isolationist and fifth columnist in America. The Army, according to the Noble Lord, has been defeated wherever it has fought on the mainland of Europe ; " against both
Brazil and the Axis
Not long ago Mexico was driven into a declaration of war against Germany by the torpedoing of Mexican ships by enemy submarines. It seems likely that the same policy of indiscriminate destruction will soon have the same effect on Brazil. The news of the sinking of five Brazilian ships, bringing the to:al of losses up to 19, has caused a strong outburst of popular indignation in Rio de Janeiro, where thousands of persons demonstrated before the Presidential palace and received the assurance of the President in person that ships of the aggressor nations would be seized to compensate for the damage, and that spies who gave information about the sailings of ships would be sternly dealt with. But that is not all. A point has been reached where Brazilian neutrality has been strained to . breaking-point, and when these acts of war against Brazil will have their inevitable consequence. And not Brazil only, but the whole American continent is stirred to its depths by such repeated out- rages and is moving towards a solid front against the aggressors. Even in Argentina, where President Castillo is so persistently in favour of neutrality, feeling is growing and the President is likely to find it more and more difficult to maintain his policy.
Regular Commissions in the Army
The number of captains and subalterns in the Regular Army has been steadily dwindling since the beginning of the war, owing to the fact that emergency commissions only have been given to those who become officers under war conditions. It is now announced that the granting of permanent commissions will shortly be reopened to provide the Army of the future with officers of all ranks who intend to make soldiering their profession. They will be granted sparingly, so that dismissals may not be necessary when the Army reaches peace-time proportions, bu: in sufficient numbers to ensure that there will be experienced, qualified men in each rank to carry out the necessary duties. The character of the Army of the future will depend in no small measure upon the regular officers who are created now. There will probably be a much wider range of choice than in normal times, since many men of high qualifications are likely to be available, who in other circumstances would not have thought of looking for a career in the Army. We are told that the selection boards will require a good general background of education, experience and breadth of interest, and will look also for men qualified for specialist work in connexion with weapons and equipment. The Army in the past has failed to attract enough men of high intellectual attainment and all-round ability, and this lack has proved a grave hardship to its efficiency and leadership• Now is the time to get in a nucleus of officers who will bring fresh ideas into the service and check the excessive influence of a tradition much of which is undesirable.
Japanese and Germans it has only chronicled a dismal record of failures." The key positions, he adds, are still held by men of Imperialist outlook, drawn from a very narrow circle, whose influence permeates right through all ranks. He has apparently no knowledge of the number of officers who were pre-war rankers, or of the fact that (to take one example) the Deputy C.I.G.S., General Nye, began his army life, like Sir William Robertson, C.I.G.S., in the last war, as a private. But that is, of course, beside the point. Even if everything Lord Strabolgi said or implied were true, this deliberate be-fouling of the British name in America is a singularly repulsive act. To criticise British institutions in the British Press is a legitimate exercise, sometimes salutary, sometimes discreditable, but to create in the minds of citizens of an Allied nation the belief that the British Army, beside which their own army is to figlit, is an incompetent machine which has sustained disaster after disaster is to do considerably more damage to the national cause than Sir Oswald Mosley, who has rightly been kept out of mischief for nearly three years, had any prospect of being capable .of. Iz is to be hoped that the Labour Party, which Lord Strabolgi's coronet adorns, will have something to say on an utterance which has the effect of doing Goebbels' work far better than he could ever hope to do it himself.