The Lesson of Indo-China,
Indo-China is one of the subjects which have come up for dis- cussion between the British and French Ministers in Paris this week. It is undoubtedly true that a close understanding between the two countries in the Far East is as essential as it is anywhere else in the world, and in spite of important political and strategic differences there is a basic similarity between the problems facing the French in Indo-China and ourselves in Malaya. Certainly the result of appointing General de Lattre de Tassigny as supreme political and military representative of France in Indo-China can now be shown to have paid dividends whose significance cannot have been lost on Mr. Lyttelton. His conduct of affairs has shown that the question of whether political or military aims should have priority in such a struggle is really an academic one, for the very good reason that success in each sphere is dependent on success in the other. The latest Viet-Minh offen- sive appears to have been decisively repulsed, but even more significant than this new stage in the battle for the Red River delta has been the decision of certain local magnates (who are also, perhaps a little surprisingly, bishoRs) -to range themselves and their forces on the side of the Emperor Bao Dai. It has all along been the wary indifference of the mass of the popu- lation in Indo-China which was more of a threat to French and Viet-Namese arms than the active hostility of ,the rebels. When a corresponding point is reached in Malaya—when, that is, the mass of the Chinese move over from neutrality to active co-operation with the Government—then the political and military turning-point in Malaya will have been reached.
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