TOPICS OF THE DAY.
INTERNATIONAL ANIMOSITIES.
MR. BALFOUR and Sir Henry,Campbell-Bannerman have both during the past week lectured the British Press, including, no doubt, the Spectator, on its recklessness in stirring up international animosities,—the allusion, of course, being to the way in which the German Alliance has been criticised, and to the plain speaking in regard to Germany's policy and her aspira- tions towards this country. The Prime Minister, quoted with approval by Sir Henry Campbell-Banner- man, used the following words :—" Let us remember that the old idea of Christendom should still be our idea ; that all those nations who are in the forefront of civilisation should learn to work together by practical means for the common good, and that nothing could militate against the realisation of that great ideal so conclusively as the encouragement of these international bitternesses, these international jealousies, these international dislikes." Though this passage is, as we have said, aimed at ourselves, among others, we cannot feel in the least either angered or depressed by the reproof. We agree with every word of it. None can hold more strongly than we do that it is a folly and a crime to foment international ill-feeling, and to do anything to produce the conditions which lead to war between nations. But, indeed, on that point all right-minded men are of one opinion. What divides us and those who agree with us from the men who agree with Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is the question of means. We hold that it is not conducive to national good-feeling, and so to the peace of the world, that we should act towards Germany as -the Government have acted, maintaining, on the other hand, that their action was far more likely to increase than to decrease the ill-feeling between the two nations.
We do not, however, wish to indulge in mere generalities, but to try to look fairly and reasonably at the problem with which the British Government were con- fronted when they decided to take common action with Germany in the Caribbean Sea. We will admit that if Germany had been a Power whose friendliness to this country had been strongly marked during the past six or seven years, and if Germany had also been known to be a Power whose action aroused no sense of suspicion or distrust in the United States, it would have been most natural and right to join her These were the conditions necessary for safe and beneficial co-operation with Germany ; let us see how far she fulfilled them. Was she a Power whose friendship-for us was real and trustworthy ? Let us look at the facts since 1896. To begin with, there was the German Emperor's telegram to President Kruger ; the proposal to land German Marines at Delagoa Bay, and to send them up to Pretoria, nominally to help the Boers pro- tect the German Consulate ; and there was the official declaration of the German Government that they would view as inimical to their interests any change in the status quo in South Africa. We do not wish to dwell further on these facts, save to ask whether if they had been normal, and of the kind to be expected from a friendly Power, it would have been necessary for our Government to give the order to fit out a flying squadron. We come next to the acEoa of the Germans in regard to Samoa. Can it be said that there we found in Germany a friendly co-operator? We were involved in finding a settlement in which America and Germany were also concerned. Did Germany on that occasion play a, friendly part? We must also ask whether during the past ten years the action of Germany in Egypt has been one of sincere and friendly co-operation, or whether instead it has not been one in which she has never made a concession without exacting the uttermost farthing of com- pensation. -This brings us to the Fashoda incident. Here we would ask,—Did. Germany, as a friendly Power would naturally have done, at once make it known to France that she could not encourage her in any way to withstand the British demands ? Rumour said that her action was quite in the contrary direction. Possibly rumour lied. In that case a contradiction would be most welcome, and ought to be made public. Meantime we can only ask,—Was the attitude of Germany that of a true and sincere friend during the Fashoda incident ? If so, we think Mr. Balfour should state the fact publicly, as it would go a considerable way to alter opinion here as regards Germany. We come next to German action while we were at war with the Boers: Did the German Government show real friendliness, or was it merely concerned with maintaining an attitude of official neutrality P We do not wish to enter in detail into the question of how the German people behaved during the war, for we have always scrupulously avoided the dis. cussion of . these details, as, indeed, likely to produce international animosity. Still, we know what the attitude of a large section of the German people was, and we know also the spirit in which the Imperial Chancellor of Germany allowed himself to speak of the. British Array. Did that show friendliness ? Next, we must not 'forget the attempt of the German Government to sow seeds of dissension between us and the United States of America. It is true that the attempt was a complete failure ; but that does not alter the fact that it was made. The inten- tion was perfectly clear, though the execution was defec- tive. Lastly, we must ask whether any unprejudiced person can say that the Germans inspired us in China with the feeling that they were safe and loyal colleagues, and that their essential friendliness made joint action with them safe and beneficial. If the answer given by the Government is here to be " Yes," it is difficult to under. stand why they should have found it necessary to ad. minister a snub to Germany in the case of Shanghai.
In view of these facts, can it be said that Germany during the past ten years has won for herself the right to be regarded as a friend so sincere and loyal that she could be trusted as an ally in political circumstances no matter how difficult and delicate ? The public knows our answer to this question. Let us presume, however, that the Government are prepared to answer it in the affirmative, and to declare that Germany had justified her demand fcr joint action by her persistent friendliness during the past ten years. We . must then ask, assuming Germany's friendliness and trustworthiness,—Was she a Power with whom to co-operate in a case which was by its nature, if not very carefully handled, liable to arouse intense suspicion in the United States ? Can any one say that she was ? Our Government are represented by an able and clear-sighted diplomat at Washington, and they besides have access to plenty of other sources of information as regards American opinion. From these they must have been able to gather that the American people were still hostile to Germany owing to the Manila incident and to the general attitude of Germany during the Spanish War, and that this feeling had been recently reawakened by the wide- spread belief that Germany used her influence to prevent the Danes selling their West Indian colonies to the United States. Add to this that for the last ten years American suspicions have been keenly aroused as to German designs and aspirations in South America. Rightly or wrongly, the American is convinced that Germany has hankerings after some portion of the South American Continent; and the people and Government of the United States:are always inclined to be anxious and suspicious when Germany makes any sort of move—witness the Haytian incident—in the Western Hemisphere. But that being the case, can it be said that Germany, as the American caricaturist puts it, is a safe Power " to go gunning with " in the Caribbean Bea ? Granted the Government's sincere desire to promote international good-feeling, was it likely to be improved by exciting American prejudices just where they are notoriously most excitable,—i.e., in regard to German designs in South America.
It seems to us, then, impossible, to . consider the hiatory of the past ten years without coming to the conclusions (1) that Germany had not proved herself to be sufficiently trustworthy and friendly to justify joint action with her in a delicate and difficult operation ; (2) that the sus- picion of. Germany entertained in America in any case pre- cluded us from joining her as an ally. But if this was so, then the Government were the worst of sinners in regard to the crime, whose greatness we fully. admit, of stirring up international animosity. They must have known that there was a large and important body of opinion here which not merely resented the ill-feeling shown by Germany during the war, but which; rightly or wrongly, believed that Germany's aspirations were so hostile and so dangerous to us that she must be watched with the utmost vigilance. But knowing this, and knowing also how strong the primd-facie case against Germany was, they must have been aware that an alliance, however temporary, would be sure to awaken here a • strong ' feeling of animosity. It could not have been otherwise. Those who, like ourselves, sincerely believe in the dangers which we run from German hostility could not without the gravest dereliction of duty have failed to accept the challenge thrown down to us by a German alliance to justify if we could our distrust of Germany. On the Govern- ment, not on the British Press, must rest the grave responsibility of having produced the ominous outbreak of active ill-feeling towards Germany which we have witnessed of late. Again, what are we to say of those who, wishing to promote international good-feeling, helped the Germans to awaken a feeling of angry suspicion in America,—a feeling which has swept from one end of the United States to the other? Any one who knew anything of American feeling knew what must happen if Germany, protected from an American protest by the might of England's Fleet, were able to take action in South American waters. The sentiment, You would not have dared to move if you had not first entrapped Britain as your protector,' did not tend to smooth, but to embitter, the relations of America and Germany. That may be, and no doubt is, a most unreasonable frame of mind; but it exists, and its existence ought, we contend, to have weighed strongly with a Government admittedly bent on preventing the outbreak of international ani- mosities. Governments must treat nations as they are and not as they ought to be ; and that being so, their first object should have been to avoid helping to inflame American suspicion of Germany. On this point, then, our own conscience is quite clear. The responsibility for the deplorable outbreak of international ill-feeling in Britain and America as regards Germany, and the reciprocal feeling in Germany, rests with the Government that took action, and not with the Press, who were bound to protest as they did lest the next request made by and granted to the Kaiser should be one for a still closer alliance.
But it may be said : All this may be true, but you still have not answered the question, What were the Govern- ment to do ? Were they to endure the wrongs done us by Venezuela for fear of the consequences that might flow from righting them ? ' Certainly not. They should have pro- ceeded to obtain redress, but alone. But when Germany proposed to co-operate, what could they have done ? ' They should have firmly pointed out to the Germans that their persistent unfriendliness towards us as a Government, and the animosity displayed by their people, together with the suspicion and distrust which their policy had aroused in America, made it impossible for us to act with them, and that this inability would remain till their tone and temper had been materially changed and the change had been maintained. But next comes Mr. Balfour's pathetic in- quiry : How could. there have been two blockades ? The answer is that there would only have been one, and that one would have been ours. Without our assistance in regard to coaling-stations Germany could hardly have enforced a blockade. But still, supposing the Germans had insisted and had begun operations, what then ? ' In that case, we should have left our claims in abeyance for a short time longer, withdrawn our ships, and awaited events. The result must have been that the Germans would either have failed in their attempt owing to coaling difficulties, or else they would have got involved in embarrassments with the United States, and would have been summarily required to stop their blockade,—a demand which, we venture to think, would have been obeyed. The Germans removed from the scene, we should have been able to take up our claims single-handed, and should undoubtedly have been able to carry them to a successful issue. To allege that we could not possibly refuse Germany's offer of co-opera- tion, and that whether we liked it or no we were forced to accept a German alliance, is, in truth, to admit that our power of independent action is gone. We do not profess to be diplomatists, but if the resources of diplo- macy are as feeble as one must judge them to be from the Government's presentation of this part of their case, it would be better at once to close all our Embassies, dis- band the Corps Diplomatique, and use the Foreign Office as a public museum. Imagine Lord Palmerston's smile if he had been told that, whether he liked it or not, France or Russia or Austria insisted on acting with Britain as her ally !
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