Sir: A. J. Spence, in his letter of January 31
has failed to grasp the points I made in my review of Captain Moore's book about the Soviet navy. First, I argued that 'facts' about the so-called strategic balance are misleading and I tried to show that 'facts' which purport to demonstrate a new and growing threat from the Soviet navy can be countered with others depicting an altogether different situation. For example, A. J. Spence refers to a Soviet superiority in 'major' surface combatants, reported by the House Armed Services Committee. This 'fact' is based on the assumption that numerous small patrol craft possessed by the Soviet Union can be treated as 'major' combatants. Equally, A. J. Spence's 'facts' about the numbers of missiles and the numbers of strategic submarines fail to take account of the sevenfold American advantage in nuclear warheads on submarine launched missiles, as a result of its superiority in MIRV (Multiple Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicles) missiles. In addition, A. J. Spence puts the Soviet strategic submarine fleet at seventy-five, a number which is larger than the maximum permitted under SALT. The difference is occasioned by the inclusion of some old diesel powered submarines with medium range missiles, considered obsolete by the SALT negotiators.
Secondly, [argued that the increased overseas deployment of the Soviet navy should not be interpreted as an offensive policy. 1 pointed out that Soviet naval forces do not appear to be designed for intervention or interdiction of western shipping. This view was confirmed by the US Secretary of Defence in his recent 'defence posture statement'. He said that the Soviet navy has 'a poor capability for sustained combat operations' and 'little capability to project power ashore in distant areas.' This is because the Soviet Union lacks sea-based air power and its amphibious and logistical systems are quite inadequate for operations outside home waters. I also argued that the
new naval strategy is intended to complement, not contradict, détente.
Thirdly, I suggested that the development of guided missile equipped ships, in the West as well as the Soviet Union, has revolutionary implications for current naval strategy and for our perceptions of the strategic balance. Neither A. J. Spence nor any other defence expert has chosen to take up this issue.
A. J. Spence does suggest, somewhat naïvely, that the 'problem of strategic comparison' presents an obstacle to the `conclusion of a satisfactory SALT agreement'. Surely, it is more the excuse of those interested, for one reason or another, in continued and accelerated military expenditure in both East and West.
Mary Kaldor The University of Sussex, Institute for the Study of International Organisation
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