THE LITTLE CLOUD IN THE NILE VALLEY.
THE position of affairs in Egypt is becoming clearer, but not better. The Note of the protecting Governments, the counter message from the Porte, the language of the Austrian journalists, and the demands of the Egyptian Chamber of Notables, throw a flood of light on the situation. The Sultan, whose permanent hope is to compensate himself for all losses in Europe by rebuilding his authority as Khalif in all countries owned by Mussulmans, believes that the hour is favourable for the resumption of direct sway in Egypt ; and he finds in his project unexpected assistance, both external and internal. The German and Austrian Governments encourage him, because they see that his action must embarrass both England and France ; and because they wish, by concessions to the Western Powers in Egypt, to secure equal concessions in the Balkans. The Russians encourage him, though more re- servedly, because, though the Panislamic movement would ultimately be formidable to them, they must for the moment counterbalance the influence of the German Po ers in Con- stantinople. The Khedive, a weak man, growing daily more jealous of European interference, encourages him, as his only protector against the Control—that is, against a pressure which, to a sincere Mussulman, anxious at once for prerogative and for freedom of action, must be at times indescribably irritating. The Notables encourage him, partly from jealousy of the Euro- peans, who are in their way ; partly from a real desire to have a stronger voice in affairs than the Control will allow ; and partly from an acute idea that the Khedive is not displeased with claims which morally hamper the Controllers, who do not want to appear hostile to just national aspirations. The Notables are mere nominees, and directly represent nobody ; but they claim to speak for Egypt, and do speak for its better classes. And finally, the Sultan is encouraged by the soldiery, whose leader has undoubtedly some secret relation with Constanti- nople, and though an Arab, and therefore probably not orthodox as to the Sultan's higher claims, regards him as at all events pro-Khalif, and is friendly to the Panislamic idea.
The result of this situation is that the Sultan is acting with unusual boldness, and is instigating and protecting the quasi- national movement against the Controllers, who are therefore isolated, and forced back upon the direct support of the two protecting Powers. Those Powers, therefore, are compelled either to recede, which they cannot do without seeing Egypt sink once more into a Turkish province, or to step forward more openly, and explicitly declare that the Control shall not be overset even by Constantinople. This they did in the Note delivered on January 8th, which was at once a warning to the Sultan that he must go no further, and a pledge to the Khe- dive that if he would be loyal to the Protectorate, he should be guaranteed against internal and external enemies. It was expected, of course, that both in Constantinople and Cairo so decided a message would at once produce its effect, and at first it did produce one. There was " conster- nation " for a moment throughout the Panislamic camp, but unfortunately it was only for a moment. Acting under some influence not yet revealed, the Sultan re- solved to hold on, and addressed a Message to the two Powers which, if at all correctly described, amounts to an assertion
that they are unwarrantably interfering in Egypt ; that the ultimate sovereignty of the country belongs to him alone, and that none but the suzerain has the right to address such Notes to the Khedive. Stimulated by this action, of which. they must have had early information, the Khedive and the Notables adhere to their position, the former writes civilly evasive replies, and the latter continue to demand control of the Budget. Upon this point the Powers have, it is stated, issued peremptory orders to the Controllers to make no concession ; and even if the statement is unfounded, there can be no doubt of their course. The surrender of the Budget to the Notables is the surrender of the Treasury to the Khedive and the Army, and that is precisely what the French Government are de- termined not to endure. They intend that the Bondholders shall be paid, and as they cannot be left to act alone, the English Foreign Office, though comparatively indifferent to Bondholders, supports their policy, so far as the Budget is con- cerned. The Egyptian forces, the Khedive, the Notables, and the Army chiefs are, therefore, in a more or less secret manner, resisting the Protecting Powers, and a situation of extreme danger may arise at any moment. If the Egyptians have the necessary nerve or confidence in the Sultan, or dislike of the Control, they can, whenever they please, force on a crisis. The Notables have only to insist that they shall enjoy Parlia- mentary powers, or that the Budget shall be subject to• them, or that a Nationalist shall be Premier, and the Protect- ing Powers must act. The Control has no other strength behind it. The Khedive is not sincerely with the Controllers,. the Sultan will give them no help, except by an occupa- tion, which would be fatal ; and the Egyptian Army is at the disposal of Arabi Bey, who, in spite of some plausible promises, is their pronounced enemy. The Powers must act, and as the Notables are supported by the Army, must act through a display of physical force, which can hardly, unless Constantinople is to be threatened, be confined to the Fleet. The dangers involved in a combined occupation of Egypt are, in fact, in certain contingencies imminent, and may at the slightest false move on either side become unavoidable. Whether those contingencies will happen is a different matter, but we confess to the gravest apprehension. Policies intended. to secure money rarely succeed, and the joint Protectorate in• Egypt still suffers from the vice of its origin, which was the determination of the French Government to obtain unjust ad- vantages for a financial Ring in Paris. The pressure upon Egypt caused by this demand is excessive, one-half the pro- duce of the taxes being steadily sent away to pay heavy in- terest on loans of which, as Egyptians contend, not half was- ever received. This loss irritates every class, for just and un- just reasons. It angers the Khedive, who has no money either to waste or spend. It angers the Notables, whose pilferings are stopped, and whose just claims to lower taxation are rej:eted. It angers the Army, which wants part of the surplus revenue for itself. And it angers the Fellaheen, who are told, falsely, that the foreign claim is now the cause of their taxation. The general feeling is, therefore, adverse to the Control, and there may be no fear strong enough to check its overt manifestation. The Khedive, though a timid man, is a Turk and a Mussul- man, and may not only prefer subjection to the Sultan to sub- jection to England and France, but may have good cause to know that the Sultan is much the most to be dreaded of the three. The last Shereef of Mecca died because he directly resisted the Sultan, and even if his assassin was a fanatic, he was fanatic for the Khalif. The Notables probably think the Sultan the greatest man in the world, and certainly think— for they say it—that he is supported by Powers who can stop England and France from sending troops to Egypt. Arabi. Bey knows little of foreign countries, is probably filled with promises by the Sultan, and is pledged to changes which, if the Control remains master of the situation, he cannot carry out. His necessity is to gratify the Amy, at the expense of a Treasury over which the Control keeps guard. Partially ignorant men, inflamed with political passion, seeing their own interest in a change, and flattered with promises of sup- port which to them seem very great, are nearly certain
very soon to cast prudence to the winds. It is true, they saw Ismail led away to his ship like a male- factor. It is true, they know that under a blockade the wealth of Egypt would be worthless. It is true, they are in the habit of talking to Europeans who know perfectly well that England and France in conjunction are irresistible. All these ar•e strong reasons for submission. But still they saw the Control beaten by the Army, and as regards Arabi Bey, they see it remain beaten ; they are ignorant of essential facts, and they are bewildered by carefully-spread rumours of a German alliance with the Sultan, and of the movement which is impending against the French in Africa. They feel certain that they hate the tall hats, and do not feel certain that the wearers of tall hats can punish an emeute. The Egyptians, by which word we mean the Khedive, the Notables, and the Army, acting in secret union, may stir, that is, may allow a military demand for the dismissal of Europeans ; and if they do stir, interference is inevitable, and half Europe may be thrown into a blaze. We do not wonder that, with such a prospect before him, Lord Granville follows Sydney Smith's advice to " take short views," and puts forth his hand as slowly and in as short a way as possible. We have never discussed, and do not now intend to discuss, the view sure to be expressed when the crisis is actually on hand, that the British Government may at the last moment refuse to do anything whatever. That course has been pursued in some cases, but in this instance we do not believe it is open. We regard it as the cardinal fact of the situation that the English people, even if prepared to let Egypt govern itself, and ruin itself at discretion, are not prepared to see France in occupation of Egypt. Apart altogether from any value in Egypt itself as a possession, which is very small, or any danger to the Canal, which might be prevented by negotiation, the relation of the two nations to each other, if France held Egypt, would in twelve months be un- endurable. We should always be expecting an attack on India, always suspecting treachery in Paris, always watching the move- ments of every Frenchman in the East. Half the fear would be unreal, but its result would be a hostility to our nearest neighbours, as deep and as incurable as that which certain classes now feel and express towards Russia. We should never really be at peace, and he forced sooner or later to an alliance with Germany, which would make of France and Russia together our deadly and permanent enemies. That is not a possible situation, and we do not believe, therefore, that England will agree to a French occupation of Egypt. And yet, if the Control is attacked, and we recede, nothing but a definite and immediate menace of war would stop France, and possibly not that..
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