ENGLAND IN EGYPT.* MR. MILNER'S very able and interesting book
on Egypt might be taken by a logician as a colossal example of a. non sequitur. Mr. Milner explains that if the interference of any European Power is to bear good fruit in Egypt, such interference must be from the first understood by the natives to be irresistible and unquestionable, and that the Power in- volved must have a clear understanding of its own aims, and must carry them out by means of a policy that shall be both consistent and continuous. But England, as Mr. Milner points out, has not only studiously endeavoured to appear to the Egyptians as if she were only ad- vising them, but has never known her own mind about Egypt, or been able to come to any definite decision as to. why she is in Egypt, or what she intends to do in re- gard to the future relations of the two countries. We have, then, premises from which the only conclusion logically pos- sible is " Therefore the English have failed in Egypt."
But Mr. Milner's conclusion, owing to the sternness of the facts, is obliged to be exactly the opposite, and to run : "The English have succeeded in Egypt." To speak as if this monstrous non sequitur were Mr. Milner's fault, would be most unfair. Both his conclusions and his facts are perfectly sound, and his failure in logic is solely due to that idio- syncrasy of his countrymen which is so tiresome and bewildering to our neighbours in France. We have proved in Egypt, what has been proved a hundred times elsewhere, that we are a hopelessly illogical nation, and that when we are con- cerned, major and minor and middle terms are utterly useless, and might as well have never been invented. It is needless to say that Mr. Milner is perfectly well aware that his book might appropriately have received for its sub-title, "The his- tory of a non sequitur." He is, indeed, himself a sort of per- sonification of the Egyptian fallacy. His argumentative. faculty has enabled him to see where our drifting ought rightly to have led us. His great administrative ability, and the excellent work he did in the Financial Department in Cairo, have, on the other hand, helped his country to get the
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* England in. Egypt. By Alfred Milner, late Under•Sterotary or Finance to Egypt. London 1 Edvtard Arnold.
better of a syllogism, and to bring about that soundly falla- cious conclusion that has saved Egypt.
The earlier chapters of Mr. Milner's book are devoted to a recapitulation of recent Egyptian history. Though the facts are clearly and ably given, these are lees interesting and remarkable than that portion of the book which deals with matters that came within Mr. Miler's own experience. Here the style grows terse and clear, the writing becomes like that of the best semi-official and confidential State papers,—the memoranda which administrators write, not for Blue-books and Returns, but for each other's private use and guidance. One of the beat of these later chapters is that which deals with the Egyptian Army. Mr. Milner insists upon a fact too often ignored in England,—namely, that it is by no means fair to talk as if the "black troops," the Soudanese regiments, were the only portion of the Army of the Khedive that is worth reckoning as a fighting force. Such is by no means the case. One of the greatest of the miracles wrought by the English in Egypt has been the organisation of regiments of fellaheen that can and will fight. It was once a common- place that it was absolutely impossible to make soldiers out of Egyptian peasants. Our officers, however, nothing daunted by this, and strengthened, Eke their Indian prototypes, by the knowledge that "they had the order in their pockets," took the recruits in hand, and very soon endowed them with a sense of cohesion and esprit de corps, By treating them like men and 'soldiers, they soon developed the qualities of soldiers, Nor were the fellaheen naturally slow to acquire military habits. They 'developed a positive passion for drill, and the privates had actually "to be prevented from practising their drill in their leisure hours." Mr. Milner tells us that, "not only would a non-commissioned officer get hold of a squad on his own account, whenever an opportunity offered, but it was a common eight to come across a private drilling three or four of his com- rades." After describing the Soudanese troops, and noticing the camaraderie which sprang up between them and the British troops—a friendship between the 79th Highlanders and the 9th Soudanese caused the latter to be called the "second 'battalion of the Cameron Highlanders "—Mr. Milner thus -speaks of the two divisions of the Egyptian Army :— " The addition of this new element greatly strengthened the Egyptian Army, and still constitutes its most striking feature as a 'fighting force. But it is not just to assume, as is sometimes done, that the native Egyptians are of small account in the corn- 'position of the Army. No doubt the Macke have borne the chief brunt of attack in the majority of engagements. No doubt they are the men whom a commander would most readily pit against the reckless courage of the dervishes. Still they have not done all the work. The native Egyptians, who have fought steadily beside them in more than one critical struggle, deserve their share of the credit of victory. The truth is, that the two sets of -men, with their widely different qualities, form a very strong combination for fighting purposes."
Mr. Miler's account of the financial situation in which Egypt now finds herself, his review of the circumstances tinder which Egypt was well-nigh involved in national bank- ruptcy, and his description of the various institutions and international instruments under which Egyptian taxes are raised and spent, is most perspicuous. After the publication of his book, indeed, no one will have any excuse for misunder- standing the financial arrangements forced upon Egypt by the Powers. The Egyptian finances are in the hands of two distinct 'bodies'.-(l), the Ministry ; (2), the Caisse—a body of National Debt Commissioners who may be described as a sort of inter- national man-in-possession or official receiver. The revenues of the State are divided into two nearly equal parts between the Caisse and the Ministry. What happens, it will be asked, if either the one or the other has a surplus or a deficit P If the Caisse has a deficit, it can come down on the Ministry -to supply the deficiency. If, however, it has a surplus, the Ministry gets nothing. On the other hand, when the Government has a surplus, the Caisse has claims on it ; "011ie, if it has a deficiency, the Caisse is under no obligation to bring help. This is the main principle. By the London 'Convention, however, signed March, 1885, it was agreed that, when the Caisse had paid the interest on the Debt, the Govern- ment might claim that a certain amount of help should be given in respect of what was called the authorised expendi. lure. A scale of expenditure, that is, was fixed, and after the coupon was paid, the Caisse was to make up to the Govern- ment any deficiency in this scale. In addition, if, after making op this deficiency, anything remained over, that overplus was to be divided into equal shares between the Caisse and the Government, —one.half going to the reduction of the Debt, and the other half to any object the Government might choose " This sounds, and is, very complicated. But it can be ex- plained by a concrete illustration. To simplify matters, I will not cite the Budget of any particular year, but will draw up, in round figures, an imaginary Budget, fairly representative of the actual situation in an average year, or rather in what was an average year before the recent great development of Egyptian prosperity. The total revenues of Egypt are, lot US suppose, 4E9,500,000, of which £E4,000.000 go to the Caisse, and 4E5,500,000 to the Government. But, whereas the Caisse with receipts amounting to 4E4,000,000, requires only 4E3,500,000 to pay the interest on the Debt, the Government, with receipts of 4E5,500,000, is, let us say, obliged to spend, for purposes of ad- ministration (including the payment of the tribute to Turkey and of the interest on the Suez Canal shares) 4E5,850,000. The total expenses of the country are thus 4E9,350,000, leaving a surplus of 4E150,000. But the Government is in a deficit of 4E360,000, while the Caisse is 4E500,000 to the good. How does the London Convention provide for this deficit of the Government ? That all depends upon the question, to what extent the 4E5,850,000, which the Government has actually spent, come within the description of authorised' expenditure. The Convention of London accorded to the Government a fixed annual sum of £E5,237,000, pZus one or two variable sums, depending upon the financial results of each particular year ; and subsequent agreements between the Powers have further augmented the 'authorised' figure by allowing cer- tain novel items to be added to it. In 1891, for instance, the total 'authorised' expenditure amounted to no less than 4E9,01,000. Now, up to the limit of this 'authorised' expenditure, the Government is entitled to draw upon the money remaining in the hands of the Caisse after payment of the interest. But whatever is beyond that limit, it must defray, if it can, out of its half-share of any surplus, which the Caisse may etill have after making good the deficit on the 'authorised' expenditure. Let us apply these principles to our imaginary case. The actual expenditure of the Government, in that case, has exceeded the receipts by 4E350,000, but we will suppose that the 'authorised' expenditure has ex- ceeded them by no more than 4E300,000. It is only 4E300,000, therefore, that the Government can demand from the Caisse. When this sum has been transferred, the Government is still 4E50,000 to the bad, and the Caisse has still 4E200,000 in hand. Now comes the last stage in these complicated proceedings. The 4E200,000 still remaining to the Caine have to be equally divided between it and the Government. With the 4E100,000, which the Government obtains by that division, it clears off the difference of 4E50,000 still existing between its means and its outgoings, while the remaining 4E50,000 are its own to do what it likes with. The LE100,C00 retained by the Caisse go to the reduction of the Debt. This is a typical Egyptian Budget for any year since 1885."
When, then, the Government raises additional taxes for ex- penditure upon objects outside the authorised expenditure, they have to raise an equivalent sum for paying off debt,— that is, they have to raise twice what they really want, because as it flows through the Caisse half is stopped for the purpose of paying off debt. In other words, if the Government wants to spend £10,000 on a canal, they have to raise £20,000. This is, of course, a great source of inconvenience to a good Govern- ment, though doubtless it might act as a check on a bad one.
We have left ourselves no space to notice the able account Mr. Milner gives his readers of the effect of English influence on irrigation, and on the legal administration, nor to discuss what be has to say on those vexed questions,—the reconquest of the Soudan, and the future relations between England and Egypt. In regard to the last, he expresses no very direct opinion, but we take it that he would like to see Egypt remain permanently under English influence, occupying the sort of position which belongs to the dominions of the Nizam. Before leaving Mr. Miler's clever and thoroughly readable book, we have one com- plaint to make, and it is the only one. Why did he not give us in an appendix the text of the various instruments by means of which Europe controls Egypt ? The essential portions of such documents as the Law of Liquidation, the London Con- vention and the draft Convention, so nearly accepted by the Sultan in 1887, would have greatly added to the value of this very interesting book. No doubt Mr. Milner was afraid of making his book look dull and uninviting, but that was a quite unnecessary fear. His subject and his powers of in- teresting his readers would have easily carried such a collection of documents.
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