MONARCHICAL DREAMS IN FRANCE.
WHATEVER else the Panama business has done, it has made the position of the Constitutional Right one of great anxiety. Until the recent disclosures, there was. no question but that their action in coming over to the Republic was at least practical and businesslike. It was open to the Monarchists to object to it on principle ; to say that, with Cato, they would rather be beaten in a good cause than victorious in a bad one ; to profess their disbelief in the possibility of the Republic coming. to any good. But even while they said this, they were conscious that their scepticism was regarded by the world as a piece of pure fanaticism. To be a Monarchist had become a respectable form of political suicide. Those' whom nothing but a de jure Government would con- tent, might cling to their dreams if they would ; but men who had to live and work in the France of to-day, must look out for a Government which had fact, and not merely right, on its side. The Constitutional Right were Repub. licans because France had unmistakably pronounced for the Republic. It is impossible for the Constitutional Right to use this language now. They may stall be convinced that they have taken the right course. They may still hold that patriotism and prudence alike justify the choice they have made. But they can no longer count on the reluctant and grudging admissions of their old companions. In the opinion even of competent observers, there is room for doubt whether the Republic will last. It is still in undis- puted possession of the political field, but it is profoundly discredited. The Constitutional Right can still draw the distinction between Republican institutions and Republican administration, which has already served them so well. They can say that the Panama scandals are merely another proof that the Republic has fallen into bad hands, But though they may maintain this as loudly, and even as confidently, as before, they can no longer maintain it with the same sense of general acceptance. There are some who think that the Panama scandals prove more than this,—that they do really show the essential weakness IA Republican institutions. If this view is correct, the Constitutional Right are the most unfortunate of men. They have parted from their old friends and their own convictions just at the wrong moment. If a restoration is brought about, there will be pardon and oblivion for every one but them. Enemies may be for- given, and even taken into confidence and favour ; but there can be no place under a revived Monarchy for men who did not despair of a new day until just before the .sun rose. This, we may be sure, is already the language of the Monarchical Right among themselves, and the seceders must be very certain of themselves and of their country- men if they are never troubled with any such fears on their own account. They are still an appreciable group in the Chamber, and, as appears by his letter to M. de • Mun, they have still the Pope on their side. But as regards the Chamber, we can hardly doubt that if M. Ribot had broken with the Radical Party as decisively six months ago as he has broken with it now, the contingent of seceders from the Right would have been a good deal larger than it was in the division on the Vote of Confidence the other day. M. Robert Mitchell's excellent speech was made with every show of assurance that he was taking the only line which is open to a rational Con- servative who has to take politics as he finds them ; but of those who listened to it, many probably, who three months ago would have welcomed his words as the .expression of an accepted and. obvious fact, were now only half convinced.
If we ask how much truth there is in these revived doubts as to the stability of the Republic, the chief fact we are confronted by is the absence of any pretender com- petent to turn them to account. If either the Royalists or the Bonapartists could bring forward a leader who had a particle of popular fibre about him, things might be dif- ferent. The Count of Paris is now paying the penalty of his acceptance of the part of a Legitimist King. We do not say that it was open to him to play any other part. The sacrifice alike of friends and of traditions which would have been involved in the formal subordination of his pretensions to the will of the nation, may have been greater than it was possible for him to make. But his maintenance of his hereditary claim has, we may -fairly believe, impressed the French people with a pro- found distrust of any restoration effected for his benefit. A Parliamentary Monarchy must be content with a Parliamentary title, and a Parliamentary title does not admit of being defended against the will of Parliament. Frenchmen may be of many minds as to the kind of Government they want ; but -they have shown remarkable unanimity as to the kind of Government they do not want. In this respect the Bonapartist pretender has the advantage over the Royalist. Heavy as were the burdens which the Imperial system imposed upon France, they were imposed with a technical deference to the will of the nation. But any superiority based on this ground is more than counterbalanced by the insignificance of the candidate in whose interest the iaL.f.biseite would be taken. We do not forget that Napoleon III. was an unknown quantity when he became President of the Republic. But Napoleon III. was at least a mystery, and Prince Jerome's heir cannot rise even to that level. Moreover, Napoleon III. had behind him the Napoleonic legend, resting on real achieve- ments, and weakened only by an honourable defeat. Sedan and Mete are not the stuff of which legends are made.
It would seem, therefore, that if either the Count of Paris or Prince Victor is to occupy a throne, he must be placed on it by other hands than his own. Before the next Restoration can have its Charles, it must have its Monk. And this, of course, is in itself not an impossible contingency. The unpopularity which has overtaken the Opportunist Party may not stop at the Cabinet, and M. Carnot, either with or without his own consent, may be replaced by a military President. We shall not now discuss the chances for and against such an outcome of the present situation. It will be enough to remark that, even if this were to happen, there is no reason to suppose that a military President would necessarily play the part of General Monk. Ho would probably regard the facts from one of two points of view,—the ambitious and the patriotic. If he looked at them from the ambitious point of view, why should he be in any hurry to divest himself of his newly won authority ? Republican forms would be perfectly consistent with the exercise of very real power ind ecd. A President appointed under such circumstances would be expected to make of his office something far more real than it has meant to M. Grdvy or M. Carnot. It offers opportunities out of which —supposing it safely attained—an able and energetic soldier might build up a position greater than anything he could expect to hold in the Court of a King or Emperor. If, on the other hand, the new President looked at things from the patriotic standpoint, he would be at once confronted with the difficulty men- tioned just now. No Frenchman who has the interest of his country at heart can wish to add one more to the long list of revolutions, His first object would be to set up a Government which had some promise of stability. But in a country such as France, one essential element of stability in a restoration would be the character of the restored Sovereign. Given a King or an Emperor likely to govern strongly and well, and we can easily imagine a patriotic soldier willingly parting with his authority, in order to transfer it to hands better fitted to use it for the good. of France. But in the absence of any pretender possessing this character, what motive would the temporary ruler have for laying aside his powers ? Would he not be more disposed to appeal to the better and more disinterested type of Republican politicians to help him to make the Republic what it has not been yet, but what honest and capable Frenchmen were, until lately, hoping to make it F The weak point of these Monarchical speculations, is that the one pre- liminary which seems indispensable to their realisation, would probably end by realising something altogether different.
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