TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE.
THE exact nature of the British reply to Germany is still undisclosed. That it will accept, in prin- ciple, Germany's offer to have the extent of her capacity to pay reparations estimated by an International Com- mission of Experts and to abide by their decision is, we hold, certain. Of the exact machinery and method for estimating the capacity to pay which our Government will propose the public has as yet received no information. We trust, however, that it is safe to surmise that America, even if she cannot see her way to any form of official participation, will be asked to allow her citizens to act in their individual capacity. A neutral Chairman is greatly to be desired, and an American would be the nearest thing to a neutral who can be procured. Two Americans well fitted to fill the post may be named as affording examples of ideal Chairmen, though we ought to add at once that we have no notion whether either of them would feel able to act. The two men in question may be named in order of seniority. They are Mr. Root and Colonel House. Mr. Root is a great international jurist and also a man conversant with all business details, especially on the legal side. He knows how business is done and how credit is the petrol or gasolene of indus- try. Colonel House is not so deeply read in business or law ; on the other hand, he knows at first hand all the chief men of Europe—statesmen and diplomats. He knows also the hidden wheels and springs that moved the makers of the Versailles Treaty. Last, and most important of all, he has judgment. It would be difficult to name any man in Europe or America who has so sure an instinct as he for seeing what is possible and what impossible. It is to him like a sixth sense. Either of these men, if nominated as Chairman, would strive to the end for a just and lasting settlement and would do the fair thing by all concerned. Neither of them would fail in courage or consent to a sham agreement, or would _consider for an instant whether he himself would gain or lose in personal prestige and reputation by his action.
But this matter will probably have been decided before these pages reach our readers' hands. Therefore, at the moment it will be more profitable to deal with wider and more general considerations. The first and most import- ant of these is the position of France. Our reply to Germany, as we have pointed out, is sure to be an accept- ance of Germany's offer to abide by the decision of an International Commission. France, unless some great change takes place in the spirit of her Government—a change rather to be hoped for than to be expected—will persist in her refusal to agree that a new and impartial .estimate of Germany's capacity to pay shall be made by a method which will have a voluntary sanction and will not be merely an agreement extorted by fear. Yet the need for a new estimate has become patent. The French policy of occupation and its disastrous effect on German credit and German mentality have made Germany a very much poorer country than she was before the French marched into the Ruhr Valley. The French have not only got nothing tangible out of the Ruhr, but have spent enormous sums in their chase for the reparations which have not been paid. And they have injured their own credit and their own financial position, not only by the spending of money but also by the great fall in the value of the franc. Further, they have postponed and impaired, if not permanently destroyed, Italy's and Britain's hopes of ever getting anything substantial out of Germany in the way. of _reparation payments.
But these facts, though so patent to us and so deplorable, the French Government will not and perhaps cannot be expected in all the circumstances to admit. Such confessions of failure are never easily obtained. Unfortunately, however, in asking France to take joint action with us in reply to the German Note, we are necessarily asking her to own that she has made a huge mistake. Possibly some method may be devised for concealing this fact by a diplomatic formula. If it can be devised, by all means let us adopt it, for the very last thing we want to do is to make France lose " face "—or rather let us say the French Government—for if France has suffered it is because she has been misled and badly advised. Still, the fact remains that the French policy in the Ruhr, so far as reparations are concerned, has failed ; and, if it is con- tinued, the results of its failure must be immensely increased and intensified. For us to try and ignore the fact could only result in the increasing of the danger. This being so, we are bound to take action based on the inevitable conclusion that France has made a blunder. In these circumstances it seems to us that the best thing that any true friend of France can do, though it is a most ungrateful piece of work, is to try and point out to her the grave dangers that she will run if she does not ignOre the call of pride and consent to help us to get a real settlement—a settlement which, though it cannot be satisfactorily made without her, can and will be ultimately procured, though in a mangled and imperfect form and of reduced value.
If France should refuse and we, in company with Italy, and probably in the end with Belgium, with the good will of the people of the United States and also with the tacit encouragement of the Neutral Powers of Europe who want peace and safety above all things, proceed to deal directly with Germany and to obtain an impartial estimate of Germany's capacity to pay, the isolation of France will be absolute and will be evident. We must hasten to say that we do not mean by this that France will be in danger of any hostile acts from us, or from any other of her Allies or the associated Powers. Again, she can be in no danger from Germany so long as Germany remains disarmed and under our influence. Though we cannot in the nature of things check Germany's passive resistance, we can, and of course should, if anything so mad was ever dreamed of, prevent any aggressive acts by Germany upon France. The danger of the isolation of France which we dread and foresee will be of a, very different kind. France, isolated and in co-operation with no other Power, would, in the first place, be sure to find minor diplomatic troubles and difficulties in North Africa and Syria, in the Far East, indeed in every other quarter of the world. It could not be otherwise. The Power without co- operators always comes off badly in diplomacy, even though her physical strength is very great. Again, there would be no hostile action of any kind, but France would miss that " give-and-take " in diplomacy which is so much employed by the Powers that are in constant and friendly touch with each other.
Still worse must be the effect of the isolation of France upon French credit. Credit is a very tender plant, and though no doubt France prides herself on her economic isolation, or, as she would call it, inde- pendence, she would, we venture to say, find herself a good deal more dependent on others than she now imagines herself to be. Even so-called self-sufficing nations are in trade members one of the other. If not, why should the value of the franc so clearly reflect her losses through the policy of s occupying the Ruhr ? Why, too, should French financiers worry over_ the fall in the exchange, as undoubtedly they do ? No doubt it will be said that in spite of all these considerations France will meet us with a rigid non possumus. She will, we shall be told, not only not budge one inch in the Ruhr, but will go on as she has been going on during the past six months, and even the past week, i.e., occupying larger and larger stretches of territory, tying up the population of the Ruhr more tightly in their bonds, preventing more sternly the movement of men or of goods in the occupied area, sentencing to death those who resist, and generally increasing her strangle-hold on Germany's richest pro- vince. No doubt she can, and probably will, do all these things ; but if she does, it will not merely intensify her isolation, but will vastly increase the financial and also the military drain on her national resources. The German people who are now resisting France must inevitably be encouraged by seeing France isolated. Though we shall try to the best of our ability to prevent this from happening, we shall in fact be unable to do so.
The practical result will be that the occupation will have to be gradually spread over a wider and wider area, and become more bitter and fierce in character. Such must be the outcome of resistance. This means that, before many months are over, France will have to choose between military jeopardy or a waste of men and money which will be as weakening as an actual war. Nor is this all. If France is provoked, as she may well be, to resort to desperately stern coercion, it will be impossible to keep the public opinion of Europe and the world as cool as it has hitherto been. Already independent testimony is beginning to leak out regarding the French severities and the results of policing a European country so civilized as the Rhineland largely by African troops. Intensified resistance, put down with severity and under conditions which will mean the employment of large numbers of coloured regiments, might easily cause an explosion of feeling throughout the white man's world which would very greatly embarrass France. The Separatist coup d'etat in the Rhineland, which is discussed with great judgment and detail by the Cologne correspondent of the Times in Wednesday's issue, is a matter of no small importance ; but we venture to say that, if the French were to yield to the temptation to encourage this movement, or even if they only allowed it to take place, they would not find the ultimate aim of their extremists, who would create a so-called independent Buffer State under French control, brought any nearer. There is enough race feeling left in the various States of Europe to make them view with horror any attempt to break up a nationality like that of the Germans by encouraging an anarchic and anti-national revolution. France her- self in a calmer mood may think of her Mandate in Syria and her North African possessions, and of the possibility of similar movements in those lands.
Here we are drawing near to the essential point. The people of France, as apart from their Government, are still a pacific people at heart and want security and a quiet life. Indeed, they want it so much that they are inclined to get " panicky " about it. Will not some wise man arise between the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to point out to them that neither isolation nor the creation of a human hornets' nest on their Eastern frontier will help them to get security, or even that military domination of Europe of which some of them dream ? That last wild policy is already rousing, and, if persisted in, will rouse still more vehemently, the jealousy of the whole white world. Neither Europe nor America is in a mood to tolerate militaristic Imperialism under Republican any more than
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