Commonwealth and Foreign
MR. ROOSEVELT'S NEUTRALITY DEFEAT
By ERWIN
THE great contest between President Roosevelt and the Congress over control of foreign policy has marched to a sudden and unexpected denouement. The Congress, temporarily at least, has won. It is, to be sure, a victory mostly in the field of symbols and prestige. Congress has said that the arms-embargo provision in the present Neutrality Law is not to be repealed, that the President is not to be given a free hand to permit the supply of arms, ammunition and instruments of war to such nations as can pay for and transport them. Rather, in the event of war, the President is directed to impose an embargo on the ship- ment of these products to belligerents.
But under the law, American steel, cotton, motor-cars, copper, oil, other minerals and foodstuffs—indeed, all supplies except the narrowly defined instruments of war— are freely available to all nations which can pay and trans- port. The arms-embargo restriction apparently will apply to aircraft, and this is no doubt important to Great Britain and France. It may be possible, however, for the Presi- dent to avoid recognising that war exists, as he has done in the Far East, or to permit shipment of aircraft engines separately, or transhipment of them, or otherwise avoid the restrictions of the embargo, however ungracefully. Or—and most Americans think this is likely to happen—in the event of a war public opinion may sweep all restrictions aside. In a practical sense, therefore, should war break out, the re- tention of the arms-embargo may not mean a great deal.
It does mean a great deal, however, to Mr. Roosevelt's prestige in the never-ending contest between the American Congress and the Chief Executive over the control of foreign policy. Congress has said, by its refusal to follow the wishes of the President and Secretary of State Hull, that it mis- trusts the Administration's current foreign policy, and believes it to be too interventionist. This condemnation, at least, has been made by the minority of the Senate which— by threat of a filibuster—was able to prevail.
Whether the victory will be long-lived or not remains to be seen. Some acute observers feel that the Senate is more isolationist than the country, and that the President can appeal to public opinion on his forthcoming trip across the continent, returning to Washington to call a special session of Congress and reverse the decision. That may well be the Administration strategy, for Secretary Hull, on learning of the Senate's decision, said: "The peace and security of the United States require the Administration to continue to seek changes in the Neutrality Law."
In any event, the foreign-policy issue rushed to a swift climax. The Senate opposition struck quickly and decisively. On July 7th, under the leadership of the veteran isolationist, Senator Hiram Johnson, of California, it was announced that no fewer than 34 Senators had banded together to fight by every means—including the filibuster—against any change in the present arms embargo restrictions. Now 34 Senators are not a majority of the 96-member Senate, but they are more than enough to ensure victory in any filibuster fight. They could prevent a vote indefinitely, and thus bring about the speedy breakdown of the nominal majority. Then, on July Iith, the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted by 12 votes to II to postpone all neutrality legislation until the next session of Congress. That made an end of the matter, to all intents and purposes, and for the present the President is defeated.
The balance of power in that 12 to II vote was swung by two Senators whom the President tried to defeat last year in his effort to "purge" conservative Democrats from office. He went into the State of Georgia to campaign against Senator Walter George, and his closest associate opposed Senator Guy Gillette in Iowa. These two votes have now tipped the balance against the President on neutrality. It is particularly unfortunate that such an im- portant decision had to be taken in a strictly partisan atmosphere. For there were, and are, numerous Senators who have a great deal of sympathy for the President's foreign policy and feel no basically isolationist convictions, who felt that they could not relinquish this opportunity to _ overturn Mr. Roosevelt personally. It was, therefore, a personal blow at the President, struck by a possible minority, and not a valid decision on foreign policy.
For that reason, the decision is apt to be profoundly mis- understood in Berlin and Rome. It is not that a Senate majority, or even a minority cabal, wishes to halt the Presi- dent's campaign, by " methods short of war but stronger than words," against the authoritarians. It is simply that this successful group does not want the President to go farther, they oppose granting him additional discretionary authority, and they are joined by Republicans and others who feel they simply have to vote against Mr. Roosevelt whatever the circumstances.
As a consequence, Congress once more has a partial seat in the foreign policy saddle. But the President and Mr. Hull are still there, too. A balanced policy is the obvious result. Messrs. Roosevelt and Hull will continue as they have been doing, perhaps more carefully and discreetly, than in the past, and they will not have authority to go ahead in an even more stem crusade against the dictatorships.
The vote was a major victory for those various groups in Congress and the country who want to stay out of war, who are not clear as to the means of doing it, and who there- fore are reluctant to cut the anchor-line of partial safety which they consider—nominally at least—that the arms embargo affords. It is a product of the confusion which besets American thinking on foreign policy today, and a by-product of the political opposition to Mr. Roosevelt which in its main lines has little to do with his attitude toward Germany and Italy.
Doubtless numerous Senatorial spokesmen will do as much as they can to prevent the decision from being misunder- stood in Berlin and Rome. Senator Pittman, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, did his bit on the heels of the vote. He announced that the vote now made it imperative to hold a special session of Congress in the event of war. This was a direct forecast that if war breaks out the United States will speedily change its neutrality legis- lation. Moreover, Senator Pittman pressed his resolution to empower the President in his discretion to impose an embargo on all American exports to Japan. It is not certain, and rather unlikely, that this measure will pass. The Administration itself is doubtful of the wisdom of such drastic steps. But that the proposal is advanced, and given a hearing at all, is an evidence of Congress's willingness to strike a blow at the aggressors so long as the President is not manoeuvring into position thereby.
Numerous New Dealers willing to follow the President on domestic matters were among those opposing him on neutrality. Therefore it is a mistake to assume too much from the vote in the• way of dimmed prospects for the third term. But undeniably there is a dent in Mr. Roose- velt's armour of invincibility. It is late in his second term. The gilt is off the gingerbread. From time to time you can sniff the winds of potential reaction. But the President is the ablest politician of them all, an acute judge of public opinion, and in the past he has generally been able to laugh last. So it may be on neutrality, and perhaps sooner rather than later.
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