THE BASIS OF BRITISH STRATEGY
The Defence of Britain. By Liddell Hart. (Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.)
A BooK by Captain Liddell Hart on this subject cannot fail to be of interest at the present time. His was the one voice to plead intelligently the cause of army reform in the militarily lean post-War years. Unlike most reformers, he was in the end listened to, and called upon by those in authority to co- operate with his advice in putting through many of the
measures that he had long advocated. The part of the book in which he describes from first-hand experience the progress of army reform makes a document of considerable historical interest.
He is at his best on the subject of training. All soldiers could profit by his remarks on the subject. His study of tactics has led him to the conclusion that only really well- trained infantry, confident in their weapons and themselves, can live on a modern battlefield. Here he comes down to the root of the matter:
" A great change in outlook and atmosphere is needed if service in the infantry is to attract the keen young men of this genera- tion. They have heard too much from their fathers of the Somme and Paschendaele. If the infantry spirit is to be revived the causes of its decay must be frankly recognised and adequate treatment applied. The infantry must be shown, not merely told, that theirs is a higher role than that of the supporting arms, calling for more skill and initiative than are required of the man who belongs to a gun-crew. A proper appreciation of their role should lead them to be regarded as a corps d'elite, not as cannon-fodder."
In the first part of his book he makes an attempt to answer Foch's immortal question, " de quoi s'agit il?" He has always been an advocate of the return to what he calls our " traditional " policy of limited liability warfare, and he opens
on this note. He harps again on the relative strength of the defensive as compared with the offensive under the conditions of modern war, and goes on to express doubts as to the technical possibility of a decisive victory. On other and wider grounds he doubts whether decisive victory is even desirable. He is a strong advocate of Collective Security. " That conclusion was indicated on strategic grounds alone. But it also took account of the higher aspect of strategy— that a secure base must depend on morale ; and this, in its turn, on a secure moral basis."
This part of the book is the least satisfactory. Indeed, much of what he says here seems calculated to undo the good that he has done elsewhere. To the citizen soldier, soldiering and war are means to an end, not ends in themselves. The end he pursues will always be a secure peace. Our Higher Command made many mistakes in the last War, but nobody who saw the collapse of Turkey, or who followed the retreat- ing German army into the Rhineland, could doubt the com- pleteness of our ultimate victory. The fact that victory was not capitalised in the form of secure peace was the fault of the statesmen rather than the soldiers. The opportunity was there and it was not taken. And it is worth while examining to what extent the almost indecent haste of our demobilisa- tion and the very general desire on the part of Englishmen to return to our " traditional " policy, which meant in practice disinterestedness in the affairs of Europe, was responsible for the state of affairs that has now arisen. That is certainly the impression that I carried away after spending the years 1920 to 1930 in Germany, five of them as Liaison Officer with the French army of the Rhine.
I doubt if men will ever give of their best unless they are fighting for victory. Oliver Cromwell discovered this great truth. This applies particularly to the infantry, on whom in these days the bulk of the casualties will inevitably fall, whether in attack or defence. And there will always be occasions in war where it is necessary to take the tactical offensive. The enemy will not always be so obliging as to attack you. Even Captain Liddell Hart admits as much. " The advantages of the general defensive could be enhanced, its risks diminished and its common value increased by combining it with a harassing ' offensive "; as an example of which he goes on to suggest local and limited attacks against weak points on the enemy front. It must be obvious that without this the enemy could contain us with negligible forces on the west and throw his whole weight against the east. It is another weakness of the book that in the part entitled Forward Positions he only considers the Centre (France), the Left Flank (the Low Countries) and the Right Flank (Switzer- land). There is mention of Spain, but it is clear that our Right Flank extends a good deal further even than this. A very eminent French soldier has given it as his considered opinion that the final decision in the next war, should it come, will be settled in Eastern Europe.
To return to the question of our " traditional " policy. A year ago I found myself acting as an " Observing Officer " in Czecho-Slovakia, superintending the transfer of the Sudeten areas to the control of the German army. From my experi- ences at that time, and from subsequent contact with candid French friends, there was burnt indelibly on my brain the lesson that in future this country could not afford to take more out of the common pot in the form of security, of wealth, of Empire or of anything else, than she is prepared to put back. There may have been something to be said for our " traditional " policy in the eighteenth century. In any case, we could then afford to disinterest ourselves to a far greater extent from events on the Continent. If our, or our Allies', arms met with disaster on land we could safely retire behind our moat and wait for the tide to turn. Today we cannot do this for two reasons. First, air power ; and, second, the technique of the modern Totalitarian conqueror, which makes it infinitely more difficult than before for a people once beaten to stage a come-back. The modern version of our " traditional " policy has been pretty effectually seen through. Neither Collective Security, nor, for that matter, the continued existence of the British Commonwealth and the ideals for which it stands, is possible on a limited liability basis. The secure moral basis on which British strategy must ultimately rest depends in the last resort on our willingness to stake everything on the furtherance, rather even than the defence,
of the ideals for which we stand. B. T. REYNOLDS.
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