THE STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY C APTAIN LIDDELL HART'S new book
is reviewed on another page of The Spectator this week ; but some of the larger issues with which it deals deserve further attention here. For apart from Captain Liddell Hart's account of Great Britain's new defences, of Army reform, of the armaments of Great Britain's allies and potential enemies, his general argument is of vital im- portance. It is based on the conception of collective security, the same conception which inspired idealists to strengthen and develop the League of Nations, which has been mocked at by so-called " realist " statesmen as a form of midsummer madness, to which at length, in a mutilated form, the British Government has returned as the only safe foundation for its foreign policy. This dream of idealists and utopians Captain Liddell Hart accepts as the most serious of military realities ; and that the military themselves should have arrived, on strategic grounds, at precisely the same conclusion as those who have tried to find a moral basis for foreign policy is the most encouraging feature of his book. It may be noted that Captain Liddell Hart is realist enough to realise that the moral content of the idea of collective security is in itself a factor of strategic value. In his chapter on " The Conditions of Defence " he writes : "Years ago, a survey of the strategic situation of the British Commonwealth led me to the conclusion that the best chance of its continued security lay in fostering the system of collective security. That con- clusion was clearly indicated on strategic grounds alone.
But it also took account of the higher aspect of strategy —that a secure base depends on security of morale : and this in turn on a secure moral basis." These lines should be imprinted on the minds of every British statesman.
The idea of collective security offers a hope by which men can live and for which, if need be, they will die.
The immense interest of The Defence of Britain is that it attempts to describe the military strategy by which that hope can be realised ; because of its different objec- tives, it is a strategy which differs profoundly from that which has been advocated by military thinkers in the last 15o years. The only purposes of a war in pursuance of collective security are (i) to resist aggression, (2) to demonstrate to the aggressor that aggression cannot succeed. If these two purposes are achieved, the war is won, though victory in this sense differs completely from the victory at which soldiers and strategists have aimed in the last too years. To them victory has meant, according to the doctrine of Clausewitz, the destruction of the enemy ; in the totalitarian theory of war this doctrine is pushed to its extreme limits But for the strategy of collective security, victory implies no more than a successful defence against aggression. The enemy may remain in the field, his armies in battle order, though impotent to push an offensive home ; so long as aggression is repulsed and it brings no gains to the aggressor, the aim of collective security is achieved. Captain Liddell Hart adds wisely that in such cir- cumstances there is a greater probability of a just and lasting peace than when, as in 1918, the enemy is decisively defeated and incapable of resistance.
Captain Liddell Hart has little difficulty in showing that a defensive strategy is favoured by the development of modern warfare. Modern wars have shown that the defence becomes progressively stronger ; and even the air menace can be overcome by efficient anti-aircraft and air-raid precautions. On the other hand, the offensive becomes progressively more expensive, more wasteful of life, and more difficult to prosecute successfully. Indeed, even a successful offensive may weaken the attackers so much as to contribute directly to their defeat. Thus the great German offensive in spring, 1918, was the direct cause of the final collapse ; as Captain Liddell Hart says, the German Army committed suicide. Later wars have only confirmed the con- clusion drawn from the battles of the Great War that, where the antagonists are equally well armed, no offensive can succeed unless a superiority of at least 3 tot has been achieved.
Thus to pursue a defensive strategy, such as is dic- tated by a system of collective security, is to engage in war with a decisive advantage ; and the aggressor is handicapped because he must necessarily take the offensive. In a coming war in Europe Captain Liddell Hart calculates that the Axis Powers can place a com- bined total of perhaps 210 divisions in the field, to which France could oppose no more than 50-70. Even given large-scale assistance by Great Britain, and the diversion of a large part of the Axis forces to the Eastern fronts, there is no likelihood, under such odds, of the Western Powers achieving the necessary superiority for a successful offensive ; equally it can be said that the superior strength in the field of the Axis Powers is not such that they could conduct a successful offensive in the West. It is, however, an obvious deduction from the situation that the greatest need of the Western Powers is to constitute an Eastern Front which can offer an equally impregnable defence against a German offensive. This can certainly be done with the aid of the Soviet Union ; without her aid the Eastern Front would be exposed to the greatest dangers. Thus both the development of modern war and the , objectives of a policy founded on collective security dictate the strategy which has to be followed ; the moral objective and the military objective coincide. There is a further conclusion to be drawn which offers some encouragement in the desperate condition of Europe today. A defensive strategy which successfully with- stood the offensive of the aggressive Powers would itself be the strongest proof that aggression will not and can- not pay ; on the other hand, the self-imposed limitations of such a strategy are a guarantee that a war undertaken to defend collective security would not seek any further objectives. Such considerations show that, so long as the final aim is not forgotten and strategic realities are respected, even the war with which Europe is threatened may finally conduce to peace. By showing that even war has turned against the aggressor Captain Liddell Hart has produced the strongest of arguments in favour of the policy of collective security.
Previous page
