GERMANY'S MISGIVINGS
By ROBERT POWELL Berlin.
BRTTADI'S dear and insistent statements regarding its attitude towards any German attempt to change by force the status of Danzig have begun to make even the most optimistic Nazis believe that at last the Western Democracies are serious in their pronouncements. Such a change is not recorded in the Goebbels-controlled Press, but is evident in the manner in which a foreigner is asked whether the English think Danzig is worth fighting for, or the hesitance or hope—it depends upon the speaker's atti- tude towards Nazidom—in the question, " Are the English really going to do something this time? "
Dr. Goebbels may _fulminate against Britain and repeat ad nauseam that the British have lost their nerve and are the greatest hypocrites the world has ever known, but his success can be measured by the general realisation here that he is following the time-hoLoured trick of seeking to attribute to others one's own weaknesses. The quick- change attitude of the German Press during the past few weeks has demonstrated beyond doubt that while it is " a piano which shall play only Nazi tunes," it has been so played that the average German gets out of this atonal music only a confusion of sound, and is left bewildered. He has also come to see that his own Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment needs to return for enlighten- ment to his master's voice in Mein Kampf, where the author of that classic work talks of not underestimating the strength of one's opponent. The change which has come over Britain since it awoke to the real meaning of the Munich Agreement is clear to most thinking Germans, but on Dr. Goebbels it makes no impression. In consequence, it is not surprising to find that many of the older genera- tion here today are prophesying that should war come, the disillusionment among the Germans will be as great as it was in 1914.
But if once this possibility of a war over Danzig is admitted, then the misgivings of the people here are in- creased a thousandfold. The question whether the British or French are prepared to fight for Danzig should really be stated differently—whether the Germans are pre- pared to fight for it. The Nazis are certainly willing to face the sacrifice of a few lives and even a war with Poland, since their booty might be the Polish Corridor (Pomorze) and Upper Silesia as well, but not if it means a European struggle. This they cannot stand.
If, then, the Germans are more or less convinced that this time the Democracies mean what they say, why then do they avoid a rational settlement of the Danzig issue? The answer is naturally that in the Third Reich the decision rests with one man, and that it depends upon whether Adolf Hitler is convinced on this same point. Few things indicate the throw-back in twentieth-century political developments so much as the fact that the future of 8o,000,000 people, and of war or peace throughout the world, depends upon the decision of one man The Spectator last week rightly insisted that the important question was how could Hitler be convinced, and also indicated a very effective step to that end. The Nazis themselves have so long used words ambiguously that they cannot believe others mean just what they say. Hence, deeds alone count with them. One im- portant deed of this sort would be the inclusion of men in the British Cabinet who have clearly revealed that they understand Nazi aims and are prepared to combat them in the only way which is understood here. Some readers will immediately assume that this means war. As a matter of fact, unless. Hitler feels that Britain is, embarrassed else- where, in the Far East or through the failure of the negotia- tions with Russia, this is the only way to bring him to reason. Otherwise, he will be tempted again to believe that shortsightedness or petty, personal or party considerations are given precedence over Empire interests.
There are hundreds of Germans, many of them Nazis, who would today like to have the courage to tell Hitler that he should cry " Halt! " They see clearly what will happen should a war come, but are unable to translate their views into action because six years ago they sacrificed their right to self-expression and could only regain it today through open opposition. This applies in some degree even to those in the intimate circle of the Fiihrer. Some of them have tried in the past to venture contrary opinions, but their words of moderation have unfortunately been disproved—on the short-time view—in Austria, Czecho- Slovakia, &c., so that they hesitate to speak today. Others of them wait only to know Hitler's will and then rush to fulfil it, for purposes of personal advancement. In fact, as a prominent German told the writer recently, " we have built up a system in which we cannot talk to the head of it, and some of us wonder sometimes whether we do not wish for a war in order that we can restore our self-respect. What we gained in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia we have lost in ourselves." • But it would be entirely misleading to imagine that it is merely for such moral reasons that present-day Germans have misgivings about the present situation. It is rather because each realises that a war would be a catastrophe out of which his particular " Germany " had little to gain. Take the Nazi leaders themselves. When they stop to think they know that the outbreak of war means not party, but military, control, with the strong probability that even Hitler himself would have to take a secondary place in the councils of his army chiefs. They know also that while the Reichswehr appreciate all that Hitler has done for rearma- ment, the generals would be the first to destroy party hegemony.
As for the military authorities, they are not in favour of a war. They know that they still lack reserves of both trained men and raw materials for any war which would last more than a few months, and despite all the talks of unity among the people, their secret service has told them that strikes and sabotage followed by the general unrest which air raids and shortage would bring hardly create the conditions of victory. They also know from business reports the deplorable conditions in which the country is carrying on at present. Much false prophecy has been written about the coming collapse of Nazi economy during the past few years, but it is one thing to continue to exist in peace time and another to start a war on such con- ditions as exist here today. Even the most optimistic German openly admits the existence of inflation, while one important banker stated recently in private conversation that prices could not be maintained for more than six months, and that during the next twelve months z o,000,000,000 RM worth of Gutscheine (payment-certifi- cates) would be forced upon an unwilling business world. Add this to the fact that Germany is only 56 per cent. self-sufficient in fats (even including whale-oil supplies, which would cease in war), that even with Rumania's oil supplies the Reich's motorised army could not carry on for more than a few months' campaign, and one realises why there is no enthusiasm for a large-scale war. The Italian Press has spoken loudly about the Duce's support for German claims in Danzig, but everybody here also knows how much Italy wants to avoid a war in which it becomes a tool of the Reich.
The Nazis, it should be emphasised a thousand times, will think only of a big war if they believe we are weak or hesitant. Otherwise, they will again postpone a settlement of the Danzig issue and Hitler' will either abandon or tone down his speeches during August. England carries a great responsibility for the turn which events may take in the next few months. Our strength, determination and under- standing of Nazi bluff, combined with a consistent policy of being willing to call it should the occasion arise, will decide world peace.
In the meantime, Herr Hitler could not do better than realise that a way to a peaceful solution of the Danzig issue has already been indicated in his own action in South Tyrol. The transfer of Germans from that region into the Reich in order to keep Italian friendship indicates that he is willing to violate his "Blut and Boden" policy for, higher national interests. Here, " blood " has been separated from " soil " in a way which the orthodox Nazi must consider shameless. But if this can be done in South Tyrol, why not settle the Danzig question in a similar fashion? Such a method of dealing with racial problems is certainly drastic, but it succeeded well in the case of Turkey and Greece, it could prevent the greater outrage of war, and it offers Hitler the opportunity of saving the Third Reich and Europe from calamity. And this would disprove all claims to hegemony in the Baltic most effectively.
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