SPECTATOR'S LIBRARY.

HISTORICAL lhosrAser„

The Fall of Napoleon ; an Historical Memoir. By Lieut. -Col . J. Mitchell, H.P.

Author of " The Life of Wallensteln," " Thoughts on Tactics," Scc. &c In thre volumes Niai8S011

TRPOLOGY,

Scripture, and the Authorized Version of Scripture : being the substance of two Ordination Sermons ; with an Appendix, containing Notes and a Glossary of Words which have become obsolete in the sense which they bear In the Translation of the New Testament. By Samuel Hinds, D.D., Prebendary of Csatleknock, and Chaplain to his Grace the Archbishop of Dublin.. Fellows; Hodges and &nigh, Bubiin.

FICTION,

Satanstoe, or the Family of Littlepage ; a Tale of the Colony. By J. Fenimore Cooper, Esq., Author of " The Spy," " The Pathfinder," &c. &c. In three volumes.

Bentley.

COLONEL MITCHELL'S FALL OF NAPOLEON.

THE object of this work is to take a searching and critical survey of Napoleon's career and conduct, in order to arrive at a true judgment upon the merit of that wonderful man ; which Colonel Mitchell maintains has been greatly overrated. The author originally proposed to have gone through the whole of Napoleon's life, but found that his work would have been extended beyond all bibliopolic bounds. He therefore cut down the earlier part of the history into a brief and rapid introduction, though not without some traces of deficiency in the callida junctura. The re- mainder consists of a series of books or acts, descriptive of the hero's decline and fall. The Russian invasion, rather rhetorically entitled " Moscow," opens the descending series ' • " The 'Maine of the Nations " embraces the campaign in Germany—the battles of Ltitzen, Dresden, and Leipzig with the subordinate combats, and the retreat across the Rhine. The third act is called " The Abdication " : it narrates the last struggle in France, the scenes before the treaty of Fontainbleau, and the residence in Elba. The fourth act stands out as " Waterloo " ; and contains the escape from Elba, the difficulties Napoleon laboured under, from the emergent Jacobins, when he had expelled the Bourbons, and an elaborate account of the brief campaign that began on the 14th or 15th June and terminated on the 18th at Waterloo. The " last scene of all, that ends this strange eventful history," is named "St. Helena " ; describes the conduct and temper of Napoleon in his exile, and enters somewhat upon his character as an imitator of Louis le Grand.

The essential nature of Colonel Mitchell's work is military frequently intermingled with moral criticism. There is, it is true, much of narra- tion, and in a formal sense the whole might be characterized as narrative. The story is exceedingly well told ; full, fluent, and readable; not de- void of rhetorical touches, but less inflated than Alison, with more condensation and a good deal more military knowledge. But the exposi- tion of the plan of a campaign, or the description of a battle, is subordi- nate to the military principle it contains. Remark is continually inter- mingled with the narrative, to call the reader's attention to faults or merits • and at the conclusion of each great event, the author enters into a critical examination more or less extensive. This, of course, has rather an im- peding effect; but the greatness of the events, the attraction of their in- herent interest, together with Colonel Mitchell's mastery of his subject, and his clear and forcible style, carry the reader along without weari- ness or a sense of heaviness.

The literary merit of The Fall of Napoleon is great. The author has examined all the original authorities, German as well as French; he has brought to his task professional knowledge, and some professional re- membrance, though, slight and juvenile. He also mentions as a quali- fication, that, with the exception of Napoleon and Murat, he has seen nearly all the principal actors named in his work: and this perhaps in- volves more fitness than appears at first sight. It shows that the author must have mingled in some of the scenes which are the subject of his pen, and have had his mind directed to them with that living attention which only an actor, however subordinate, can feel. The author has also given unity to his subject by considering Napoleon alone, and scarcely touching upon events of which he was not the principal actor or direct- ing agent, as well as by nearly limiting his inquiry to the military cha- racter of his subject. In point of style, or rather of mind, he is of the school of Napier; with less swell and less vigour than that great mili- tary describer, but with the same kind of art in making military descrip- tion intelligible and interesting. In a logical or philosophical sense the work is of less value. It is based on a paradox, which is never lost sight of—that Napoleon Bona- parte was little better than a fool, and very little short of a coward; that his capacity either civil or military has not only been vastly overrated, but that he really had little in either pursuit; that he was never equal to great occasions, but committal throughout his military career errors or blunders, from which he was only rescued by Fortune or the weakness or panic of his enemy, whilst where any personal risk was to be run, either fear or some other quality not more reputable entirely deprived him. o. self-possession ; in short, that he was a mere child of luck, indebted to circumstances for victory, elevation, and prosperity, but mentally very in- ferior to several of those generals and statesmen to whom he was opposed, and to some of his own subordinates. We think we could adduce proo. of this deduction of ours in so many words by Colonel Mitchell, but such is the general scope of the book, and often in particular passages very strongly expressed. Without at all falling into the common and exaggerated notions which it is the fashion to entertain of Napoleon, we must observe that Colonel Mitchell's theory comes under Hume's position, that "where a suppo- sition is so contrary to common sense, any positive evidence of it ought never to be regarded." No man raises himself from obscurity to emi- nence without ability of some kind or other, though it may only be the ability of an artful sycophant or intriguer. Napoleon Bonaparte raised himself in a few years from a lieutenant of artillery to be the first ma- gistrate of France, and that with the universal concurrence of the peoplev whose finances he rescued from bankruptcy and their social state from anarchy. He was then thirty. At the age of forty, he was the actual dictator of Continental Europe, sovereign of France, Italy, and part of Germany ; had allied himself with one of the oldest and proudest imperial houses in the world, and nominated several of his family to thrones as if they were clerkships. He encountered and successively overthrew all living commanders save one; he executed a road across the Alps, which was without a parallel for national diffi- culties ; he erected monuments of art in different places, especially in Paris, which combined utility and ornament, and if not models of a high style, were superior to those of his age ; whilst he gave to France a code which places him, according to those who have a theoretical and practical acquaintance with the subject, upon a level with Justinian and Theodosius. That circumstances, or if you like it, Fortune, assisted him in all this, is very true. Without a social convulsion that had over- turned all existing orders and privileges, destroyed all established preju- dices, too often suspended all ideas of morality or right, and made Con- tinental society a great scrambling-ground, such success would not only have been impossible, but the very idea of it ridiculous—a subject for burlesque. At the same time, the field was as open to others as it was to Napoleon. Hundreds of men had the same opportunity ; some had more advantages, because they were at the head of armies, or in office, when he was obscure. Barras, for example, had actually a power nearly if not quite equal to the Consulship ; but he could not keep it. Moreau, and many officers subsequently Marshals of the Empire, had martial op- portunities, without, as with Dumourier and Pichegru, the taint of trea- son or Royalism. But, though respectably successful, they could not conquer a country like Italy in one campaign, dazzle the world with the appearance of a military meteor, and impress France with the notion, no matter how, or how truly, that "this is the man to save us from terror- ists, anarchists, and foreign enemies." Stories of this general suggesting one operation, or that general another, have an interest, if true and phi- losophieally used ; but are idle, not to say ridiculous, when brought for- ward for the purposes of inferring that the subordinate was greater than the principal. Why did he not forestall the position ? He had the same course, the same or perhaps a better start ; and of all the many active Jacobins or Republicans who figured during Napoleon's obscurity, the fortunes of very few, we take it, were marred by their delicacy, or their scruples, or their tenderness towards human life. The play that is damned, the book which the reader throws away, are good in vain. Criticism as vainly assails the permanently successful work : particular censure& may be keen or cogent, but the whole defies the power of objecting words. And this is about the character of Colonel Mitchell's book. Particular parts are in the main true—such truth as may fairly pass in disputed questions : but the whole conclusion sought is not so much wrong as absurd.

There is, however, a good deal of truth in The Fall of Napoleon, a Military Memoir; though the author's paradoxical zeal has over- whelmed it, or at least given it so onesided a character as to lose much of its effect, and to make the whole conclusion appear like falsehood. Napoleon rose (or at least had the means of rising) to eminence, and fell, by one and the same principle—a popular uprising. With some allow- ance for national differences and changes of circumstances, the means were the same. The French Revolution and its wars were an outbreak of the people, right in its origin however wrong in its course, against a corrupt, tyrannical, and worn-out system. The nations at first were in- different or approving : it was only princes, courtiers, and nobles, who were really opposed to Gallic reform. The national spirit was quiescent, and the military force an effete formality, corruptly appointed, pedantic- ally led, and incapable of resisting the vigorous onset of enthusiasm. The folly and phrensy of the Jacobins quenched some of the zeal for liberty with which the Continental peoples at first regarded the French ; the systematic tyranny of the Empire, and the misery inflicted by its con- stant wars, changed this opposition into burning hatred; and Colonel Mitchell's title of the German campaign under the Allied Sovereigns, "The Rising of the Nations," is not a mere rhetorical flourish, but the expression of a principle. Europe rose against the Empire as France had risen against the Coalition.

There was something of resemblance, too, in the character of the mili- tary action, as well as in that deeper principle on which it was based. The forced levies of the Reign of Terror facilitated incessant combats, without any regard to human life; the want of money to pay the troops regularly, pushed to its utmost extent the foreign law of making the war maintain itself; the beggarly slenderness of their baggage, the ne- eessity of frequent movement from exhausted districts, with the military advantages rapidity often procured, made that a practice which was at first a necessity; and neither in battle nor on the march was the life of the troops, or what we call the economy of the army, thought of for a mo- ment. Bonaparte in his two Italian campaigns exhibited the highest mi- litary effects of which this practice was capable, and subsequently reduced it to a system. The conscription was only another name and a more regular form for the Revolutionary levies en masse; the contributions and forced requisitions were as odious and oppressive as the less regulated takings of the Revolutionary armies, whilst the employes of the Empire were tainted by a peculation from which the zealots were generally free; though the material appointments of the Imperial armies, with a &Ann- tion of zeal, might prevent the rapid and incessant marches of the sans- culottes, yet life and order, save fighting order, were as systematically neglected in military operations and military movements under Napoleon as they were of necessity under the Revolution. In the long run, this system contained the germs of self-destruction, as Wellington early pointed out from Portugal, and made it the grand pivot of British resistance : but to argue that Napoleon did not perfect it, and could not wield it— that he was an incapable or besotted or cowardly head of it, taking the advantage, of subordinates' ability, or of what gamblers call a run of luck -•-is ton idle.fordiscusaion. The system was, we think, ever defective—

it risked too much, by presupposing success when failure involved de- struction. It was the principle the poet applied to personal venture-

" He either fears his fate too much,

Or his desert is small,

Who will not put it on a touch

To gain or lose it all."

The vital and the fatal fault of Napoleon—for it cost him every thing save life, which he had better have lost—was in not seeing where his system could not be exercised and when it was not applicable. The first blindness led him to Russia, where, from the character of the country and the absence of population, his army could not be fed. The second was displayed in the German campaign, where he persisted in his old system of enormous risks, enormous loss of life, and inattention to de- tails,—as, in his non-withdrawal of the garrisons when time and cir- cumstances had almost reversed the position of the belligerents. For, independently of regular troops and British supplies, Germany was rising with a voluntary levy en masse, whilst France was exhausted in meu and apathetic or hostile in mind. The Allies could afford to lose probably two for one ; which, steadily persisted in, must secure an eventual triumph. Yet Napoleon exhibited no greater disposition to husband his resources, or avoid staking destruction upon a single card, than when he was in the opening or zenith of his career, and had Revolutionary France or half of Europe to fall back upon. Besides this fundamental error, which of course produced errors at every step, and faults of detail, which seem inseparable from operations performed upon such an extensive scale with such immense armies, Napoleon committed positive faults upon any system, and probably grievous errors judged by the principle of his own ; or rather, he did not promptly carry out his own principle. The Emperor, turned of forty, and sated with prosperity, had not the incessant activity and vivacity of General Bonaparte at twenty-seven, with his fortune to seek: he did not pursue an advantage or press an enemy as he did at Montenotte and the ensuing operations of his Italian campaign; though something must be allowed for the animus of the army. The heights of power and great experience might also have sobered the enthusiastic and ignorant dash of the youthful sans-culotte, and some depression have arisen from his great reverse of fortune in Russia. All faults, or errors, or mistakes, Colonel Mitchell was perfectly justified in pointing out, and he does it in full. His error lies, not in particular criticism, but in the deductions he draws from them all together. He does not use his criticisms to show that Napoleon's vanity and success had possessed him with an obstinate notion of his own infallibility— that he wanted judgment to thoroughly comprehend the bounds and capa- bilities of his own system, and versatility of mind to meet new circum- stances by new modes of action ; but endeavours to make out that Napoleon was not much above a perfect incapable and an arrant coward. Hence, we say, the work is a singular example of acuteness in its par- ticular parts and of absurdity in the whole. The Fall of Napoleon, however, is not without great readable inte- rest, or devoid of critical use. We have long since lost the " truly British " and perhaps correct judgment of Bonaparte's early contemporaries, which, whilst doing justice to his military abilities, pointed out his disregard of all understood rights and usages as one source of his success, denounqed his crimes without scruple, and painted him as a melodramatie actor and a blackguard. Even old Tories, ldte Scott and Alison, have overlooked his public selfishness and total want of principle, as well as all the misery it caused, in the greatness and brilliancy of his warlike exploits; have invested him in private with a simplicity and naturalness which he never appears to have possessed; and given him accomplishments and a bon- hommie which he only wore for any length of time together, when on board of a British man-of-war. What M. Guizot is reported to have called " les romances " of M. Thiers, will carry this beau ideal to a still greater extent and in a more florid style. It is, therefore, quite as well to have the other side of the case, although it is carried to an equal or greater extent from the true central line of judgment : and by this we mean, in its particulars, for Colonel Mitchell's general views are Mrely, to be received by very few. In fact, we think his theory may injure his work; people extending to particular parts the opinion they form of his leading crotchet. The greatness of the events, and the character of the style, which if not brilliant is mostly forcible, allow choice enough of striking military description for extracts ; but we will lean to what is more truly the cha- racter of the work, military criticism. The book appears to have been finished before Thiers's History of the Empire appeared; but the pre- face is devoted to a consideration of some of the errors of the Ex-Minister in his panegyric upon the Emperor. Here is a curious one.

THE STORY OF THE STORY OF 31ARESOO.

Al who are familiar with the histories and biographies of Napoleon, will know that the gain of the battle of Marengo is ascribed to an "oblique retreat, —a throw- ing back of the left of the right wing by an echelon movement, of which the village of Castel-Ceriol became the pivot. • The absolute extravagance of slip- posing each a movement practicable, when the situation of the parties is con- sidered, cannot be detailed here, nor is it necessary; we are only recalling the fact, that all accounts of the battle represent it as having been made. M. Thiers follows his predecessors, and only surpasses them in the glowing colours with which he describes the conception of this brilliant movement flashingon the mind of the First Consul, and its prompt and gallant execution by the troops. And yet it was never thought of tall.five gears after the battle had been fought! The fact is this. Napoleon' wishing, about the year 1808, to have a detailed account of his most brilliant victory published, caused materials for the work to be collected. The General and Staff-officers were consulted, and the Field-officers who had commanded regiments in the action were ordered to Paris for the purpose of being examined. Two German statements of no particular value, the one con- tained m The European Annals, the other in the New Bellona, were also taken to hand; and with these materials the work proceeded. Count de Castras was employed to draw the xdans; Colonel Vallonge wrote the text; and, when the whole was completed, Berthier' who afterwards lent his name tb the book, submitted it to the Chief Consul. It was returned with an endless number of alterations, and had to be worked over again; for the Consul desired that the retreat, which was still a direct one should be described as having been made-by " alternate batta- lions,"—though the testimony of all the officers declared, that the battalions, re-

faced to half their number, were falling back in utter confusion, one only being in condition to obey the orders of General Lame. The chief however had to be obeyed: and when the work was finisned to the Consul's satisfaction, it was prepared for publication. Napoleon, in the mean time, had been crowned King of Italy, and was about to hold a review at Ma- rengo; a circumstance which suggested to Berthier the idea of presen • ! him with a copy of the book on the very battle-field itself. Two were ac'' ly sent to Milan, and submitted to the Emperor. But a change had come over t be Imperial dream: the direct retreat across the plain was now far too simple a movement, and the grand conception of the " oblique retreat"—movement de conversion.--was then determined upon. And after various changes, which can- not be detailed here, the work so altered was published to the world, under the title of Relation de la Bataille de Marengo, par le General Berthier. Napoleon fearing, no doubt, that chance might cause this piece of historical forgery to be divulged, gave orders that the printed copies of the first version, only five in num- . ber, should be destroyed, the types broken up, the plates ground down, and the written document burned. Colonel Muriel succeeded, however, in saving a copy ; and in 1828, the whole transaction here briefly related was published in the fourth volume of the Memorial du Depdt General de la Guerre. As M. Thiers deviates In a slight particular from Berthier's Relation, the uncharitable will suspect that he knows the publication here mentioned; and the reader, who looks for truth in the pages of history, may possibly think that he ought to have known it.

The next passage, from the early part of the Russian campaign, ex- hibits the mixture of narrative and remark we have already spoken 04 and may be taken as a fair example of the writer's manner.

EARLY ASPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

According to Segur, Napoleon declared on entering Witebsk, that "the cam- paign of 1812 was ended; that he world rest there for the winter, organize Po- land, reform the army, and finish the war in the following year." Other writers deny this, and endeavour to prove that a halt at this point was altogether im- practicable. We are unable to decide between these conflicting assertions, but rather suppose that the Emperor had no very clear and well-defined intention on the subject; and that, whatever he might say, he acted, as usual, on the mere impulse of the moment. In the first instance, some rest was indispensably necessary; for the army was melting down rapidly; and the central corps, under his own command, had already lost upwards of 80,000 men, principally from sickness, few having fallen in action. -Half the cavalry were dismounted, and the still remaining horses greatly reduced in strength. " Our horses have no patriotism," said General Nansouti to the King of Naples, who complained that a charge had not been executed with due energy. " Our soldiers may fight with- out bread, but the horses will do nothing without corn." The cheerless aspect of the country, and the manner in which the war was now carried on, might also have given rise to reflection. Interminable pine forests -extended in all directions, cultivation was rare, and the few villages and hamlets scattered in these wildernesses were found altogether deserted. At the approach of the invaders, the peasantry, terrified by the excesses committed, forsook their homes, and with their herds and moveables sought shelter in the recesses of the surrounding woods. The soldiers, exasperated by want, and to punish the fu- gitives, often set fire to these deserted habitations. At first, this was as much, perhaps, the result of carelessness as of wantonness; but the Cossacks, never slow at learning such a mode of proceeding, soon reduced it to a regular system, and spared the French the trouble of laying waste the country, by burning every place ey left on their retreat. That the inhabitants purposely set fire to their dwellings, to prevent them from giving shelter to the French, is a mere fable: as unfounded is the assertion that the country was laid waste according to a regular system, and that the Co--sacks acted by superior orders in thus burning the houses and villages as they passed. It resulted entirely from a disgraceful want of discipline, which both parties were afterwards sufficiently anxious to disavow: the French attempted to conceal the brigand conduct of their own troops, by ascribing the general devastation to a Scythian mode of warfare adopted by their enemies; and the Russians were ready enough to let the savage folly of their Tartar hordes pass on the world for a noble display of generous patriotism, when the result had given them the benefit of the wide-spread desolation.

The following is curious if true ; and it does not represent heroes in a very imposing light on the most imposing occasion of their lives—for if one hero does so we may suppose others do likewise.

HEROES AT BORODDIO.

It was between eight and nine o'clock in the morning; and though great loss had already been sustained, the French had made no impression on any part of the line; none of the redoubts had yet been carried. We shall, therefore, while the action is thus in suspense, take a look at the two commanders, as they have been represented by credible witnesses who approached them during the conflict.

Napoleon had stationed himself nearly a mile from the scene of action; and is represented as sitting, or walking slowly up and down in front of the re- doubt captured on the 5th: he is described as using no personal exertion of any kind, seeming dull, heavy, and distressed, ifferent to the progress of the action, and only making signs of melancholy resignation whenever news reached him that any of his favourite officers had fallen. Segur describes this apathy to illness; but the existence of such a cause is denied by other writers; and it is certain that the Emperor was perfectly well during the remainder of the campaign, and for many years afterwards. Besides, any man possessing mind enough to exercise influence over the earthly mould of his composition must have been aroused from a mere passing indisposition by a battle in which thousands were falling in his very cause. But this heavy and dull inactivity agrees perfectly well with the description we have given of his conduct on other (cessions and seems, as we shall show, to have been in fall accordance with his real character. Between three and four o'clock, he went, according to Pelet's account, to reconnoitre the redoubt of Gorki, and became exposed to its fire; but at this time the action had almost ceased.

Kutusoft, though present in the battle fought by his army, .does not appear to have acted a more energetic part. Stationed in front of Gorki, he listened, says Clausewitz, "to the reports made to him, like one who did not exactly know where his head was." In reply to any information communicated, he answered, " Verygood, very well": to any measure proposed, he generally assented with the words, " Do so."

The following is a passage of pure description—the close of the battle of Leipzie, which really decided Napoleon's downfall. The Emperor has escaped with such of the army as could get across the river, and the Allies have forced an entrance into the city.

" By Blucher's orders, some light infantry had already forced their way into the gardens bordering the Elster, and were firing on the confused column flying along the causeway. But the French, undismayed by certain defeat, still main- tained the light; as if anxious to contrast by brilliant deeds of arms the gloomi- ness of the fate by which they were crushed; to show, even in the last of their great fields, that fortune might forsake the brave but could not subdue their valour. Forced back to the Western extremity of the city and suburbs, the chaotic mass filled the Western esplanade and all the avenues leading to the miter. Bandstadt gate; the last plank of hope, exposed almost defenceless to the storm of shot poured upon them by the assailants. At this moment sprung the Mine beneath the bridge. The tremendous explosion, the shriek of wild despair that nee above the deemed multitude, as numbers were precipitated through the fatal chasm into the watery abyss below, told that resistance was vain, and that the fate of battle and of nations was decided. The remnants of the vanquished then, seeing that hope had fled their banner, surrendered at discretion, and laid down

the arms they had so bravely wielded. • " At one o'clock, amid the wildest tumult of joy, the Allied Sovereigns made their triumphal entry into Leipzig. From all quarters, the multitude, frantic with delight to find themselves Berated from the yoke of foreignggress ., flocked round the victors, and rent the air with enthusiastic greetings: e music of the martial bands swelled the cheers of the exulting citizens; while the ringing of bells, the roar of artillery, and the firing of musketry, still sounding from the banks of the Elster, raised a mingled chorus of joy and terror, such as best be- came the closing scene of that great and fearful drama.

" The interior of the city presented an awful spectacle. Booths had been erected for the annual fair, the period of which was approaching; but, instead of being furnished with the merchandise of all nations, they were now filled with bleeding and wounded French, who had tried to shelter their last moments within these frail mansions. In all the streets and walks, heaps of dead, friends and foes, already stripped to the skin, and presenting their ghastly gaping wounds to sight, lay piled along the walls. Opposite the Randstadt gate, the Elster and the Miihlgraben were almost choked with men and horses, who had been precipi- tated into the streams by the pressure of the multitude, or had perished in at- tempting to swim or ford the treacherous waters, and now projected in horrid groups above the surface in all the frightful attitudes which death bequeaths to those who grapple for life even with the last remnants of parting-breath. Every- where was the image of destruction: broken carriages and ammunition-waggons, overturned guns, swords, cuirasses, knapsacks, broken muskets, cooking-utensils, lay around in mixed confusion; shattered windows and the marks of balls upon the houses, showed the fiery work which had been done. Streets and squares swarmed with Austrians, Prussians, Cossacks, and Baskiers ; numbers of French mixed carelessly with the throng: no one seemed now to think these meagre and half-famished apparitions deserving even of notice."

Besides his view of the character of Napoleon Bonaparte, Colonel

Mitchell has some peculiar ideas upon tactics. One of them is, that infantry cannot or rather ought not to resist cavalry. This crotchet, like his larger crotchet, sometimes gives a paradoxical air to his accounts ; of which an example may be found in his description of the cuirassiers and squares at Waterloo,—certainly bringing down the ro- mance of that operation. His theories sometimes lead him into a re- presentation of facts contrary to those which are usually received. For example, at vol. i. page 275 et seq. he gives an account of Anson's charge upon some French infantry, which leaves an impression very different from Napier's account of the same affair, in the fifth volume of his History, page 182, 183.