THE REVISED PEACE TREATY.
WE sincerely hope that the Allies will concentrate all their moral and intellectual strength on backing up the Peace Treaty in its latest form. We do not, Say that the Treaty is an instrument which does not contain in it the seeds of trouble ; it would be easy to indicate many points where trouble seems to be almost inevitable ; but we do say that the Treaty is nevertheless an instru- ment which deserves to be supported, and which gives the world as good a promise of security and peace as it is likely to get. Except by visionaries who believe in the creation of sonic kind of super-State—which if it had been created would have brought a larger crop of mischief than any other conceivable plan—it never could have been expected that a perfect Treaty of Peace would be drafted. The primary requirement of mankind is that we should have peace at the earliest possible moment. According to the scheme accepted at Paris, there is no finality in the Peace Treaty because it is to be Abject to more or less continuous revision by the League of Nations. But this very fact makes it the more futile and wanton to resist the Treaty, and to deprive it of a strong moral and intellectual backing because it can be shown to have numerous defects. Even from the German point of view there is vastly more to be gained by signing the Treaty than would ever he gained by a wicked attempt to keep the world in a state of chaos in order to snatch chance benefits out of the turmoil. No one in any country can live again in comfort and prosperity till the wheels of industry are set revolving. As soon as people turn their attention from Treaty-making, with all its attendant intrigue, and are able once Inure to avert their eyes from the spectacle of armed men, and bring their strength to bear upon the production of bread and clothes and houses' they will find themselves in a much more reasonable frame of mind. The grievances which seem intolerable now will not be found to be so very burdensome after all.
It may be said that the danger of deferring peace is greater in the United States than it is in Germany. It may be so, and we can well understand, for we have frequently commented upon the injury which President Wilson has done to the dignity and the functions of the Senate. But we earnestly hope, and we cannot help believing, that in spite of this the majority in the Senate will not postpone the benefit of all mankind-to prosecuting a most natural political quarrel with Mr. Wilson. We do not write these words lightly. We thoroughly appreciate the critical character of the dispute lietween the Senate and Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson is not only in a sense creating a precedent by ignoring the large share which the Senate has under the Constitution in the making of Treaties ; he is ignoring the Senate's responsibility in the most desperately important decision which has ever had to be taken in the name of the American people. Some of the most learned and able men in America disapprove of the whole idea of the League, which exacts from America the repudiation of her traditional policy of aloof- ness arid non-interference. Yet this idea is so firmly welded into the Treaty that it wouild be impoSsible to disentangle the terms imposed upon Germany from the clauses creating a League of Nations without annihilating them all. The first thing which strikes us in the reply of the Allies to the German comments on the Treaty is that the intro- ductory letter is bound to rout the Pacificists, who have been objecting to the Treaty throughout as inercilesis and
disabling. " Somebody must suffer " are the key-words to the reply, and it would not have been easy .to produce a nobler or more crushing answer to the pretension of Ger- many that she has a right to be treated on terms of equality. If the Peace is to be a Peace of justice, it must do justice, and justice in the circumstances, as the writer of the letter points out, requires that the people who have committed crimes should pay the penalty. Since this letter has been considered by public opinion, the out-and-out critics of the Treaty have indeed made a rapid retreat to the rear, and well they might. Those who continue their-condemna- tion are a small and dwindling minority. This fact is yet another reason for inducing the Allies to concentrate all their energy on ratifying the Peace immediately Germany has signed it—if she does sign it. Hundreds of attempts might be made at framing a Peace Treaty, and probably not one of them would command such general assent as is enjoyed by this one. Our 'first inclination when -we read the introductory-letter was to believe that it had been written' by Mr. Wilson himself. It certainly bears a strong resemblance to 'his style, if not to his substance. • Messages from Paris, however, tell us that it was written 'by Mr. Philip -Kerr. Whether Mr. Kerr is a conscious parodist or not we do not know, but the imitation is 'extremely good. -He has reproduced-Mr. Wilson at his-best. " Paro- dist," however, -is perhaps the wrong word, for it implies caricature, and there is not a suspicion of caricature in this-letter.. The bulk of the German commentary on the Peace Treaty. deserved the -fine rebukeit has received. It-was surely an excess of clumsiness on the part-of the Germans to accuse Mr.-Wilson of -bad faith,- and ,of a departure all along the line -from his Fourteen Points. The. Allies, with Mr. Wilson's approval, have therefore had no diffi- culty in showing thtit- the Peace Treaty in its final form is exactly the kind of Treaty which Mr. Wilson always contemplated. With what absnrd.inappropriateness such a protest comes from the Germans, who, as they proved in their countless provisional drafts of terms to be imposed -.upon the vanquished, • and as they proved again in their murderous Treaties with Russia and Rumania, meant to leave their victims, in Bismarck's terrible -phrase, nothing but their eyes to weep with ! To a certain extent the Germans do admit that they owe reparation to Belgium, but they acknowledge no obligation to other countries— Serbia, Poland, Rumania, and Italy—which have been partly or wholly devastated through the aggression of Germany. In a recent publication we find Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who has always seemed to us a man dragged at the chariot-wheels of Germany's infamous policy, and therefore a statesman of the less infamous German kind, still chopping words, minimizing the crime of Germany in violating Belgium, and trying after all to put the blame upon the French. The frame of mind which makes this kind of thing seem worth while is almost un- intelligible. ' What would the ordinary sensible man in the private relations of life do when he found out that in trying to commit a great wrong against his neighbours he had not only been found out but had been thwarted ? If he wanted to settle down once again in friendliness with them, he would of course tell himself that no apology could be too ample or too frank. His one desire would be to - show that he had learned his lesson, and that, so far from being likely to be a hostile neighbour in future, he had - been inoculated by experience against the virus that had made him temporarily mad. But the Germans do not proceed on those lines at all. They make their apology as slight as possible, and even while they talk a great deal about democracy and self-determination they show by their dealings with Russia and with Poland, and by their malicious penetration of many neutral countries with their peculiar propaganda, that they are trying still to ride the old horse • while they praise the new one. In their comments on the Treaty the Germans talk of the " great transformation " which has occurred in their nation. It is necessary to point out, however, that this great transformation was brought upon them against their will by events and by the crusading-valour of the Allies, and not by the beneficent impulses of their own hearts and minds. Unless there is an inner change the whole world will be very slow to trust Germany.
We have several times argued in the Spectator that Germany in paying compensation-should pay a fixed sum, and not be bound to an indefinite amount on the fatal principle that the better she worked -the more she would have to pay. That would be a disastrous principle from the Allies' point of view, if from. no other. We must
dangle the carrot ; we must. make it plain- to the Germans that the-more they put their hacks into-the job, the sooner they will get rid of their debt and-be free from-all external control, which must be exasperating to them even though they brought it on themselves. • The, acceptance by the Allies of the German-proposal that the- Allies in collecting -payment should co-operate with a German- Reparation Commission, yet to be created, seems to us sound. The Germans .necessarily. know more . about their country than we. do, and.theyknow bow payment could bemost readily and quicklymade. -The-Allies suggest that the German Commission should submit programme within four months. This arrangement of -course prevents a definite sum being fixed at the moment. If. the .Treaty- is to be signed without delay, no-fixed sum can be -named -in it. .But a fixed sum would-apparently be arrived. at after. a few months. The plan contains the :principle :'for which we have contended,- and seems torus in the circumstances the nearest approach -that can be contrived to mentioning a definite sum in'-the Treaty. Again, the Allies are very wise in expressing their-.willingness- Whelp! Germany, so -far as they can,:to,revive herindustries. Any one who is trying to extort-payment of a debtlas entered into a-kind of partnership with the- -debtor.. It is to the creditor's interest tolteep the debtor on his legs in order that the debt may be -paid, and -.it is against-the creditor's interest to -drive the debtor into the-Bankruptcy Court.
:The Allies have not made 'many territorial adjustments in response to the German criticisms. To begin with, we must express our profound- thankfulness that they have -remained firm about the former German colonies. None of these is to be restored to Germany. The native popula- tions are-saved from that miserable fate. Germany always regarded her colonies as a means—or rather an ultimate means—of making-money. She did not succeed even from that ignoble point of view, as nearly every one of her colonies was a charge upon the Imperial Budget. But the principle was utterly wrong and inexcusable in itself, and it would have been the last word in disgrace if the Allies had handed back any of the native populations to Germany till she has given a proof that she can mend her ways. The arrangements about the Saar, Memel, Heligo- land, and of course Alsace-Lorraine, hold good. • The most serious matter is the alterations made to the detriment of Poland. We have recorded these changes elsewhere, and -we need say here only that the reduction in width of the Polish corridor to the sea is likely in itself to be a temptation to the Germans to go on demanding reductions till the corridor disappears. As regards the plebiscite which is to betaken in Upper Silesia to decide whether the people will belong to Poland or Germany, we have no doubt that the plebiscite will be as satisfactory as such a thing can be, as it is to be taken under the scrutiny of the Allies. It cannot be denied, however, that if plebiscites for the purpose of self-determination are to become the practice of the League of Nations, a certain risk will be run. Consider the Balkans, for example. For generations the rival States in the Balkans have been vying with one another in pro- ducing statistics to prove that particular districts were occupied by people of a certain race, or of a certain language, or of a certain racial allegiance. Most. of those statistics were illusory. They were wildly partisan. Nobody very much believed in them, and they were the despair of travellers and students. Now imagine what might happen if some small unscrupulous and acquisitive State wanted to ensure a plebiscite going in its own favour. If not most carefully watched, it would -deport or exterminate those people who could not be relied upon to vote " right " in the plebiscite. It would let loose its bands. This is a danger which must -be constantly borne in mind. It was for a cognate reason that the Turks massacred the Arme- nians. They massacred them because they could not make them Turks. For a similar reason, again, -the Prussians expropriated the Poles of Posen whom they could not absorb.
The only other matter we wish to refer to is the status
of the Kid Canal. We should like to see this made an inter- nationalized waterway, but apparently the International Commission is no more heard. of. In our opinion, a great mistake has been made. So long as the Kiel Canal remains the property and the exclusive responsibility of Germany, the Baltic will remain a much less open sea than it ought to be for the safety and benefit of all Northern nations.
Some people may be inclined to exalt the patent defects of the League into insuperable obstacles. Apart from the territorial, weaknesses, there is of course always the possi- bility that the League of Nations will not work, and will become a cause of friction more than of pacification. On this occasion we do not propose even to touch that subject. As we have said, the League is so deeply embedded in the Treaty that it cannot be removed. We repeat, therefore, what we said at the beginning, that the true policy of all who wish for the healing benefits of peace as soon as possible is to put aside criticism, to remember the advantages rather than disadvantages of the Treaty, and to do their level best to create an atmosphere during the next few weeks favourable to the universal acceptance of the Treaty.
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