MR BOTHA PREPARES FOR THE SIEGE

Stephen Robinson finds that external

pressures on the South African government are merely entrenching opposed positions

Cape Town `PEACE — IT'S LOOKING GOOD' screamed the front-page banner headline in the Johannesburg Sunday Times, South Africa's biggest selling newspaper. The article did not appear in the last hours of the second world war, nor in the heady days of the gold boom in the early 1980s, but a mere seven weeks ago. A few days previously a conciliatory President Botha had announced to the world the repeal of the despised pass laws. The article under- neath the headline of 27 April noted that all the indications pointed to an early re- lease of Nelson Mandela under the direction of the Commonwealth group, the possible un- banning of the African National Congress, and a suspension of violence on both sides. Then African and Afrikaner nationalists could get around the table for a chat.

This story shows not merely the dangers fac- ing journalists who make predictions, but also how quickly things can change in South Africa. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible only to wonder how on earth anyone here took the motley collection of Commonwealth Eminent Per- sons seriously: or more specifically, why anyone expected the South African gov- ernment to take them seriously. Again with the benefit of hindsight, of course, we all know that the government could never be seen to reach an agreement with the EPG for they looked far too much like a mechanism for a Rhodesia-style sell-out along the lines of the Lancaster House talks.

And yet, fortified by discreetly placed leaks in Cape Town and London, which all stressed that absolute secrecy was essential as the negotiations were so delicately poised, we all put the finishing touches to our Mandela profiles, in order to be first on the telex as the great man stepped onto .the tarmac outside Pollsmoor Prison.

In South Africa, as Alan Paton put it, one has to be optimistic because to be pessimistic does not bear thinking about. So when the rand collapsed to one third of its value three years ago, people talked excitedly of the potential for an export bonanza. So when the South African de- fence force launches one of its occasional raids into a neighbouring state, this can be seen as a signal that the government is rallying Afrikaner ranks prior to Mandela's release. And when P. W. Botha makes a belligerent speech, it is assumed that he is merely placating hardliners in his cabinet and that deep down he remains a pro- foundly reformist statesman.

But there is little to be optimistic about in South Africa at present. As states of emergency go, this one is the real McCoy, and far more extensive and restrictive than the previous two imposed in 1960 and 1985. The only source of information now is a functionary in the bureau for informa- tion who holds a daily televised news conference, assuring him that temporary household fame gained by the Ministry of Defence official who managed news for the British during the Falklands war. Foreign correspondents have been warned that the term 'white minority regime' will no longer be tolerated, for there are now dusky-hued members of the cabinet. Where applicable, journalists must stress the number of those who die in black-on-black confrontations to empha- sise the complexity of the South African situation. Local newspapers have been placed in an almost impossible situation in attempting to present the news, and are liable to have complete print-runs seized with no recourse to the courts. It is impossible not to sym- pathise with a newspap- er editor who must in- terpret what a warrant officer in the South Afri- can police might consid- er subversive.

According to the current political wis- dom, the South African government began its latest 'retreat into the laager' with the unexpected bombing of the capital cities of the front-line states last month. This unfor- tunate piece of Boer belligerence, con- tinues the political wisdom, sabotaged the Commonwealth peace mission just as suc- cess appeared to be within its grasp. This analysis is based on several assump- tions, the most important one being that the South African government ever had any intention of entering into dialogue with the ANC. A great deal was made of a speech by President Botha two months ago in which he invited the genuine nationalists within the ANC to return from exile. It is high time,' he told parliament, 'for those ANC leaders who do not support commun- ism to step out, to come back to South Africa and to take part in constitutional action.'

This is in turn based on the seductive, yet sadly misplaced assumption, that the Afrikaner understands the black man, and vice-versa. Some commentators in both the English and Afrikaans press are fond of highlighting the mutual respect between African and Afrikaner nationalists. They both belong to the same continent, and after all, are there not striking historical parallels between their respective struggles for freedom and economic advancement?

Unfortunately, this is gravely misplaced. The government refuses to deal with the ANC not because they are communists, not because they refuse to renounce vio- lence, but because they want power. The ANC repeats ad nauseam that it is in- terested only in discussing the modality of the transfer of government. This demand for total power is not confined to members of the Politburo of the South African Communist Party; it is a central plank of African nationalism within South Africa, as it was in colonial Africa before. Any black organisation which demands any- thing less than that is doomed to political irrelevance.

At the very same time that foreign minister Pik Botha was impressing the Eminent Persons Group, and it was 'look- ing good for peace', the bureau for in- formation was putting together a glossy booklet for distribution to overseas opin- ion formers on the dangers of dealing with so scurrilous an organisation as the ANC. In the final analysis, the South African government simply strung the EPG along, until the tension was broken by last month's raids into Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

But the main lesson to be learnt from the current chaos in South Africa is the extent to which foreign governments have consist- ently overestimated their ability to prom- ote change in the subcontinent. The Amer- icans hoped they could clinch it with constructive engagement: what is heard now of the impending deadline for Nami- bian independence? What has happened to the new-found climate of regional peace, once exemplified by the Nkomati accord with Mozambique?

The EPG, another effort in that direc- tion, has also ended up on the rocks. The problem is that racialism is confused with apartheid, and apartheid with political power. The theory behind foreign attempts to bring change to South Africa is that with a little prodding the Boers can be per- suaded to stop being beastly to the blacks. They can be dragged over the hump of racial discrimination just as the Americans were before them. Racialism might be a state of mind. But apartheid is a real and formidable means of ordering a society. In South Africa no one, on the left or right, has a credible picture of what is likely to succeed white minority rule.

The Western world now looks certain to repeat the same error: that their sanctions, or 'measures', will force the government to liberalise further. Anyone who witnessed President Botha introducing the state of emergency in parliament last week would doubt that. The ANC was reduced to the status of the 'proven pawn' of the South African Communist Party. Mr Botha assured the country he was prepared to accept international condemnation rather than sacrifice 300 years of Afrikaner herit- age on the altar of chaos and decay. Prepare to meet thy siege, and the nationalist benches, and the conservative opposition members, loved every minute of it. Nudge nudge, wink wink, we knew all along that the EPG were a bunch of foreign troublemakers.

In the short term, Botha has probably calculated correctly in not worrying too much about the threat of economic sanc- tions. The truly destructive sanctions the severing of foreign credit lines, and the chronically collapsed rand — have already been imposed informally and without pressure from foreign governments. Against these genuine sanctions, threats emanating from Europe of a possible withdrawal of air links with the republic and a ban on the import of South African fruit are not unduly alarming. (The former will mean at worst that white South Afri- cans will have to jump into their Mercedes to catch a plane from Swaziland, and fruit farmers find alternative markets where governments are not so squeamish.) Be- sides, South Africans have a deep-seated belief that any measures imposed by an international body such as the Common- wealth or the United Nations are doomed to failure. Foreign multinationals will cer- tainly come under increasing pressure to leave, but let us be honest, the real disinvestment will start once there is black majority rule in South Africa.

So large is the National Party's majority that parliamentary politics in South Africa tend to be extremely boring. For this reason observers are wont to contrive artificial divisions within the nationalist caucus and even within the cabinet itself. In particular, it is tempting to view this state of emergency as a victory for the cabinet hawks over the doves, the sup- remacy of the military over the reformists. The Eminent Persons Group, commenting on this, acknowledged that there were differences in outlook but that even the more enlightened cabinet ministers were seriously out of touch with the mood of the black majority.

President Botha stands at the very centre of Afrikaner politics — and indeed the whole of white politics. He straddles both wings of the party, and the party is right behind him on the state of emergency. Most whites, and an overwhelming major- ity of Afrikaners, are as well. Order must prevail, whatever the costs. This was doubtless the opinion of white South Afri- cans as they drove past military vehicles on their way to work on Soweto day, especial- ly after the shock of the previous weekend's bomb explosion in Durban.

The relative calm of Soweto day last Monday showed that the security forces can still maintain order if the chips are really down. Already people are pointing out that it took Rhodesia 13 years to arrive at independence after UDI. Businessmen are now implementing their well rehearsed plans for import replacement programmes.

But the price will be desperately high and South Africa is certain to become a far less pleasant and affluent country. More and more residents with access to foreign passports will leave, the majority being highly qualified professionals who are more acceptable to foreign governments. The economy and the country will be permanently damaged. Dialogue has failed in South Africa not because the security forces got cold feet about the immediate threat to public order posed by Soweto day, but, more depressingly, because neither opposing party in South Africa has anything to say to the other.