THE END OF FRENCH AFRICA
Douglas Johnson on the real
meaning of France's moves in and out of Brazzaville
Paris THE HEADLINE was not unexpected: `The first test for cohabitation'. M. Jospin and the Socialists had not yet been in power for a week, so it was happening more rapidly than one had foreseen. But it was in the order of things: President versus Prime Minister. However, the subject of the crisis was a surprise: 'Widespread dis- turbances in Brazzaville'. And there was no crisis in cohabitation. After an emer- gency meeting there was full agreement between Chirac and M. Jospin.
Heavy fighting had broken out in Congo-Brazzaville. The troops who were loyal to the ex-President, Denis Sassou Nguessa, were in conflict with the army of the President, Pascal Lissouba. A French soldier had been killed and several wound- ed. Some 2,500 French residents were being threatened. Therefore Paris decided to send re-inforcements to Brazzaville and to seek a mediator. He could be, in the first instance, the mayor of Brazzaville, Bernard Kolelas, who also had an army since he was the leader of the so-called Ninja faction, but essentially M. Chirac placed his hopes in Omar Bongo, Presi- dent of neighbouring Gabon. It was decid- ed secretly by Paris that whatever the success of these attempts at mediation, once the army had evacuated the French (and others) from Brazzaville and Pointe Noir, 'Operation Pelican' (as it was called) would be ended and the troops would withdraw to Libreville (capital of Gabon).
There were more French troops in Braz- zaville than was customary since they were there to supervise the refugees from Mobutu's army in Congo-ex-Zaire fleeing from Kinshasa across the river. France had few economic interests in Congo-ex-Zaire, although successive governments had always supported Mobutu and there were accounts of a French company, Geolink, giving money to the Zairian leader shortly before his fall. There were also rumours of discussions in the Elysee about helping Mobutu to recruit European mercenaries.
However, there are considerable French interests in Brazzaville, once the capital of the former French Equatorial Africa. Geographically it is strategically placed between central Africa and Gabon and the beginnings of west Africa. Economically it has petrol resources which place it second only to Angola. It has introduced demo- cratic reforms in accordance with the prin- ciples laid down by President Mitterrand at his meeting with French-African leaders at La Baule in 1990. There he announced that France would be somewhat quke- warm' towards those African states which did not move towards a multi-party democ- racy. Typically, Mitterrand subsequently watered down this condition, saying that the African states must judge for them- selves the pace of change. Nevertheless the implication was that French aid would be proportionate to democratisation. This encouragement to political reform, the La Baule doctrine, was popularly known as Parisstroika.
When President Chirac visited Congo- Brazzaville in 1996 he declared himself to be very 'Afro-optimiste'. Democracy had been installed with a multi-party system replacing a military dictatorship, and presi- dential elections had been held in 1992. Annual economic growth was about 6 per cent. The French petrol company Elf- Aquitaine was dominant in exploiting the mineral wealth.
But now, although the French are tradi- tionally less unnerved than the British by a sudden, particular crisis in Africa, they have been considerably shocked, not only by the numbers who have been killed, but by the reports of anti-French sentiment, accusations that everything has been wors- ened by the French army's intervention. Only in November of last year Jacques Godfrain, M. Juppe's minister for co-oper- ation, claimed that he too was 'Afro-opti- miste' and spoke of the indissoluble links between France and Africa, links of histo- ry, language (meaning French) and blood (recalling how African troops fought with France in two world wars). These ties, said Godfrain, were more important than those of commerce. There was not much differ- ence between the language he used and that used by Vincent Auriol, former presi- dent of the Republic, when he visited Conakry 50 years ago. But now Godfrain's successor, Charles Josselin, speaks of the end of an epoch in France's relations with Africa. A new policy has to be defined. The downfall of Mobutu and the announced withdrawal of French troops from Brazzav- ille illuminate the changing situation.
The French had always claimed to be the leading European country to modernise its relations with Africa. In 1958 General de Gaulle had the vision of a union between France, its former African colonies and Madagascar. The President of the Republic would preside over meetings with all the prime ministers of the union, one French, one Malagasy and some 15 African. But he readily accepted the failure of this scheme and sent Andre Malraux to preside over the ceremonies that marked the indepen- dence of each African state. The ownership space of empire was to be replaced by the zone of influence. France would be gener- ous with aid and in return would benefit economically. The French language would be the lingua franca (de Gaulle personally was unable to refuse anything to the Sene- galese leader, Senghor, because the French he spoke was the most perfect that he had heard). Through Jacques Foccart, France would, by all methods, establish an agency of friends who would be powerful and get rid of those who were unfriendly.
When Francois Mitterrand came to power in 1981 French Africa, according to his close collaborator, Hubert Vedrine, now minister for foreign affairs, consisted of some 25 sub-Saharan states (they included the former Belgian colonies, which were linked to France by agree- ments on economic and monetary mat- ters). The zone of influence was thus even larger than the colonial empire. One hun- dred and sixty thousand French people lived in these states; there were more than 1,000 large French companies and more than 1,000 small French business enter- prises in operation. They provided France with 15 per cent of its petrol needs. They absorbed more than 20,000 million francs in aid and provided 50,000 million francs in commercial exchanges. It was said that in the year 2000 they would form 100 mil- lion French-speakers. There were also military co-operation agreements with more than 20 African states, and military and technical aid to Africa accounted for some 10 per cent of the ministry for co- operation. When M. Chirac was elected President in 1995 it could be said that France was the most powerful non-African state in Africa (not taking into consideration the North African states which are a particular concern of French policy). The United States had allowed Liberia to fall into a sort of anarchy and had no wish to repeat military intervention after the unhappy experience of the Marines in Somalia. The British were largely absent except in terms of aid and Africa was only an intermittent preoccupation of successive British gov- ernments. Therefore the French self- image of France as a world power was sustained by the spectacle of Africa. Chirac emphasised this when he made his first official journey as President. It was to Africa, and he emphasised the continuity of French policy by bringing back Jacques Foccart to the Elysee, in spite of his bad health, and by appointing his collaborator Godfrain to Co-operation. He adopted the mantle of an `Africain', and he was soon saying `tu' to many African leaders. How then has this situation disintegrat- ed? Some would lay the blame on Presi- dent Mitterrand who, in 1991, intervened in the former Belgian colony of Rwanda. His aim was to protect his ally and friend, the Hutu president Habyarimana, against the Tutsi rebellion coming from the north and supported by Uganda. The French were therefore intervening in an ethnic war. They tried to withdraw and hand over to the United Nations and to arrange a peace between the main Hutu and Tutsi organisations that would be signed at Arusha, in Tanzania, but Habyarimana and the Hutu president of Burundi were shot down in their plane. In June 1994, as the ethnic killing came alive again, in spite of the moderating advice of the then prime minister Balladur, the French launched `Operation Turquoise'. This was too late to stop the killing. Was it Francophone versus Anglophone, with the Tutsis supported by Uganda? At all events, with French encouragement the Hutus took refuge in Zaire, which provoked the Tutsi reply com- ing from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The rebellion of Kabila and the fall of Mobutu were already visible.
The African states are becoming more prosperous. They turn to American compa- nies, as did the government in Brazzaville. The American Mineral Fields Society has invested heavily in the mines in Katanga. An American company has installed the Internet in Mali and Rwanda. Franco- phone Africans find that it is useful to speak English. 'French', they say, 'teaches one how to be an administrator and an expert on civilisation. American teaches you how to get on in life.' La franco- phonie' is denounced as 'la cacaophonie'. The Congo-ex-Zaire asserts that it is bantu- phone.
France is tired of paying huge sums in aid and watching others reap the benefit. Foccartism is dead. The old friends and networks have gone. France is tired of Africa — `malade d'Afrique'.
The author is emeritus professor of French history at London University.
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