BOOKS
The Anatomy of Appeasement
By DESMOND WILLIAMS TT is commonly believed that Neville Chamber- 'lain overthrew 'appeasement' as a result of the pressure of domestic opinion caused by Hitler's occupation of Prague on March 15, 1939. And it is true that the Prime Minister was influenced partly by the sudden wave of anger aroused in the days following upon his initial cool reception of Hitler's new move. These articles* make it clear, however, that the particular steps he took were occasioned by an event of an entirely dif- ferent character. On March 16, the Foreign Office had been informed by the Rumanian Minister in London, M. Tilea, that the Germans had delivered an ultimatum during economic negotiations then proceeding in Bucharest. Chamberlain immed- iately dispatched a circular telegram containing inquiries as to what other governments would do in the event of further 'aggression' by Hitler. Tilea's report was categorically denied in Buch- arest and was shown later to be unfounded. But before awaiting fuller information on this matter, Chamberlain then had another idea. On March 19, he had personally drafted a plan of his own for Four-Power consultation between Britain, France, Russia and Poland. The Kremlin countered with a proposal for a Six-Power conference which would include Rumania and Turkey. The Rumanians and the Poles were unwilling to bring the USSR into discussions of this sort. And the Russians were offended because their proposal was then re- jected.
Meanwhile, Ribbentrop opened negotiations with the Poles on March 21 for a settlement of the Danzig problem and for the construction of a `corridor' across the Corridor. The Poles re- jected the German advances and mobilised part of their troops. Colonel Beck,' the Polish Foreign Minister, did not inform Britain or France either of the negotiations or of the mobilisation. And Hitler, who had hitherto considered Poland as an ally rather than a foe, now for the first time began to contemplate the destruction of his eastern neighbour. He believed (wrongly) that the Poles would never have risked mobilisation unless they had already joined Chamberlain's peace- front. In fact, they had not. However, he had not yet decided on war against Poland in that year.
On March 28, the British Government received news from a journalist of 'imminent German attack on Poland.' This news also was later to be established as false. In view of absolute Polish silence in regard to their mobilisation and to the German-Polish discussions which were continued later in the week, the Prime Minister —again without checking on the evidence— offered the Poles a unilateral guarantee against a German threat to their independence; and the Poles were accorded the right to decide what con- stituted such a threat. British policy was thus made dependent on the views of Poland. The guarantee was announced in the House of Com- mons on March 31; and in April of that year Hitler decided on war against Poland for the first time.
Chamberlain had not consulted the War Office on the military implications of the guarantee (a fact not mentioned in this volume, but which was revealed by Lord Strang in his memoirs). The French General Staff was not consulted by the French Government. The Russians were affronted by the preferential consideration of the Polish view; Chamberlain turned Hitler against Poland without initially assuring himself of Russian sup- port; and he had lost his own freedom of action. The whole episode, therefore, as revealed by the documents, displayed extraordinary irresponsi- bility and ignorance on the part of the Prime Minister, Beck, Hitler, the Foreign Office and the intelligence services.
Chamberlain has usually been accused of being too weak, and this weakness, it is suggested, was mainly responsible for the German aggression of September. The latest evidence would indicate
* THE EVE OF WAR 1939. Survey of International Affairs 1939-46. Edited by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee. (O.U.P., for the R.I.I.A., 90s.)
that if Chamberlain was a weak man, it was nevertheless the 'strong line' into which he was forced that was responsible for the particular timing chosen by Hitler for the war and for the area against which Hitler moved. In addition, the intervention of Poland, by excluding the Russians, left Moscow with a freedom of manoeuvre which was later to be exercised with surprising effect on August 22.
The role of the Foreign Office in these develop- ments could have been dealt with in a more con- crete way. It was certainly extraordinary that it did not consider the main implications of the Anglo- Polish guarantee before March 31; and there is no evidence that it did: The assessment of intelli- gence information between March 17 and March 31 was not only inaccurate, but was to prove decisively so. And it also looks as if the Foreign Office subsequently took the view that Hitler was bluffing.
Understandably the authors have not had access to Allied military documents—at least on the level of Cabinet consideration. Some of the German directives have been used. But conclu- sions on the relation of military to foreign policy in the West still remain largely speculative: The Foreign Office account of the negotiations with Soviet Russia adds nothing to what was known on the British side, and Russian intentions during the summer remain as obscure as they were then.
The best contribution in this book is written by Mr. F. C. Jones. It is an exceptionally able treatment, coherent and conclusive, of a sideline topic, the Far East. Mr. Toynbee's introduction is fair and thorough, though it includes some characteristically strained historical analogies. He refers critically to Belgium's policy in 1937, when `she found herself confronted by a ruler of Germany who was manifestly more criminal- minded than any of his predecessors.' Readers of the Survey of International Affairs for the prewar years will realise that Mr. Toynbee himself did not then regard Hitler as an exceptionally 'bad' man. The chapters by Veronica Toynbee, Catherine Duff and P. E. Baker are useful, if occasionally superficial, contributions to separate aspects of the main theme. The chapter on the USSR is solid, but limited. And the weakest part of the volume is that provided by Viscount Chilston on British and French rearmament. He mentions German efforts in this direction, but does not even cite General Thomas's invaluable reports on the subject.
In conclusion, one is tempted to compare the diplomacy of 1939 with that of the period after 1945. One striking point emerges. Whatever one may feel about 'brinkmanship' in the era of Dulles, it has hitherto fulfilled its purpose more adequately than the diplomacy of Neville Cham- berlain or that advised by the Opposition when Chamberlain abandoned appeasement after March. The Eve of War gives sonic grounds for optimism to those who face the consequences of contemporary diplomacy.
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