THE EVACUATION OF SOMALILAND.
[To TEE EDITOR OP TEE " SPECTATOR." J SIT-,—May I endeavour to correct some misapprehensions which exist in the public mind as to the effect of the Govern- ment's policy of withdrawal from the interior of Somaliland? I have served for many years in that country, and speak therefore from personal knowledge. The misapprehensions which I wish to correct are as follows :—(1) That the with- drawal from Somaliland is a mistake which will be followed by an expedition to recover lost ground as in the case of the Soudan, and that this will be forced on us by the friendly harassed tribes. (2) That our occupation of Somaliland was vital to our prestige in the Moslem world, and that our with- drawal will strengthen the position of the Mullah, who will be joined by our friendlies. (3) News of the Mullah's "victory" will spread to the Soudan, India, and to East and Central Africa, and to the native mind it will not appear as a diplomatic success, but as a war victory. (4) Our Abyssinian relations make it necessary that we should occupy the interior of Somaliland.
As regards (1), no one, I think, who had lived long in
the interior of Somaliland could ever bold conscientious objections to the Government's decision to withdraw from it. The interior is, as I have previously stated, absolutely worthless ; is to all intents and purposes a waterless desert from which no trade can ever be developed. Why, then, com- pare it to the Soudan, or take exception to the Government's very sensible decision to cease to squander any more treasure on it ? We are told that an expedition to recover lost ground will be forced on us by the friendly "harassed" tribes. But these tribes are not and need not be " harassed." They are well armed and stronger than any combination which the "Mullah," even allowing him the power with which he is popularly credited, can bring against them. These " friendly" tribes will, though, in their keen desire to get Government treasure again lavished on them and their country, pretend to be " harassed," and spread most plausible and credible reports to show that that is the case. Let the Government, then, be firmly on their guard against these reports, and they need never regret their present sensible action.
As regards (2), the public are evidently unaware that the " Mullah" and all his following were a year ago proscribed and discredited from Mecca by the Patron Sheikh (Mahomed Seale) of the sect to which the "Mullah" and his following professed to belong. Sheikh Mahomed Seale then publicly proclaimed and widely promulgated that neither Hashein Mahomed bin Abdullah Hassain nor any that followed him were true Mohammedans. All that had any pretensions to religion left the Haroun on hearing of this denouncement. Those that remain are but excommunicated freebooters, having no influence whatever on the Moslem world nor any rower of coercion on our friendlies.
As regards (3), I have served with the natives of India, the Soudan, and East and Central Africa in Somaliland, each and all of whom were never tired of expressing amongst them- selves their surprise at the British Government's profligate waste of treasure on that dustheap. They, believe me, do not look on our evacuation as a "war victory " to the Mullah, hut rather as a victory to the Government of common-sense over an obstinate folly. Each and all of these native soldiers thanked his God when he left the country, and will pass down to his children's children his horror of the country, its people and their idiosyncrasies.
As regards (4), our evacuation of the interior will have no adverse results on our relations with Abyssinia. We are holding the coast-line and Zeila. Should an expedition west- wards be ever considered necessary, that port will be all that is necessary as a base. The attitude of the Somalis when passing through their country need never be considered. Furthermore, Abyssinians know all about Somaliland, and will, I am sure, not think the less of us for evacuating it. They could have taken the country long ago had they con- sidered it worth doing. Their opinion of its barren wastes may be gathered from their refusing to advance across them
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