WAR AND Tellt: ARME BLANCHE.*

War and the Arme Blanche is a book liable to be at first misunderstood. The author, though a thinker as well as a writer, and not without some personal experience of attire service—he served with the C.I.V. in South Africa—is not a soldier. As he has produced a work which deals with a technical point of cavalry armament as well as with tactics, handles his subject in no half-hearted fashion, and runs counter to the official opinions held by some of our leading experts, there is a probability that a certain number of soldiers will resent his temerity, doubt his competence to discuss the subject, and ignore what he writes. It also may from its tone be mistaken for an attack upon the branch of the Service to which it refers. In his introduction to the book Lord Roberts draws attention to the fact that some of our finest military histories have been written by civilians. Mr. Childers is not only an historian, though large portions of his book are historical. He makes use of history to advance a theory, and to criticise a line of military thought which appears at first sight to be one for the consideration of professional soldiers, and of professional soldiers alone.

The amateurs of the military art in our nation occasionally

show a tendency to lay down the law to their soldier brethren—even in some cases to assume their responsibilities— which is not exhibited towards the professional element in any other walk of life. Where this is the outcome of conceit, or ignorance as to the complicated nature of modern warfare, it may be treated with contempt. It may, however, sometimes be due to the fact that the conduct of war is an art which cannot often be practised in reality, since it is one in which even the experts can only occasionally obtain an oppor- tunity of really exercising their profession, and of thus gaining that first-hand experience which, when accumulated, amounts to wisdom. Wherever actual experience is so rare that the greater part of collective thought must be based on second- hand transmitted information, on theory, and on reasoned imagination, the outsider or amateur is more favourably placed to put forward his own views and enunciate theories than where professional knowledge is founded on continuous practice.

There are probably no men who can really exercise them-

selves less in their trade than naval and military officers. The most exacting manoeuvres carried out under the strictest "war conditions" are not, and cannot reproduce, the real thing. This applies to the Army more than to the Navy, and more to certain portions of the Army than to the rest. Of the number of our cavalry officers, for instance, who possess first-band knowledge of cavalry work in war under modern conditions—that is, since the introduction of the magazine, long-range, smokeless rifle—hardly any have positive personal experience of what forms the subject of Mr. Childers's book,— the value of the arias blanche and of " shock action." Their experience is entirely negative. Again, much of the theory extant upon this point is available to any one who can read English, French, or German, and has the time to collect and study it. Whether such labour results in the production of anything which will add usefully to the existing mass of thought on the subject depends on the industry, the analytical

and critical powers of the student, and on his faculty for presentation. Though it is not likely that cavalry leaders —or any others—will be produced by the burning of mid- night oil over research and the collection of records, it is probable that a mind capable of assembling and analysing facts, and of judicially tracing cause and effect, may produce something of value to the men of action, not all of whom have the opportunity, the inclination, or the ability for the particular and laborious mental process involved.

We have enlarged somewhat on this aspect of Mr. Childers's effort because he is in the invidious position of an amateur who seeks partly to revolutionise a profession. He not only essays to upset the whole of the generally accepted views upon the combative action of cavalry in war, but challenges nearly all the acknowledged authorities in the boldest manner, criticises their dicta with considerable force and some heat, and runs atilt against some shibboleths and old-established traditions. The only real justification for his temerity is the strength of his case. Many soldiers of all arms, we believe, agree with the author in his demand for a readjustment

• War and Ow draw Bianchi. By Erakiae Childers. London: Edward mold [is. 64:1 net.] of our views on this branch of tactics, in spite of the fact that the weight of established official opinion is against him. It has certainly been open to any of them to air views similar to those now expressed, but their argument must have been emasculated by their inability to treat official opinion in the same frankly critical spirit. Indeed, it is in this connexion interesting to note how barren our modern military litera- ture is of works dealing with cavalry action. For anything resembling the exhaustiveness of Mr. Childers's treatise we must refer to a chapter in The Science of War written by the late Colonel Henderson.

The hitherto almost universal theory as to the proper action of cavalry in the combat has been that they should, whenever possible, make use of " mounted action "—that is, shock action—with the arme blanche. But in the only two great wars that have taken place since the introduction of the modern rifle, though in each case one side possessed cavalry trained to " shock," there has been, for some reason or other, no shock action. This is an incontrovertible fact which bears with such overwhelming importance upon the problem of bow cavalry should fight in the future that it stands before any other consideration. From the Crimean War to that between Turkey and Greece the occasions when mounted troops have charged "knee to knee" have been few enough. But when we find that the last two wars were fought to a finish without any such charges having taken place, the necessity for a reconsideration of previously accepted views becomes apparently obvious. As to the case of the Boer War, we imagine that no one, certainly no soldier, will be found to dispute the assertion that no shock action took place ; but if proof be required, it is only necessary to refer to Mr. Childers's detailed narrative and searching analysis of all the main actions of the campaign. Excepting minor melees, there were during the whole war only two cases of the use of the arme blanche by the British cavalry, and these, being pursuits, were not examples of " shock." Mr. Childers does not give us the struggle in Manchuria in such great detail; it would be impossible to do that; but he gives sufficient to prove that the result was the same as in South Africa. Working back from this broad result, from effect to cause, and taking the South African War—our own experience—as his main platform, he essays to show that this result was due mainly to the fire-power of the modern smoke- less magazine-rifle carried by mounted men. In this he is correct. Not only was our cavalry unable to use the weapon in which it had been chiefly trained, but the Boers were able by means of fire effect to impose their tactics upon our cavalry educated for "shock." From being armed with the sword and lance and an inferior firearm, they were converted into mounted riflemen, equipped with the long rifle, and gradually learned to fight as our mounted irregulars fought, or the Boers did themselves. This system of fighting, forced upon us by the reality of war, is now relegated to a subordinate place in training for war.

As far as our own national experience goes in our only modern war, it is difficult to understand how so much reliance can still be placed upon an armament and a form of tactics which we were forced to discard so completely ten years ago. When another campaign presents to the world the same lesson, it becomes still more mystifying. It is true that the Boers exhibited a natural instinct for fire tactics and a skill in the use of the rifle which are not likely to be met with very often; but these characteristics apply to neither the Russians nor the Japanese. Yet the result was the same. In spite of the probability that as high a standard of fire tactics as the Boers possessed will never be met with again, we do not think the power of the rifle fire will decrease. Automatic weapons have now arrived upon the scene, and it is only a matter of time before some form of silencer is introduced which will add to the power of the rifle almost as much as smokeless powder has done.

There may be some very strong reasons which have pre- vented these considerations from having received from all nations the attention they appear to deserve. We think that the chief cause is the conservatism inherent in us all. This is more comprehensible in the case of those armies which have not had the first-hand experience that we have. There is a latent fear in many quarters that if cavalry take to mounted rifle tactics, and drop what is known as " mounted action," they may lose the "cavalry spirit," or, in other words,

the dash without which horse soldiers are worthless. We agree with Mr. Childers that with the rifle there is as much scope for the development of the offensive, and for the

exercise of the typical quality of dash, as there has ever been Vita the arme blanche. A good deal also is made of the moral

effect of the charge and of the fear of cold steel. We venture to think that this fear is greatly exaggerated. The Boers very soon lost their fear of cold steel in the confidence that their firearms and their mobility gave them. Infantry are taught not to fear cavalry, and mounted rifles have no more to fear than infantry.

Though our own official views appear to be based to some extent on German theory, as Mr. Childers clearly shows, and are quite opposed in this particular to what he endeavours to prove, yet he has one very important champion in our late Commander-in-Chief. Lord Roberts agrees entirely with Mr. Childers's main thesis. He now states this, and his former actions prove it. But he differs from Mr. Childers in not thinking it advisable to deprive the cavalry soldier of

any hand-to-hand weapon. Even if our cavalry are to give up all idea of shock action, we think that each man should have

some hand-to-hand weapon for individual combat and personal protection, and be trained to use it for that purpose only. By this it is meant that the time at present given to training for shock action should be entirely given up to mounted rifle training. The two are so different that no man can become so expert at both as to adopt either at will as occasion arises.

We are with Mr. Childers again as regards the illogicality and confusion caused by our present categories of mounted troops. They should all be trained to fight in the same way, the only difference between Regulars and Auxiliaries being in the extent to which they are trained. The accomplishment of attempting to fire from the saddle, for instance, might be left to the professionals. There are many other important and interesting points discussed in this book to which we have not space to allude. We have read through it, not once, but three times, and we are glad it was written. Though the author may not be completely accurate in all his facts, and may even be unsound in some of his arguments, he has presented a well- reasoned and logical exposition of his case. His deductions are drawn from a careful examination of the only two wars which have any real bearing upon the point at issue, his conclusions are based upon close reasoning, and none of his assertions are pure dogma unbacked by argument. He does not realise to what an extent his views are shared by the younger officers in many foreign armies, and he might have been less aggressive and more gentle when controverting the opinions of various living authorities, who, though possibly misguided, probably have feelings. The very directness of his attacks, however, may have the value of preventing his challenge from being ignored. So long as there is no tendency

to obscure the main issue in an unnecessary defence of the cavalry arm, which has not been assailed, we can ask for nothing better than that some champion of the arme blanche should take up the gage now thrown down. But it will

require a very convincing chain of reasoning to show that Mr. Childers's conclusions are wrong.

Lord Roberts, at the end of a lucid introduction, makes one demand. He says :- " In conclusion, I would ask you, my brother officers to read this book with an unbiassed mind, and not to be put off by the opening chapters, or to throw the book on one side with some such remark as, 'This is written by a civilian, and what can he know of the subject ? ' Remember that most of our military histories have been written by civilians. I would ask you to study the facts for yourselves, weigh the arguments, follow the deductions, note the conclusions, and then do one of two things. Either traverse the facts, refute the deductions, and upset the conclusions, or admit the facts, agree to the arguments, acknowledge the deductions, and accept the conclusions."

Whether he be right or wrong, Mr. Childers's subject is sufficiently serious, and his indictment of present views sufficiently convincing, to command attention and an answer equally logically argued.