ENGLAND'S DANGER.
TilRE is one nervous dread which, once thoroughly ex- ted, is always strong enough to upset the balance of England's political reason, and to drive every other considera- tion of principle and sentiment before it, as dust before the wind, and that is, jealousy of a Bonapartist France. We were threatened with a terrible access of this hysterical affec- tion before the Italian war, in 1859, when all the island rang with gloomy warnings to Italy, to prefer the Austrian tyranny to the French alliance, and when Liberals as well as Tories were never tired of repeating that nothing but dreadful disaster to the dupe of France could result even from the total destruction of Italy's foes. The most Liberal papers and reviews, as well as the most Conservative, stormed against the unholy alliance. Austria, who had been treading Italy under foot for forty years, became a political martyr and almost a political saint. And had not, fortunately for us, the Liberal party been then in Opposition, and, therefore, consti- tutionally disposed to counteract the obvious bias of Lord Malmesbury and his friends towards the Cabinet of Vienna, we might have had the satisfaction of doing everything that England could do to arrest the most glorious political achieve- ment of modern times, by simply acting with implicit faith on the principle that nothing good can come out of Bonapartism. And now, we are sorry to say, the periodic fit of hysteria seems to be recurring since the Emperor's proposal for a Congress excited our jealous fears. Something more than vague rumour describes the constant communication going on between our own Foreign Office and that of Vienna. By means of the telegraph Lord Russell and Count Rechberg are supposed to be laying their heads together, while Count Apponyi holds long interviews with the former. No one attempts to conceal the disgust and alarm which the Emperor's proposal has excited in the English Cabinet, and every one believes,—not, we imagine, without justice,—that the first thought of England has been to concert measures with Austria for thwarting the Emperor of the French. And if these things are done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry ? If the Liberal Ministry should commit the error of prematurely countermining what it dreads as Bonapartist ambition, and allying itself with those who take their stand on European prescription, what will the Tories, always Aus- trianizers, and always wont to defend the rights of crowns and to depreciate the rights of nations, do? It is almost an unfortunate circumstance for English Liberalism that the Liberal party are not stimulated, as they were in 1859, by the cold air of Opposi- tion, to see all the dangers of an actively Conservative policy in Europe. It is unfortunate also that the country itself has since then become more Conservative ; and not only less inclined than ever to foment any stir in Europe, but less inclined to permit the interference of others. It is unfortu- nate, again, that in spite of the great results of the Italian war, France BO deeply mortified the Liberal Government of this country, and so justifiably excited our dread of Bona- partist ambition by its cynical policy in claiming the terri- tories of Savoy and Nice, that our Italian policy is no longer an adequate prescription. And, finally, it is, in one sense, unfortunate that Austria has recently earned a right to some political respect, and can be made the confidant of a Liberal English Government with less discredit than could have been the case in 1859. All these things promote the danger to which Lord Derby alluded last session, when he hoped that we might not ultimately find ourselves drawn into a war against Poland, as the final result of opening the discussion with Russia in her favour. His own instincts led him to see how much more England would care to beat back France from the Rhine than to expel the Russian despotism from Warsaw,—and the danger he foresaw seems likely to be ripened by the Emperor's proposal,— so abhorrent to the laisser-faire English Cabinet,—for probing all the political sores in Europe, into a nearer danger than we had then any right to expect. If England should concert with Austria a policy generally obstructive to Napoleon, that will be the first great step in the danger- ous direction which Lord Derby's prophetic imagination foresaw.
.Now, though we can quite enter into the uneasiness, the distaste, the legitimate apprehension with which Bona- partist schemes for the "reconstruction of Europe" are regarded by all sober statesmen, and the wise desire to check the encroaching tendencies of the French territorial ambition, we must earnestly protest against the grievous folly and more grievous wrong of so discounting our fears in this direction as to become the practical antagonists of a great and just cause. This is not the way in which we can best control the ambition of France, and yet, if we now join Austria in the attempt to scotch the wheels of Napoleon's policy, we shall in effect be throwing our influence into the scale of tyranny, simply in order to avert what our delirious English dread conceives as a worse tyranny in the future. Austria is, it is true, in great measure a reformed Government as regards her internal policy. Austria acting with France and Italy might even become a reforming Government as regards foreign policy,—for Austria, and France and Italy could only agree on conditions which would set free Venetia and re-establish Poland. Nay, even if acting in conjunction with France alone, Austria could not be obstructive,—for she could not co-operate with France without re-opening the Polish question, and at least abandon- ing anything like abject reverence for the treaties of 1815. But Austria acting with England on a policy expressly intended to cripple France could only take one line, and that a line which it would be a disgrace to England to take,—the line of defending the vested interests of Governments against the cry of an oppressed nation, the lino of opposing intervention in Poland, the line of standing by the arrangements which gave Posen to Prussia and Galicia to Austria, of declining all further reconsideration of the Italian question, and of guaranteeing Ger- many against the consequences of its own selfish and servile sup- port of Russia. If England is now preparing to take up with Austria the position which will most impede and embarrass France, she can only effect this by lending her influence to a bad cause and a discredited international contract ; she can only do it at the risk of lending moral and, perhaps ultimately, phy- sical help to a policy which, if it did not directly crush Poland, would at least cut it off from help; which, if it did not re-enact the treaty of Vienna, would at least save as many of its arbitrary transfers of nations and provinces, as it is now possible to save, from either criticism or assault. Austria, if she now set her face absolutely against France, has no other possibility left. She will not fight for Poland herself and alone ; England will not, and cannot, help her ; therefore the only policy on which they can combine is the obstructive policy of tripping up Napoleon in his first move, and doing all in their power to keep things as they are. We should be heartily ashamed if England were betrayed into this favourite dog-in-the-manger policy of hers, which both refuses to do anything itself for a nation in trouble, and to let the only Power at all disposed to help, render aid which excites her jealous fears. We should be doubly ashamed if England were betrayed into it under a Government that not only calls itself Liberal, but that has reaped in Italy the glorious fruits of a genuinely Liberal policy. Do we, then, look upon Napoleon as the beneficent, modest, disinterested monarch for whom he gives himself out, and seriously wish the English nation to support humbly his grand " ideas ?" By no means. No one can distrust the disinterestedness of these Napoleonic pro- fessions more utterly than we do. No one can feel better satisfied that if once more the Emperor makes war for an "idea," he will manage with his usual adroitness that some foreign protégé shall settle a large additional estate upon "the idea" in trust for the separate use of France, somehow. But we do object to the shortsighted longsightedness which so often induces our politicians to increase these evils by guarding against them too early. Sir G. Comewall Lewis used to say most wisely that in nine cases out of ten, in politics, cure was better than prevention,—and this is certainly one of them. Nothing can be more mischievous than that selfish Conser- vatism which obstructs justice as a precaution against some hypothetical injustice which is thought likely to follow. It is true that this is the Emperor's method,—to redress a big wrong for Europe, and then pay himself by a little wrong in his own interest. But it is folly, as well as evil, to meet this policy by countermining it as a whole. In that way we only get France all the credit of the first design and none of the discredit of the second, —while we keep for our- selves all the discredit of checking her in the first policy, and none of the credit of checking her in the second. The simpler and jester policy which we pursued in the Italian war with so glorious a result—the result, in fact, that France incurred the expense while England reaped the influence— is much easier as well as much nobler. If we will not stir ourselves, and so gain the influence of an ally in the just cause, let us at least stand aside from all obstruction, and even cheer on France so long as she is strictly pursuing the pure and disinterested policy which gives a nation back its freedom. Then, when the moment arrives that France attempts to repay herself by any sinister policy, let England step in to the rescue, as she did after Villafranca and Zurich. Let us lend our influence to freedom against France then, as we lent it to France in the cause of freedom at first ; and the result to English prestige cannot be doubtful. The‘stimulus given to the popular cause by th.3 Italian war was so great as to bridle the power of France for evil, even when it was exerted for evil; and so it would be again in Poland. The Emperor is not a politician to be trusted, but when he puts in motion great national enthusiasms, he cannot stop thenrwhen he will ; and England, if she will act the modest part of standing aloof indeed, but always lending her sympathy to the just cause, will have no reason to complain of the proportions of credit reaped by the country which venture? nothing but also grasps at nothing, and the country which ventures much but sheathes a hungry ambition in glittering and generous sentiment.
We are not a little ashamed of the irritable jealousy which is manifesting itself just now towards France. We look on while Russia annihilates and tortures a nation with calm dis- pleasure indeed but also with the perfect equanimity with which we are apt to tolerate a poor man who beats his wife. But let France only show a disposition which may be con- strued into an ultimate danger, and we sneer, scold, bristle up, and cast our quills at her like the fretful porcupine. Clever men compare France to the greedy pike. Timid men fret and fuss like Lord Malmesbury before the Italian war. Nowhere is there any dignity and equanimity. It is obvious that Russian crimeilisturbs us far less than French restlessness. This is not the way for Liberal England to use her moral power with good effect. If we are about to concert with Austria atiplomatic checkmate to the.French designs for Poland, we are Mut to make a blunder so great and so selfish that it may be fairly called a crime. It may be well that we should ostenta- tiously hold aloof from righting the wrongs of oppressed -nations. But if it be so, we should, at least, leave the field open to less delicate agencies. To do all in our power to defgat the use of less scrupulous instruments of good, simply because we know themto be less scrupulous, is a course so unworthy of England that it should, at least, be left to Tories.
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