The War Surveyed
EXPANDING VISTAS
By STRATEGICUS
IN one of my earliest articles on the war I pointed out the overwhelming difficulty of foreseeing the course it might take because of our ignorance of the identity of the players. Since then it might almost seem that the possibilities have been ex- hausted ; but the events of the last week show how unfounded such a conclusion would be, and we shall be better advised to admit our ignorance of the final alignment. In one direction it seems increasingly probable that the Axis may speedily have assistance in pulling their chestnuts out of the fire; Japan appears to be set upon joining Germany in her pursuit of a decision. She is being spurred on to action, she affects to see a chance of advantaging herself, she recognises that precarious as this may well be there is hardly likely to be a better.
It is, perhaps, the German angle that most interests us. What has Germany to gain from Japan taking action? That is the most baffling question. The paCifist apparently sees no advan- tage unless there are rivers of blood flowing; but the soldier cannot be blind to the uses of the threat. War has some simi- larities to a game of chess. When the opponent moves a piece on the board, a player has to adjust his pieces accordingly. No one who has considered the vast battlefield can have failed to note that the mere threat of Japanese action has been a very considerable advantage to Germany and a profound disadvantage to us. In Singapore and in Hong-kong we have been compelled to tie up important forces which might have enabled us to act elsewhere. There are strong Royal Air Force units, some fine troops and great masses of munitions. They have been placed there under the compulsion of a threat. They are still being increased; and, presumably, we shall continue to increase them. This is not the whole of what Germany has gained from the mere existence of a Japan bound by treaty to Germany and as far as one can judge as little liable to be limited by scruple or civilised usage. Russia has been compelled similarly to retain in the Far East a vast army of first-rate troops with their appro- priate armament and ancillary services.
What more can Japan do to assist Germany if she determines to attack either Russia or ourselves? She appears to be bent upon challenging the United States, as if the forces Britain and Russia can mobilise against her can be ignored. Superficially she may have some justification, since her navy is very powerful. But Mr. Churchill was not speaking lightly when he said that we can now " provide a powerful naval force of heavy ships with its necessary ancillary vessels for service in the Indian and Pacific Oceans "; and no one who has any idea of the possi- bilities can dismiss them without a thought. It is certain that if we, with the most powerful fleet in the world, were faced by the possible appearance of a force such as Mr. Churchill suggests we. should take it as a matter of real gravity. Japan is rightly proud of her navy; but a strong battle-fleet manned by British seamen, even if not comparable in size to that of our former ally, ought to be taken seriously, more especially if it is to be a mere addition to a United States fleet. A show-down has its chances; but it has also its perils, and it is difficult to understand how Japan can fail to realise that those she is challenging in the Far East must prove too heavy ultimately if not immediately.
Weighing the possibilities carefully, it seems that neither the ultimate nor the immediate advantages in the purely military sphere are what Germany hopes and expects to secure from Japan's plunge into war. If America is engaged in war some proportion of her supplies to us must be diverted, but it is more probably in the direction of morale that she hopes to gain imme- diate advantages. Time intervenes in the war more intimately and decisively every day. The statements attributed to von Papen by a neutral correspondent have not been denied; and Vanguardia must be reckoned a friendly newspaper. All that von Papen has denied is that he gave a formal interview; and the procedure appears to be a well-worn one. But, if we may assume the general correctness of the report, Germany is feeling the attain of the Russian campaign and would be disposed to go far to secure a pause for a second breath. She is once more casting about for alternative directions in which she can bring pressure upon us and there are two mentioned in the report of the German Ambassador's speech that deserve consideration. Turkey and Spain are needed not for their own sakes, but as pieces to be used against us. So far General Franco has main-
tained his independence and neutrality unimpaired, and he has thereby gained for his country a precious breathing-space for recovery and also a reasonable claim to consideration from both sides. It is something of a feat, and it has not been easy ; but it has been even less so for Turkey. Germany hopes to bring moral pressure upon both of these Powers if she can persuade Japan to enter the war.
The calculation may be quite wide of the mark. Even if Japan is so misguided as to take the risk of challenging the United States as well as Russia and Britain, will that persuade Spain and Turkey that all is over? Yet that appears to be the line of reasoning; and there can be no doubt of what the inter- vention of these two Powers on the side of Germany would mean, or what a complication even facilities for the passage of German troops would cause. But time presses; and, though the Todt spirit is very powerful, Germany has undoubtedly lost very heavily in Russia. Whether winter and his allies—mud, snow, wind and ice—are generals or subalterns, the strain is mounting with a rapidly increasing acceleration. On the military side she has made an advance which has no parallel in history; but she has not put the Russian armies out of action. North and south she appears to threaten our ally with grave develop- ments; but the stubborn Russian soldiers still fight back. The threat to Leningrad and the Archangel line are almost as dis- turbing as that which von Rundstedt is directing against the Caucasus; but, if we decide that, hard -as Germany has been hit, she has still the force to deliver blows that may shake the Russian armies still more seriously, we must recognise that Russia has fresh troops available still.
It was Napoleon who insisted that in a war numbers are almost invariably decisive, and even if 'Hitler feels convinced that he can put the Russian armies out of action, at least by cutting them off from us, he cannot fail to be aware of the significant changes that are taking place in the alignment of force. The Royal Air Force is now numerically at least equal to the Luftwaffe. That is a point of immense importance, since it means that unless something entirely unforeseen occurs it will now begin to grow steadily greater. There is hardly a theatre of war or a sphere of action in it that will not be conditioned by that development. Even where the German threat to Russia looks most vital the Royal Air Force may be able to intervene effectively ; and any opera- tions undertaken in the Western Desert are bound to be affected by this superiority. But it is not the only change of essential importance that time has brought. The shipping-losses have been curtailed so much, and the building-rate accelerated so significantly, that the net loss has fallen to what should be well within the limit of safety.
But in this same direction the revision of the Neutrality Act must soon begin to operate, and it cannot fail to accelerate the growing strength of the Allies in every sort of equipment.. A number of causes have contributed to make it possible for the Navy to allocate a strong squadron of ships for service in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; and this also is of great importance. Indeed if we can be certain that the factories here and in the United States will work steadily, without " token " or any other form of strike, we shall be justified in concluding that we have reached another of what Mr. Churchill calls the " climacterics " of the war. This does not mean that we have seen the worst or that there is any reason to indulge in foolish optimism. The tide began to turn in .1W in the last war; it had definitely turned in the .middle of the following year; and yet we were brought within an ace of defeat in the year after that.
It is these considerations and the need somehow to check the rising tide of Allied strength that moves Hitler in bringing pressure upon Japan to strike. There can be no doubt that, if by means of the threat of war in the Far East and of Spain and Turkey accepting the " new order " in the west he could per- suade or coerce us into agreeing to an armistice, he would be only too glad to offer terms that might have some specious acceptability. He has achieved much ; but he or his generals must have serious doubts about being able to round off the complete victory they desire unless they can put a brake upon the Allied armament or weaken the Allies by involving other nations in the conflict. Time appears to have deserted to the Allies and some other alliance is desired in its place.
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