1 . 1:111 l'UILCO-ITALIAN WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. T HE Triple Alliance may
continue in name for some time. In fact it has ceased to exist. That is the first consequence of Italy's acquisition of Tripoli. When we say that the Triple Alliance has been destroyed by the war we are not thinking of any special estrangement of interests between Italy and her late allies. What has killed the Alliance is, not a quarrel between the parties, but the emergence of certain physical facts which cannot be got rid of by any diplomacy however skilful. Through the occupation of Tripoli, Italy has ceased automatically to be in a position to ally herself with Germany and Austria- Hungary, or to join with them should a war arise with the Powers that form the Triple Entente. Very little reflection will show that this is the case. Suppose, owing to some new and unfortunate development. Germany became engaged in a war with the Triple Entente. In that case the German Government would apply to the Italians to carry out their obligati:ms. What would be the answer of the Italian Government? As things navy exist they could only make one answer, and it must be to the following effect : "Italy, of course, desires to carry out every pledge made by her to her partners in the Triple Alliance. Un- happily, however, she is not able to do so unless, of course, Germany and Austria-Hungary can show her that they possess the command of the sea, or at any rate the command of the Mediterranean, and can clear that sea ot the French and British fleets. Unlcss they can do that Italy's hands are tied, and she can take no part in the war and give no assistance to her former allies. The fact that she has the flower of her army in Tripoli and that her troops there can only for the present and probably for some considerable time be fed by sea makes it impossible for Italy to be at war with any Power or group of Powers which possess the command of the sea in the Mediter- ranean. If the sea communications between Italy and her new provinces were cut, the Italian army would perish of starvation or have to surrender to the Triple Entente. It is not a question of good faith or bail faith. Italy is physically unable to carry out her obligations. It would be idle for her to begin a war by sacrificing some 30,000 men and her whole fleet." It is clear that the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary would have no answ..r to make to the c.tnsiderations thus presented to them. They could not guarantee her comm untca t ions with Tripoli. and therefore Italy's case against joining them must of. necessity be acquiesced in. Therefore, for the time at any rate, Italy has automatically. ceased to be in effective alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Triple Alliance has become a Dual Alliance.
If we consider the further consequences of this fact they will be seen to be of no small importance. It is some- times said that the German General Staff have never considered that the Italian army would be of very much use to them or would be able to play any great part in a war with France and her allies. Possibly this may be true so far as aggressive action ou the part of Italy is concerned. Yet as a matter of fact the Italian alliance was of great military value to Germany. It meant, to begin with, that the French would have to keep at least ten divisions and probably a good deal larger force on their Alpine frontier and also along the coasts of the Mediter- ranean in order to prevent Italian raids by land and sea With Italy out of the Triple Alliance there would be no need for these precautions, and some 150,000 to 200,000 men would be set free for use at the principal danger points on the eastern frontier of France. No doubt l50,000 to 200,000 men does not sound a very large number, but with things so nearly balanced as they will be on the line between Basle and the Belgian frontier, the setting free of such a force might very well turn the scale in favour of France. But these are not by any means the only military consequences that flow from Italy ceasing to belong to the Triple Alliance. If Italy were rendering military aid to Austria-Hungary that Power need feel no anxiety as to her southern frontier, that is, as to Italian Tyrol and Istria and Trieste. If, however, Italy were not a party to the war, then Austria-Hungary as a precaution must keep quite a considerable part of her army to guard these provinces, which are included under the term Italia Irredenta. She must take into consideration the fact that there is a large part of the Italian population which considers that the Trentino, the Dolomite Mountains, Trieste, and Istria " ought of right " to belong to Italy, and that if the arms of the Dual Monarchy and of Germany met with a reverse, the Italian Government would be practically forced by public opinion to seize the opportunity of redeeming the Italian-speaking provinces from the Austrian yoke. This means that Austria-Hungary must keep a very large force—probably not less than 200,000 men—to watch and prevent an " Irredentist " outbreak. But the sterilizing of such a force would to a very con- siderable extent diminish the aid which Austria-Hungary could bring to her German ally in a conflict with Russia. Here, again, a difference of 150,000 men might turn the scale. Nor would the matter end here. The forward party in Italy has aspirations in regard to Dalmatia as well as Tyrol and Trieste, and Austria-Hungary might there- fore be obliged to keep her fleet in readiness to protect Dalmatia, and also strong garrisons in all the sea- board towns from Polo, to Cattaro. In other words, Austria-Hungary would have to fight, not with a secure, but with an exposed flank—a matter of the gravest concern to her military commanders.
All these consequences of the automatic withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance may be regarded by the friends of peace with sincere satisfaction. While the Triple Alliance was firm and strong there was always a danger of its immense power being misused. Anything, therefore, which neutralizes that power must make for peace. Ger- many, we may feel sure, will not want to bring on a war at a moment when it is quite impossible for Italy to render her any assistance. Another consequential loss to Germany from the war is the estrangement of Turkey. Up till the beginning of this month it seemed more and more likely that Turkey would become a satellite of Germany, and so virtually a member of the Triple Alliance. That Germany had every right from a military point of view to congratulate herself upon the acquisition of such an ally is obvious. With the aid of Turkey, Germany might have made a very disagreeable counter-stroke against Britain by means of an invasion of Egypt. A Turkish force, inspired and partially equipped by Germany, could undoubtedly have got across the desert, and it would have been by no means an easy task for us to destroy such a force before it entered the Delta. What Napoleon did and Ibrahim Pasha did could certainly be done to-day by the Turkish army. In the present temper of the Turkish people towards Germany there is little prospect of Turkey being absorbed in the German system. In all probability the consequences of the war as regards Germany extend a good deal beyond the impossibility of the Turkish army being any longer at the disposal of the German Government in case of war with the Triple Entente. Unless we are very much mistaken, we shall find the Turks in the future exceedingly shy of German patronage. They will begin to wonder whether the encouragement of German enterprise in Asia Minor and so forth may not in the end lead to the virtual loss of those provinces. " Put no trust in any European Power " will become, we expect, for a very considerable time the order of the day at Constantinople.
Another probable consequence of the war is fore- shadowed in the statement as to Turkish policy made by the Grand Vizier in the Chamber last Wednesday. In that statement Said Pasha declared that Turkey desired to maintain and strengthen her normal sincere relations with the Balkan States " on a basis of mutual confidence and the reconciliation of our common interests." The advantages which Turkey would obtain by encouraging the buffer States of the Balkans are obvious, and it is by no means unlikely that the Balkan States might think it well worth while, for the time being at any rate, to fall in with Turkey's views and form something in the nature of an alliance for maintaining the status quo in South-Eastern Europe. It is true that the Balkan States are all jealous of each other, and that they all, should Turkey break up, hope to get the best pieces of the Turkish heritage for themselves. But their dislike and jealousy of each other are outweighed by their jealousy and dread of Austria-Hungary and her partner Germany. If they can agree upon nothing else they are all aereed in wishing to say " Hands off !" to Austria-Hungary. They know that if Austria-Hungary were once to grasp Macedonia and Salonika their prospects of aggrandisement would vanish, and the successor to Turkey at Constan- tinople would be not one of them but the Hapsburg monarchy. They would. far rather go on as they are for the next ten or twelve years, and so keep the door open to the aspirations of " poor honest men," than place them- selves at the mercy of Austria-Hungary. For the moment, then, they may be expected to fall in with Turkish proposals for an alliance to preserve the status quo in the Balkans. Certainly Britain could have no objection to such an alliance, for it would probably make for peace, and now, as always, peace is the greatest of British interests. We say " probably " advisedly, for we of course cannot leave out of account the fact that if Austria-Hungary saw the prospect of a firm alliance being concluded between Turkey and Montenegro, Service, Bulgaria, and Greece she might be inclined to de- clare that the affiance was in effect aimed against her and that she must strike before it was too late. Striking in that case would of course mean the movement of her troops through the Sanjak of Novibazar to Salonika, a movement which would almost certainly bring on a general war in the Balkans. If, however, instead of a formal alliance only a general understanding were to be arrived at it would be much more difficult for Austria- Hungary, though aggrieved, to take the field.
In thinking out the consequences of the new arrange- ment of the Powerswhich must follow, or to speak more correctly, which has automatically followed, Italian action in Tripoli, the conclusion reached is thus distinctly pacific. No doubt the disturbance caused by a new trim- ming of the boat always produces some danger, but on the whole the cause of peace has been strengthened, not weakened. The reason is a very simple one. In the present temper of the Great Powers what is to be dreaded most of all is, as we have stated above, that one Power or group of Powers should possess a great predominance of physical force. If and when that occurs the Power or group of Powers in question is under a tremendous temptation to say, " We can certainly win if the great war comes now. Who can tell whether we shall be in so favourable a position a year or two hence ? Had we not better strike while the iron is hot ? If we do not th e balance of military power may incline to one of our rivals, and we may be quite sure that they will not be so foolish as to let the lucky moment pass. By not availing our- selves of our opportunity we shall not really prevent war, but only postpone it till we fight at a disadvantage." If this is the temper of the Great Continental Powers, as we judge it to be, it is a great advantage that they should be so evenly balanced that no one is really able to tell what the consequences of a war would be, and therefore that no Power should feel too confident of success. The automatie withdrawal of Italy from. the Triple Alliance has most certainly weakened the military power of that alliance, and made it impossible for Germany and Austria-Hungary to say, " Now is the time to get the war over with the least risk to ourselves."
It may perhaps be said that, though this is true of Germany, the consequent increase in the relative power of France may encourage her to adopt the policy of " Now or never." That is sound in theory, but fortunately not sound in practice. The French, though determined to defend themselves, are not now an aggressive or war- loving people, and we may be quite sure that they will do nothing to provoke war, especially when they know that if they did deliberately bring on a war on the grounds we have just stated they would not have the support of Russia or Britain. The more evenly balanced the rival groups are the less the danger of an outbreak, and undoubtedly the balance has become more even owing to the Triple having faded into a Dual Alliance.
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