Profitless Past-Raking
King Leopold's Memorandum on the Belgian Surrender, first- fruits of the great German offensive in 1940, is presumably addressed mainly to the Belgian people, and 'it is, therefore, interesting, and a little ominous, that all that is new is an attack on Britain. The five columns yytlich appear in The New York Herald-Tribune are headed " LeoPOld Blames British for Belgian Capitulation." But the text does not support that thesis. On the contrary, Leopold says that, after the German break-through, the alternatives were either to fall back with the rest of the Allies on France or capitulate. It is, therefore, irrelevant to drag in the British failure to attack towards Courtrai on May 25th. That at best could have rendered only temporary relief ; and Gores only reserves were two' divisions earmarked for the attack towards the south which (if the French had been able to co-operate) could have saved the situation, though Leopold criticised the plan. When Gort heard of the King's appeal for a Courtrai counter-offensive, the two divisions had been thrown in, on Blanchard's decision that the time for the southern attack was past. The rest of the document justifies Mr. Churchill's statement on June 4th, 1940; but its tone may alienate much of the real sympathy felt with the King. Wey- gand has recently stated that the time for the attack towards the south was probably "the t6th or 17th." Would it not have been more statesmanlike to have been content with that and to have left the rest to history ?
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