THE ESTATE OF ORGANISED LABOUR
per the miners came the railwaymen. After the railwaymen he engineers are waiting. The dockers cannot be far behind, an.d.the transport workers. The miners' strike caused a power Which itself was, or at any rate seemed, more damaging than the strike itself. There is no reason whatever to suppose that a long railway strike, with or without the promised supPOrt of the miners, would not also bring about a power crisis. Cin the face of it, the leaders of the National Union of Raila5inlen and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and, Fireman behaved unreasonably in rejecting Mr Alex Jarratt s independent referee's deal which amounted to an increase °f 12 per cent. They held out for 14 per cent, saying in particular that they wanted the basic minimum wage' to be £20 a Week now, not, as Mr Jarratt suggested, next January. The legnage used by the union leaders is strange: Sir Sidney . reen, the experienced NUR general secretary, said they rerheted the award because it was less than "the programme at we have put to the Railways Board to get a £20 minimum W,,,age. What they" — British Railways' chairman Mr Richard 'arsh and Mr Jarratt — " are saying is that they will give us a £20 minimum wage in January, 1973. We are saying, Why !lot on May 1, 1972?" This is not the language of a negotiation not the language of an ultimatum, it is not the language of a reasonable man seeking an agreement but of an unreasonable Than spoiling for a fight. It is very natural that the Governni,ent, led in this instance by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, se.ould talk of union "blackmail," although it may have been inistaken for Mr Barber to make his speech, which also had rrit!ch that was aggressive in it, before rather than after the linlons had rejected the Jarratt terms. The public's first reaction may well prove to be one of support for the GovernInent: but in a dispute, should this or any succeeding industrial rtition become prolonged, rights and wrongs swiftly are conand the residual impression is more likely to be of a alltire than of a triumph of government. It is easy, and true, although some will say it is not helpful, Point out that the present state of industrial relations flows caTnnediately from the miners' defeat of the Government. The ivr°11frontati9n with the miners may not have been sought by r Heath's administration, nor may the confrontation with r ,'"e railwaymen, or the engineers, or the dockers. But the tvernment's policies and the Government's speeches have fr°t been calculated to reach an accord with the unions : far t °rn it. No Conservative government is particularly well fitted Fi° make appeals to union leaders for cooperation, and Mr oeatb's is less fitted than most. Once more it looks as if the Thcvvernment and organised labour are set on a collision course. G e Government beat the postmen. The miners beat the t °vernment. Will the battle, if it becomes truly joined, beoWeen the Government and the railwaymen decide the issue? 1:1 IS it not more likely to amount to another battle in an ttli,u'ecisive war which impoverishes all of us? In anything but a-e shortest of runs, any British government must act in such atWaY that it secures, at the least, a grudging acceptance, and e,,hest, a willing endorsement, of its policies by that major -'ate of the realm which is organised labour.
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