DYNASTIC ALLIANCES.
AFEW years ago it was the fashion to declare that Royal marriages had become absolutely unimportant from the point of view of politics, and that Kings need never again trouble to wed from motives of high policy. Sovereigns, it was said, could please themselves, for the peoples would no longer allow their welfare to be in- fluenced by dynastic considerations. If a nation wishes to make war on its neighbour it will not now be con- strained because the Queen of the neighbouring State is sister of its own Sovereign. Again, it will not risk hostilities or strain its policy in order to protect a weak State joined to it by a family connection between the two Royal houses. So ran the argument. To support this view of the question it is no doubt possible to bring plenty of historic evidence. The wars between nearly related Sovereigns have been as numerous as those between strangers, and time after time family connections have failed to secure alliances. Just now, however, there seems a reaction towards the other theory,—the theory that dynastic alliances are of real moment. Look at the effect of the betrothal of the Prince of Naples and Princess Helene cd Montenegro. The fact that the Czar has consented to a Princess of a house which is peculiarly under his protection, marrying the heir to the Italian throne, is at once taken as proof that the international position of Italy is to undergo a change, that gotid rela- tions are to be established between Rome and St. Peters-. burg, and that from these good relations will spring a better understanding with Russia's ally. The Italian Prime Minister, indeed, draws special attention to the significance of the match, and declares that it is of good augury not only for the Royal house, but for Italy. Nor are these mere empty phrases, for it is simultaneously announced that Russia, whose influence in Abyssinia is very great, is using that influence with Menelek to obtain a favourable peace for the Italians. In a word, the marriage of the Prince of Naples with a Princess who is connected with the Russian Royal house, and whose family has been, as it were, adopted into the Royal caste under Russian auspices, is at once believed by Europe to carry with it important political results.
Though we are disposed to believe that this reaction in favour of the theory of regarding dynastic alliances as of grave moment, and as likely to produce great results, has been carried too far, we must still admit that within certain limits there is a good deal to be said in its support. It is of course true that the fact that the Queen is the grandmother of the Emperor of Germany, the grandmother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia, and the cousin of every Protestant Sovereign in Europe, would not prevent the Powers from attacking England and inflicting on her every sort of injury and humiliation, supposing that they were strong enough to do so, could agree, and could find a good cause. That, however, does not prove that dynastic alliances never count. The crowned relations of the Queen might conceivably argue : 'We are not in this case really attacking a relation, but only our relation's unruly and disagreeable servants. If the Queen were really mistress in her own house it would be different. Since, however, she has the mis- fortune to be held in bondage by a ridiculous and oppressive Constitution which makes England a virtual Republic, dynastic considerations do not apply. The Queen could not for dynastic reasons change the policy of England in Asia, Africa, or Europe, and, therefore, we must treat England as if she were a Republic, and think purely of political considerations. In smaller matters no doubt we can think of relationship, for there there is reciprocity, but in great affairs England acts like a Republic.' When, however, we come to cases like those a Germany, Russia, and Austria, and perhaps even Italy, dynastic considerations have, it must be admitted, a real importance. An autocrat like the Czar can undoubtedly, if he chooses, shape his foreign policy with a view to family feeling. The question is whether he will choose. If, then, it should happen that the Czar were a believer in the effect of Royal marriages and family ties, dynastic alliances might, and no doubt would, again play a real part in international relations. But if we are to believe a curious story given by the Weltliche Correspondenz, and quoted by the West- minster Gazette of last Tuesday, the Czar does attach very great weight to dynastic alliances. The story is worth telling in full. It appears that during the festivals at the Coronation of the Czar at Moscow the Emperor, who was conversing with the Prince of Naples and .General Boisdeffre, the French Envoy, remarked, "It is strange how the ceremony of the Coronation reminds me of my marriage. Then I espoused my wife, but now I feel I have espoused Russia. You, Prince of Naples, impenitent bachelor, cannot understand such a feeling. And, apropos, when will you make up your mind to invite us to your wedding ?" Next, turning to the French General, the Emperor went on, "It is a pity that your country, by ignoring monarchy, has renounced the pleasure of possess- ing Princesses whom you could offer in sign of peace. How happy I should be to see the Prince of Naples marry a French Princess ! And your cousin," turning to the Prince, "the Duke of Aosta, has set you a good example ! " Changing the subject with a laugh, the Emperor added, "Call me an autocrat as much as you like, but I hold that alliances of blood, in fact dynastic alliances, have a far higher value than the finesse and cunning of diplomatists." If these were really the words used by the Czar, and we see no reason to regard the story as untrue—it is certainly not per se improbable—the Czar intends to give importance to dynastic alliances.
The consequences of such an attitude in the Emperor of Russia are not likely to be anything but good, especially as the Czar is understood to be by nature pacific. If he makes his intimate blood-relationship with Denmark, Greece, Germany, and England the ground for understanding and respecting the rights of those countries, nothing but good can come of it. At the same time it is to be feared that in practice he will find family diplomacy difficult to manage. If he were only connected with one Royal house it might be all very well. Since, however, he has near relations almost everywhere, he will find one line of family policy neutralised by another. Experience will probably show him that the influence of marriage-ties will have to be restricted, to smoothing difficulties rather than to making great and new develop- ments in foreign policy. If doubts are entertained as to the bona-fides of this or that King or Royal Family, diplomacy may be used to restore confidence. Again, compacts and agreements may be made more easy when the basis for them can be arranged in family letters. It must not be forgotten, however, that intimate family relationships often lead in the end to very bitter family quarrels. The friendly feeling of a ruler to his wife's relations may prevent a war, yet, again, war may be made because of a Royal Consort's dislike of this or that relation. If once family feeling and foreign policy are mixed up, they are mixed up for good as well as for evil, and a quarrel begun by a sarcastic remark as to the shape of a Royal infant's nose may widen into a conflict which will send the guns rumbling towards the frontier. Princesses may sometimes be signs of peace, but they way also be signals of war. The Princess Miranda may have been misunderstood at home, and especially by Groughenough, the Arch-Chan- cellor, and hence her hatred of Groughenough is with- out limit. Fate makes her a Queen, but she does not forget her loathing of Groughenough, and she uses her influence to upset all Groughenough's diplomatic pro- posals merely because they are Groughenough's. But if the Arch-Chancellor has the people of his country behind him this may in the end mean war. The Queen may innocently have told her husband that "Uncle Frederick would really be very glad to get rid of Groughenough, who is always horridly rude to him, and if he finds he cannot carry the treaty, he will be sure to require his resignation ; " but for all that. Grough- enough may prove too strong, and the effort to remove him may mean an international incident ending in var. On the whole, then, and though on occasion dynastic alliances may prove useful, we hold that it is better that they should be given no real weight, and that the rule should be,—Family feeling has no place in diplomacy or foreign affairs. The fewer the personal equations in high policy the better. It is bad enough that the private feelings of Kings and Prime Ministers should have to be reckoned with. Let us not add to these the domestic predilections and feelings of Empresses and Queens.
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