TOPICS OF THE DAY
SIR BARTLE FRERE IN ZULULAND.
AATE do not see how it is possible for her Majesty's Govern- ment to acquit Sir Bartle Frere, and retain any effective control over the policy of the Empire. He has chosen, with
the rash self-confidence which has been his drawback through- out his career, to go his own way, as if he were an independent power ; and as he has gone wrong, he must take the conse- quences, as had he been independent, he would have had to do. Unless the Government have suppressed despatches of high importance—which there is as yet no reason to suspect —three points come out in the South-African papers with unmistakable clearness. The first is, that Sir Bartle Frere had decided in his own mind that the Zulu power must be destroyed by an offensive war. The second is, that her Majesty's Government disliked the idea of this war to such a degree as to refuse means for it, and almost to prohibit it by direct orders. And the third is, that Sir Bartle Frere was so resolved on his war, that he brought it on, even though doubt- ful himself whether he possessed adequate means to ensure either a rapid or a sufficient success. Upon the first point there will probably be no dispute from any side. The de- cision to invade is on the face of the despatches, and is, indeed, a part of Sir Bartle Frere's defence. His theory throughout is that Cetewayo is a dangerous military despot, whose whole system of government is based on war; who cannot and will not live without war; who, since the annexation of the Transvaal, has had no enemy to destroy but the British, and who may any day lay waste the Transvaal or Natal. So thoroughly had this idea—in itself, as we believe, a true one—penetrated Sir Bartle Frere's mind, that he began in a few months to regard Cetewayo as our grandfathers re- garded Napoleon, or as Frenchmen now regard Bismarck,—to see in him the author of all evils in South Africa, to trace his finger in every native disturbance or alarm of a native rising. The Zulu King became to him what the Czar became to Mr. Urquhart, or is now to the modern Jingoes,—the one person responsible for trouble, the one enemy to be subdued at any cost. A kind of ubiquity is attributed to him, and tribes the most diverse and most distant are credited with regarding him as the champion of the Black man against the White. Sir M. Hicks-Beach had mentioned in one despatch some " in- formation" which inclined him to doubt whether the danger was so immediate or so certain ; but $ir Bartle Frere, possessed with his idea, pooh-poohed him in a tone rarely adopted by subordi- nates in writing to a responsible superior. On December 10th, 1878, he says:—"I am not, of course, aware what information may have reached her Majesty's Government on this subject other than what has passed through me ; but I confess that, looking back at the information I have had the honour to submit to her Majesty's Government for the past twelve months, I can find little ground for any such hope of avoiding a war with Cete- wayo. For some time after my arrival on the frontier of the Cape Colony, I was incredulous as to the existence of anything like a common purpose in the restlessness of the native tribes, and their disposition to measure their strength with the Euro- pean races ; but gradually an irresistible body of evidence from every part of South Africa, all pointing to one conclusion, convinced me that though there might be no definite agree- ment between any two tribes, there was a common purpose and a general understanding that the time was now come for the black races to shake off the domination of the white, and to expel them from the country ; and that, though Kreli might be the leader among the Amaxosa races, Cetewayo, as King of the most powerful Caffre tribes, was the head and moving spirit of the combination." As if to avoid any possibility of mistake, Sir Bartle describes his plan for an offensive campaign, and indicates Ulundi, Cetewayo's residence, as the object to which his efforts would be directed. He demands reinforcements to protect his colonies, but avows that his notion of protecting them is to invade Zululand and overthrow Cetewayo.
Now, we are not about to arraign Sir Bartle Frere for taking this view of the policy to be ultimately pursued. We think an idea had taken possession of him until he was hardly in possession of his full judgment as to the meaning of the infor- mation before him, hardly able to see that he was supposing that every calamity possible in South Africa would happen all at once; till he forgot considerations of time and distance, and wanted to provide dams against a flood and an earthquake happening both together. He did just the same thing in his
memorandums on the Indian frontier, desiring his superiors to provide against combinations which might never occur, and enemies a thousand miles off, by immediate and far-reaching precautions. Nevertheless, we do not deny his insight. We think it proved that Cetewayo was dangerous, or even, though not exactly the centre of all native hopes, extremely dangerous to both Natal and the Transvaal, and that Sir Bartle Frere in sa reporting was entirely within his functions. But the well- understood duty of a Colonial Governor in such circumstances is to lay his view before the Cabinet, to insist peremptorily on reinforcements sufficient to make it certain, in official phrase, that " her Majesty do not lose her colony ;" but to await, as regards aggressive movements, the decision of his superiors. On no other conditions can there be a general or "Imperial" policy, in its true sense, at all. If every Governor is to declare war when he sees cause, we may have a dozen wars at once, and be required to send small armies for the conquest of Southern China, Afghanistan, Zululand, New Guinea, and Polynesia, all together,—suggestions in which we have only quoted actual proposals. It is simply preposterous to suppose that the British Government can allow any representative, however highly placed—be he Viceroy of India, or Governor- General of Canada, or High Commissioner of all Colonies in South Africa—to declare war at his own discretion, because he thinks that the best method of defence. The Empire would be dissolved in a year, or England ringed round with wars as it is by the sea, till, to alter Webster's famous simile, the rising sun would be saluted everywhere by the roar of British artillery. Sir Bartle Frere broke directly through this rule. The Government avowedly sent him only troops suffi- cient for defence. He allowed that he had a garrison suffi- cient to defend his colonies and carry on the policy of delay. He admitted that he doubted whether, if he resolved on invading, he should have enough men to keep open communi- cations, and asked for four regiments more. And he was keenly alive to Lord Chelmsford's deficiency in cavalry, and at the same time aware, as we judge from the wording of his request, that the Home Government would never send them. And nevertheless, without waiting for Sir M. Hicks-Beach's despatch in reply, which he probably foresaw would be fatal to his plans, he resolved on war, made demands on Cetewayo which he knew would be refused, and finally directed Lord Chelmsford to cross the Tugela, and commence a war of invasion for the overthrow of the Zulu kingdom. Admit that he was right from the beginning, that the war was ultimately unavoidable, and that invasion was wiser than defence, and still we can see no excuse for his conduct, except, indeed, his possession by an idea. He acted as if he were in- dependent, as if his regular powers extended to foreign war, as if South Africa were the only business of her Majesty's Government. He never even, as Sir M. Hicks-Beach complains, fairly discussed invasion with the Colonial Office. He showed a total want of that prudence and self-restraint which are essen- tial, not only to official subordination, but to the safety and honour of an Empire so scattered, and garrisoned upon so im- perfect a system. Suppose it had happened, as it might have happened, that on January 22nd the Government had been compelled to menace war with Russia, or to reinforce an army cut off in Afghanistan !
We shall not be accused, we suppose, of over-anxiety to de- fend her Majesty's present Government, and indeed we do not intend to defend them. It is the flatulent rubbish which they are perpetually preaching under the name of "Imperialism" which has carried away Sir Bartle Frere, and led him to believe that any policy, if only it were high-handed enough, would be condoned at home ; and they shrank from direct orders which, nevertheless, they wished Sir Bartle Frere to understand. But we cannot see that as regards the disaster in Zululand they can be directly held responsible. They did not order the war, and they did not like it. They sent out troops enough to protect the colony from invasion and protract the situation until a final decision could be arrived at, and they finally, though too late, signified their disapproval of a war of conquest. They could not be expected to foresee that a Governor, by his own statement possessed of insufficient force, would take the bit between his teeth, and " rush" the great obstacle in that style, or order an invasion, as the children say, all out of his own head. It might have been wiser, as the event has shown, to have accepted Sir Bartle Frere en bloc, and place a corps trarnzde at his disposal. It might have been wiser to recall him. It would have been wiser to send him peremptory orders not to invade without written instructions from her Majesty's Government, unless Cetewayo declared war. But the Ministry acted as any British Government, controlled by rather feeble and overburdened men, would usually act, and deserve only a portion of the obloquy which, by the usual irony of fate, is now falling upon them. Sir Bartle Frere has been their trump- card. It is really upon his memoranda that they have acted in Afghanistan. By his memoranda, they have defended that act of high-handed folly. Upon his judgment as to Indian frontiers, they have been content to depend. And it is through this cherished servant, when once set free to carry his ideas into action, to behave towards Zululand as he advised them to behave towards Afghanistan, that they have lost their hold upon the country, and incurred a disaster the extent of which cannot even yet be clearly foretold.
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