Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory

John Hackett

ONE HUNDRED DAYS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER by Sandy Woodward, with Patrick Robinson

HarperCollins, £18, pp. 360

Admiral Sandy Woodward's memoir of the action of the Royal Navy's Falklands Battle Group, which he commanded in the South Atlantic in 1982 makes compulsive reading. It does not aim to offer a compre- hensive and authoritative account of our successful action to repossess the Falkland Islands after their seizure by Argentina. It confines itself to the naval operations and to the actions and reflections of a key figure in the conduct of what may be the last major maritime enterprise in the British imperial mode. As well as offering a gripping narrative, this book will help many to understand a little of what goes on in warfare at sea (and especially in the sea-air battle) in the late 20th century, when electronic advances have left far behind methods in use only a few years ago. It also throws strong light on what has made of the Royal Navy an institution unique in human affairs, and how it turned a highly intelligent, inquiring, forthright and deter- mined young man into one of its very own, among the best.

Woodward first put on dark blue cloth- ing at the age of 13, to spend four years as a cadet, before passing out in 1949, already inducted into the absorbent, demanding, orderly way of life which unites the brotherhood and sets it apart. Following the normal path of hard work under talent- ed seniors he was drilled in every relevant aspect of life in the Royal Navy and found himself before he was 20 the watch-keeper alone on the bridge of a warship at sea.

His career led him through well-charted channels, specialising as required of him, doing a long stint as a submariner in what remains a distinguishable group of men within the naval mystery, slightly apart, a young officer tending to put searching questions which were not always entirely welcome but qualifying adequately at rising levels of experience and study, until he found himself in May 1982 appointed to command a battle group in the Atlantic. He was under orders to move urgently south in preparation for the recovery of the Falkland Isles, lately seized by Argentina. Though Argentina did not exist when set- tlers from this country in 1833 moved in to what were to become known as the Falk- lands, there is a deeply seated and persis- tent Argentine aspiration to their ownership. We shall hear more of this in future, though further military action can almost certainly be ruled out and we can only remain thankful for the ineptitude with which Argentina last tried it on.

Some 12 years ago I accepted an invita- tion to give lectures in Buenos Aires on topics which arose in some writing of mine on a possible third world war. General Galtieri was then head of the armed forces, though not yet President, and invited me to address a large group of senior officers on the international strategic scene. Argentini- an services, he said, had been for so long preoccupied with the suppression of terror- ism that they needed reminding of the true function of a nation's armed forces. Would I open a window for them on the world? I did my best, pointing out, for example, that the Straits of Hormuz were more likely to be the centre of world conflagration than the Beagle Passage. Did I overdo it? Did I open the window a trifle too wide, so that they peeped out and saw the Malvinas?

Anyway, General Galtieri gave me a lit- tle marble slab, with a brass plate on it bearing his name and mine. Back in Eng- land I took it up to London to show to Robin Day, for whom I was performing on Question Time, and left it in a cab at Paddington station. All efforts to trace it have failed. If anyone has it, may I have it back?

Our Argentine opponents, in what I am thinking of just now as Woodward's War, enjoyed major advantages but discounted them in monumental blunders. They had some very good equipment, particularly in the air arm, and excellent fliers. They were operating from the air stations of a land- based airforce within a few minutes flying time of their target areas, against a naval task force 8,000 miles from its home base. The truly catastrophic blunder of the Argentines was in timing. In another six months the naval reductions ordered by Secretary of State for Defence John Nott, as part of HMG policy, would have taken place. The two aircraft carriers, Invincible and Hermes, would have been sold off, together with assault ships Intrepid and Fearless, and little Endurance disposed of as well for good measure. There could have been no South Atlantic Task Force, no repossession of the islands and this book would never have been written.

As it was, our principal air effort was deployed from Invincible and Hermes, both together adding up to less than what was carried in one big carrier, like the USS Coral Sea. To lose one of these (a single Exocet missile could have done it) would gravely jeopardise the whole operation. To lose both, in two such attacks, would bring it to an abrupt end. Woodward had to bal- ance the imperative necessity to keep his carriers afloat, and so as far as possible out of harm's way, against the urgent need to maximise combat flying time over the oper- ational area, where our own forces were desperately in need of air cover. To have brought the carriers further forward would have exposed them to greater danger. There is no doubt at all that of many deci- sions facing the Admiral this was one of the most critical and, as in most other cases, he got it right, although men up front craving better air cover were bound to grumble.

Woodward's opinions emerge clearly.

Even with the help given us by Argentinian ineptitude, without stout support from the US the enterprise would almost certainly have failed, Caspar Weinberger, American Defence Secretary, ordered that 'Britain be given every possible assistance in terms of hardware and intelligence'. The use of Ascension Island as an advanced base, with no harbour of its own but offering the only 1000-yard airstrip on the way down into the South Atlantic, was indispensable. Of equal importance was the supply of air-to-air missiles, together with ammunition, fuel, satellite communications and other facilities. Sidewinder, the AIM 9L missile which was to prove vital to our Sea-Harri- ers, and the use of Ascension were Ameri- ca's two most important gifts. The Royal Navy pined for Airborne Early Warning too, but in vain, for AEW could only work from a US carrier and that would mean direct American intervention. Support in the States was nonetheless enthusiastic and widespread. I arrived myself at the US Army War College at Carlisle, on other business on 8 April and next day saw in a Pennsylvanian roadside eating place the blackboard usually announcing today's spe- cial, now scrubbed clean and bearing only a chalk inscription, 'Rule Britannia'.

General Haig with his tireless shuttle diplomacy was to Sandy Woodward 'a disaster area'. Every day spent in chat- ting gave the Argentines opportunities for build-up and brought nearer the onset of the South Atlantic winter, when all air-sea operations would have to cease. Woodward saw mid-June as the deadline before which a resolution was imperative.

In the sea-air fighting with the Argen- tines before the arrival of the amphibious force, all so well narrated here, the patchy performance of our target-acquisition and attack systems gave rise to concern. It may surprise many to learn how far the human operator was (and to some, though to a lesser extent, still is) in thrall to the systems being operated: a technical fault may cause a failure to respond to commands, with time too desperately short to allow for cor- rection. An effective 'lock on' may be fol- lowed by refusal on the part of the launcher to engage, for any one of a num- ber of reasons, with the operator being either powerless or with insufficient time to override.

Our missile systems. Seacat, Sea Dart, Sea Skua, Seaslug, Sea Wolf were all deployed in appropriate tasks and achieved successes, but no sea-to-air or air-to-air system put up a perfectly reliable performance, with the American Sidewinder the best of the bunch. The Rapier ground-to-air system coming in with the land forces did less well than was hoped, though the more limited Stinger, in the hands of the SAS, and Blowpipe were occasionally effective. Shipborne Lynx and Gazelle helicopters were quite invaluable and much was expected of the Wessex and the Chinooks, 'these priceless monsters', almost all of which were destroyed in the grievous loss of Atlantic Conveyor. Sea- Harrier was outstanding, a key to unlock- ing many a situation, and it is interesting to look back a little and see how nearly it was stillborn. The Weapons Development Committee in the MOD, with Solly Zuckerman in the Chair (and myself as the Army representative among the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff) had before it in 1962 advanced proposals for two VTOL aircraft, P1152 and P1184. One was denied further development and the other dis- cussed. The Army was enthusiastically in favour of an aircraft so versatile that it

could operate virtually anywhere, without comprehensive station support. This could mean closer and more intimate air support of ground operations. Largely for this reason the RAF looked upon it with disfavour. Received wisdom saw the main function of airforces as the destruction of the enemy's Air Order of Battle, the AOB, best carried out from stations where every- thing was laid on. Bomb attack had a high priority too, a function only feasible from the station. Such minor functions as Army cooperation must not be allowed to divert resource from the main effort. The Navy saw distinct advantage in VTOL and so supported the Army. The determined opposition of the RAF was overcome and in the Seventies the aircraft to be known as Harrier emerged. Victory in the Falklands would have been quite impossible without it and it has proved invaluable elsewhere.

When the Battle Group came into action failure to take out the carriers threw away the two ace cards in the Argentinian hand. Even then they could have won the day by delaying counter attack on land a few weeks longer. As we learn in this book, the onset of the South Atlantic winter from the end of June would have brought all major sea-air operations to a stop. The Battle Group's effectiveness was already running down. To maintain it in battleworthy condition through the winter months, 8000 miles from its home base, was impossible. Galtieri threw a winning game away.

Why the Argentines did not make an all- out effort to apply much superior offensive air resource (including Etendards armed with Exocet) to the early elimination of Hermes and Invincible is by no means clear. After weeks of sea-air warfare, with both still there, the British amphibious force arrived. Two brigades with appropriate support were put ashore and, after great difficulties and some disasters most valiant- ly overcome, an Argentine force many times greater than the attackers but with little will to fight it out surrendered to the British in Port Stanley on 13 June.

That evening the first real blizzard of the South Atlantic winter arrived, lashing the Islands, now ours again, with sleet and snow in a gale at Force 12 with winds gust- ing to 120 mph. General Winter, in terms

'It was either a labotomy or a five-year contract hosting a daytime TV quiz show.'

Napoleon used of his defeat in Russia, had taken over, confirming a defeat which the Argentinians were now too late to prevent.

Woodward on command is particularly interesting. He breaks little new ground but throws new light on old problems now emerging in unfamiliar contexts. All who have held command in war, at any level, know about its loneliness. There are things to be done which you alone can do and no one can do them for you. This Commander may have been on occasion more down- right than some but there was no doubt anywhere of the competence gained in half a lifetime's single-minded devotion to the mastery of his trade. In war nowadays, however, and particularly in sea-air warfare, not only do problems arising in action often demand far swifter solution than in the past but the handling of the components is more demanding and the scene can change more quickly. The human aspect is constant. Allow yourself emotion at the loss of friends and you take the sharp edge off your judgment. In battle there is no room for remorse. That can come later and is your own affair. Here and now your duty allows it no place.

Woodward in the South Atlantic was well served. Of the captains under him, of whom we get to know a good many, 11 would become admirals before this book was finished. He speaks of them with respect, confidence and affection. What he has to say about the BBC deserves caution. The World Service, to which Galtieri's men owed much, did no more, the BBC claimed, than set out what the MOD had already released. If there is a fault it may not lie in Portland Place. The premature public disclosure of 2 Para's intended move on Goose Green, which has caused much bitterness, has not, as far as I know, yet been sufficiently explained.

To Woodward the victory was not only 'a close run thing'. It was 'nip and tuck'. But now his task was done; he could come home and in the years since then has pro- duced this book, making use of diaries and letters to his wife to put together a compelling narrative with a strongly human undertone.

Some day the part played in the develop- ment of western civilisation by the Royal Navy will receive recognition now long overdue. For close on half a millennium it was dominant over huge areas of the earth's surface, for long periods of time. I am in Madeira most years and cannot look out from its cliffs over the blue immensity of the Atlantic Ocean without reflecting that in times gone by the Royal Navy virtu- ally owned all this. But wherever there was blue water it found its way, persistent, potent and pervasive, with the minimum of

self-advertisement and to maximum effect. The men who served in it, hardened by dis-

cipline and drilled into mastery of their demanding craft, developed a rare devo- tion to their service, setting them apart from other men. They are still there.