POLITICS
Labour's constitutional reforms would lead to English nationalism and hanging
BRUCE ANDERSON
In the nature of such events, the debate will have produced more heat than light. The Conservative Party's position is subtler than the Commons' exchanges would sug- gest. As for New Labour, they would be well advised to heed Ernie Bevin's warning: if you open Pandora's box you will find that it is full of Trojan horses. If Mr Blair suc- ceeded in implementing his proposals, he would feel the full rigour of the law of unintended consequences.
The Tories are — rightly — assumed to be the defenders of the Constitution, yet this is doubly paradoxical. Inasmuch as we have a written Constitution, it was written by the Whig victors of the Glorious Revolu- tion and it includes provisions on the royal succession which should distress any consci- entious Tory, as they give Parliament precedence over primogeniture. Nor should such Tories be any happier with the principal elements of our unwritten Consti- tution: democratic sovereignty and elective dictatorship — tempered only by Brussels.
It is an enduring irony that the Party which opposed the Great Reform Bill should have enjoyed so much electoral suc- cess in the ensuing 160 years. Largely because the Party has been so good at win- ning elections, the intra-Tory debate on democracy has not progressed beyond the arguments between Disraeli and Salisbury over the Second Reform Bill: pragmatists versus pessimists — and the pragmatists would appear to have won. When times are good, few Tories bother to look below the surface of events, any more than the coun- try gentlemen of 1865/6 bothered to ques- tion Disraeli's figures; they just enjoyed watching him twist Gladstone's tail. But there have always been doubting voices, especially when the Tories lost elections. In the mid-Seventies, Lord Hailsham warned of the perils of elective dictatorship and a surprising number of Tory MPs were pre- pared to listen to the case for proportional representation. Had the Party not won the 1979 election, PR would have won many Tory adherents.
There are parallels with Lords reform. Any Tory ought to feel an attachment to the House of Lords as present constituted. But Tories ought also to believe in a strong second chamber, able to challenge the Commons. As long as the Lords contains a large hereditary element, it would have great difficulty in playing that role.
Since 1911, when the Commons estab- lished its supremacy, successive Tory lead- erships have been reluctant to commit themselves to an all-out defence of the pre- sent House of Lords. At the time, it was widely assumed by Tories as well as Liberals that the 1911 Act was only the first step in a fundamental reform of the Lords, and more recently the Tory leaders in the Lords have always been prepared to discuss change. They merely invite the proponents of reform to answer a question.
That question is the one on which all attempts at Lords' reform have foundered: how are the hereditary peers to be replaced? There are only two answers, both equally unpalatable. The first is election. An elected chamber would be able to chal- lenge the Commons. But unless it were elected on the same day as the Commons — which would be absurd — it would always be controlled by the Opposition. This would lead to governmental gridlock, which is why the Commons would not endorse such a scheme. But the only alternative to election is nomination. Such a chamber would be the greatest quango of all. It would find it almost impossible to retain self-respect, let alone win public respect.
If we now decided to create a second chamber for the first time, no one would seriously argue for including the holders of certain hereditary titles. But we have no need to create a second chamber. We have one, and it works. Though Tories would ideally prefer a stronger chamber, it would be foolish to trade the acceptable for the unattainable. It is not possible to recast the present House, nor is it necessary to do so. When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change.
Britain does not have a modern written Constitution because since 1689 there have been none of those revolutions which occur regularly on the Continent leading to the overthrow of existing institutions which then have to be replaced. We have never had a constituent assembly; one reason why Salis- bury's fears proved unfounded. The newly enfranchised electorate was never asked whether it was happy with the current consti- tutional arrangements; it was merely offered the privilege of participating in them.
Influenced by Charter 88 and other con- stitutional pressure groups, many New Labourites find this offensive; when they claim that their aim is to democratise the Constitution, they are being sincere. But are they being wise? It could be argued that a sensible New Labourite has even more rea- son to distrust democracy than Salisbury had. Over the past generation, whole areas of social and foreign policy have been insulat- ed from democratic pressure and adminis- tered by establishment consensus. Homo- sexual law reform, the abolition of the death penalty, immigration, Europe: does Charter 88 really want a democratic input on these issues? The reformers may believe that they could control the agenda: give judges power on social policy, give Scotland a Parliament while still enabling Scottish Labour MPs to be over-represented in Westminster, give more power to Europe. They think that they could do all this in the name of democracy — but suppose democ- racy decided otherwise? 'Very kind of you to act on our behalf, old chap,' democracy might well say, 'but now that our interest has been aroused by all these fascinating debates, we will take over. We'll start with a referendum on capital punishment. We'll then have something to say about Europe. And as for Scottish nationalism — what about English nationalism?' Tony Blair believes that he is safe to argue for wholesale constitutional reform because the voters will not notice. This side of an election, he might be right — though John Major has other plans. But if Mr Blair thinks that he could run the constitutional debate like an Islington dinner party, he would be quickly disabused. He would claim to speak in the name of democracy; he would find that democracy spoke for itself. He would set out to appease Scottish nationalism and to give judges powers to impose liberal social reforms. He would end up with English nationalism and hanging.
Previous page
