TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE MASTERY OF THE ADRIATIC. THE fall of Cettigne and the overrunning of the whole Montenegrin Kingdom by the Austrians are a strategic annoyance to the Allies which cannot be lightly dismissed. Though we do not want to exaggerate the importance of the incident, it cannot be denied that it weakens the Allies at a point where they ought to be strong, and where they could have been strong if they had carried out a more vigorous naval policy earlier in the war. We have felt from the beginning, though it would have been extremely difficult and indiscreet for us to say so publicly, that after Italy's declaration of war against Austria the Adriatic was, or at any rate might. be made, the key of the position. To begin with, its head- waters are a comparatively short distance from the two Austrian capitals of Vienna and Budapest. Next, opera- tions by the Allies on the eastern side would have been conducted through territory occupied by a Slavonic population whose sympathies were almost entirely with us and against our enemies, while on the western side they would have been buttressed by Italy and the strong force which she had placed upon her mountain frontiers. Further, before the overrunning of Serbia, bold actioi4in the Adriatic would have had the effect of covering Serbia's flank, and would have made her destruction a far more difficult and dangerous game than it proved. To put the matter in its simplest form, the great initial asset of the Allies was the command of the sea, and from this it followed that we ought to make good that command wherever possible. Translated into terms of action, the Allies ought earlier in the war to have made a determined effort to destroy the Austrian naval force in the Adriatic. Till that destruction had taken place we could not be said to have the local command of the sea, and could not reap the advantage of our sea power. Especially was it important for our Italian allies that the Austrian Fleet should be destroyed, or at any rate be so completely penned in as to be sterilized and rendered innocuous. Considering Italy's geographical position, her commitments in Albania, and the general trend of her aspirations in the Adriatic, it was specially important for her that Austrian sea power should suffer destruction as soon as possible. When we say this it must not be supposed for a moment that we are putting any special blame upon Italy, or suggesting that it was her business to deal with Austria alone. We make no complaint whatever against Italy, but fully recognize how great have been her sacrifices on her Alpine frontier, and how extremely arduous has been the work which she has undertaken and is accomplishing, not only with con- spicuous valour, but with a steadfast determination which calls for the admiration of all who know the facts. She has been fighting her battle in what is physically by far the most difficult section of the vast battle line of Europe. Taking the war as a whole, it was as necessary for Britain, for France, and for Russia to root out Austrian sea power in the Adriatic as it was for Italy. Though Italy might have obtained a greater local benefit, the matter was really one not of local but of general importance. Instead of the mastery of the Adriatic being neglected or for- gotten, the need for dealing drastically with the naval situation from Trieste to Cattaro should never have been out of the thoughts of those who control the policy of the Allies.
We are fully aware that what we have just said is open to the criticism that we are talking as if destroying modern fleets protected by submarines and mine-fields were as easy as picking blackberries. It will be urged, and no doubt with a good show of reason, that if fleets like to stand on the defensive, as is the case with the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea or even in the Baltic, it is an exceedingly difficult, or perhaps impossible, task to get at them and destroy them. A powerful fleet which is unwilling to come out and fight cannot, in spite of Mr. Churchill's heroics, be " dug out," and there is often nothing left to do but to watch its hiding-place as a cat watches the hole of a mouse. We admit the plea in part. We fully recognize that it would have been a ticklish job to destroy the Austrian Fleet, but we cannot admit that it was or is an impossibffity. After all, it is a matter of degree. Because we cannot move the German Fleet, which has been placed on the great water-shelf of the Kiel Canal and protected by the most wonderful series of land fortifications, floating mines, and highly mobile submarine flotillas that the. world has ever seen, and also is a Fleet in a waterway open at one end into the Baltic—that is, into waters which we cannot reach in force—it does not follow that therefore the much less strong Austrian Fleet, which is without many of the advantages we have just named, is invulnerable. We cannot help thinking 'that if Italy, France, and Britain had pooled their naval resources in the Mediterranean, and made a determined effort to secure the complete command of the Adriatic in the only way in which the complete command of the sea is ever secured—by the destruction of the floating forces of the enemy—the business could have been accomplished.
At any rate, in our opinion the importance of the object should have been much more clearly recognized, and an effort should have been made before we tried our harum- scarum attempt to carry the Dardanelles by a coup de main. No doubt after we had suffered from that entanglement the British Navy was not in a position to play a large part in the Adriatic as well as in the Aegean. If, however, the Allies had fixed their eyes and wills upon Istria and the Dalmatian and Albanian coasts, we believe that our over- whelming naval force would have enabled us to do what was necessary. After all, the Austrian naval position was strategically not a good one. If the Austrians had concen- trated their force at one of their ports, they might have been permanently blockaded there, while if that force had been dispersed in order to guard at one and the same time Cattaro, Ragusa, Fiume, Pola, and Trieste, it could have been dealt with in detail.
We are not, however, going to be so foolish as to waste time in deploring past errors. We only mention them because we believe that it is still well worth while for the Allies to devise and carry out a strong and effective naval policy in the Adriatic. What that policy should be in detail we are, of course, not in a position to state. Any attempt to do so on insufficient, or even on sufficient, knowledge of the facts might prove highly dangerous. All we desire to do is to point out that the Allies still hold very many strong cards in their hands, and that if only those cards are well played a great deal may yet be accom- plished. Of course, we do not by this mean that the Allies ought, merely for the sake of doing something, to plunge into action in the Adriatic. Whatever they do must be done with a clear objective and supported by resolute action. It would be better to go on drifting than to make a demonstration of force without any serious intention behind it. That intention must be the destruction of the Austrian Fleet. If for any reason the Allies do not at present feel capable of undertaking such destruction, then clearly they must leave the matter alone.
We must guard ourselves against suggesting that the Allies are to blame for the collapse in Montenegro. It is obvious that they could not possibly have foreseen that the King would abandon ground unconquered throughout history. Who could have imagined that a country which had repelled the Romans, which had vanquished and over- come all Turkish attacks, and which had resisted the armies of Napoleon, would in the end fall before an Austrian assault I No blame can rest upon any of the Allied Governments for not providing against a fiasco so amazing. Time and the revelations of the future will show by what methods Austria obtained a victory in regard to which the only thing we know is that it was not a victory of arms. Again, we must guard ourselves against suggesting that in itself the overrunning of Montenegro is of strategic importance, or that it has done substantial injury to the cause of the Allies. The apparent success of the Central Powers at Cettigne adds no lustre to their arms and affords them no substantial gains. It is, indeed, a very poor set-off against their failure to drive the Allies out of Salonika. Though we are deeply anxious to see the Allies obtain the mastery of the Adriatic, we do not mean to let that anxiety cloud our Minds or prevent us seeing the war as a whole in its true perspective.
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