THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY.
AN excellent opportunity has arisen for the Government to declare to the whole world thit the blockade of Germany will be made as thorough as it is in the power of the British Navy to make it. We most sincerely hope that 'the Government will recognize this opportunity and act quickly and clearly. As it is, the Navy is not doing all that could be done because it is working under too many hampering restrictions. We know very well the reasons for these restrictions, and we think we have heard all the arguments in their favour. The whole subject bristles with difficulties as a porcupine with quills. There are admittedly the interests of neutral countries to be considered, and we have to remember these so far as we can without impeding our primary and essential task of winning the war. To end the war as swiftly as possible is, after all, to the interest of neutral countries, and indeed they have no greater concern than that this should happen. If we lose ourselves in a wilderness of questions about what is exactly per- missible according to precedent, we shall not really help anybody or anything ; we shall not help ourselves, or the neutral countries, or civilization, or the freedom of mankind. To dispute about " juridical niceties " now—as though we had not the right to create precedents as all countries have done in the past—is to allow the whole question to become even more difficult for us later on. Mr. Wilson has no doubt in his mind the material of several more Notes to Britain on the rights of neutrals, and if we appear to do nothing more till fresh Notes begin to arrive we shall have lost our vantage-ground, and shall seem to consent in advance to the possibility of discussing in detail the effectiveness, the legality, the propriety, the expediency, the " precedentedness," and one knows not what else, of our blockade of Germany. We say that an excellent opportunity has arisen to make it plain that we do not contemplate, and cannot admit, any such possibility, because the course of opinion in the United States—much :the greatest neutral concerned—invites us to tighten the blockade. Let us by all means accept that advice. We do not assume that the views which are expressed in many 'American newspapers imply any change of opinion in the State Department at Washington—indeed we have already assumed the contrary—but it is in the highest degree unlikely that Mr. Wilson would care to try to resist an accomplished fact in the policy of Britain which enjoyed the sanction of a great body of argument among Americans.
If evidence is needed of the extraordinary amount of foodstuffs and military supplies that is finding its way into Germany under the system created by our Foreign Office, it is supplied in an astonishing set of figures published in the Morning Post of Tuesday. The exports of flour from the United States to neutral countries 'rose from 1,417,000 barrels in 1913 to 5,100,000 barrels in 1915. The amount of bacon exported in 1913 was 30,900,000 pounds ; in 1915 it became 91,500,000. These are only examples. Why did the imports of neutral countries rise in this remarkable way, and particularly the imports of countries contiguous to Germany ? There can be only one answer. The appetites and the consuming power of neutral countries have not suddenly developed to Gargantuan proportions. Food and military supplies are, of course, finding their way by circuitous routes, and by -every kind of dodge, to Germany. We have said several times that we have no complaint to make of the general principles which the Foreign Office has laid down, but it must be evident to every one now, if it was never evident before, that the result which the Foreign Office aims at is not being secured. The Navy must be allowed 'to put the principles into practice with less interference. It must be the supreme and only executant of the Government's policy. The blockade which is ineffective should be made effective. 'And here we come back to the support of American opinion. The New York Times, for instance, says (as we read in the Times of Thursday) that there can be no doubt that the excess of goods imported by neutral countries was intended 'for Germany. Assuming that Britain is about to substitute a " lawful blockade " for the Orders in Council, the New York Times, goes on : " Will our protest against the Orders in Council on legal grounds be now supplemented by protests against Jhe blockade on commercial grounds ? Here there is a difficulty, for the blockade of neutral ports will be in accordance with our own doctrines of ' continuous voyage' and ' ultimate destination.' Are we supporters of these doctrines when they help us in war, and against them when they impede our own trade in the war of another country ? ' That is our case, and it could not be stated better. The New York Herald also welcomes a report that Britain is about to establish an effective blockade : " There have been half- measures in nearly everything, half-measures in fighting the devil with fire and gas ; there have been half-measures in regard to the restriction of commerce, much of which, doubtless, went directly through Holland and Scandinavia to Germany. The strangle-hold on supplies for Germany is now about to tighten, let neutrals take what position they may." Americans do not doubt that we can really make the blockade effective if we try to do so. As the Times correspondent says, the American naval authorities have informed the State Department that the British Navy has the situation completely in hand. The corre- spondent received the following opinion from three American Admirals : " Without employing more ships, or .redistri- buting her ships, Great Britain can to-day establish an effective blockade of Germany as the term is understood in international law." The correspondent adds :- " The only thing needful for the establishment of a blockade a differentiated from the activities of the Fleet under Orders in Council, according to the officers quoted, is for Great Britain to declare a blockade. British warships, they declared, would not have to lie off German ports or even near by ; they would only have to demon- strate their ability to prevent ships carrying supplies of any kind from reaching enemy ports. They could also, according to American precedent in the Civil War, stop and, on proof of ultimate enemy destination, seize all cargoes en route for neutral ports."
It may be thought very strange that Americans should prefer an effective blockade to the tolerant system under the Orders in Council. They would suffer in their trade. But they are great sticklers for the letter of historical precedent, even though the letter of the law be to their own hurt. They then feel content in the comfortable assurance that everything is regular and in order. This frame of mind has its supreme expression in the State Department, where it is the political orthodoxy. Among the American people the demand for an effective blockade is frequently, as we are delighted to recognize, a sign of sheer goodwill towards the Allies. Again, even where goodwill to the point of gladly submitting to personal losses is not present, many American men of business would prefer to know exactly where they stand. They do not object to the burden of blockade rules so much as to the uncertainty. of their operation. The Navy would not cause unnecessary annoyances of this sort.
Although we have a great opportunity of satisfying American conceptions of precedent, it is worth while to point out that the idea that naval practice in dealing with neutral trade is governed by a body of precedents which are final and complete is very absurd. International law would never have come into existence if somebody had not created precedents. In the past every single war has endowed the world with a new precedent which has since been appealed to as having the force of law. It is un- necessary, therefore, to make excuses for any new departure, within reason, that may be taken by our Navy. When Lincoln blockaded the neutral country of Mexico in the American Civil War, he created a precedent to which we now appeal. When the North invented the doctrine of " continuous voyage," a precedent was created to which wo also appeal. We might add, however, that our blockade of Germany can be, and we are sure will be, much more " effective than Lincoln's blockade of the South. The latter was recognized by courtesy—though it was a courtesy which brought four hundred thousand Lancashire men and women to the verge of starvation. To sum up, the Navy should be not the controller of policy, but the all-powerful executant of the policy of blockade. The system should be authorized by the Government as a whole, and not by the Foreign Office acting as a single Department. The Navy is crowded with practical diplomatists who will reduce delay and friction to a minimum. The only danger will be that some genial sailors will be too indulgent here and there in doubtful cases. We have no fear whatever that the great tradition of the sea would permit the Navy to be tyrannical or unfair to neutral traders.
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