British Policy and the Chinese
THE British policy in regard to China set forth in the. Memorandum of December 18th would be a credit to any country. It was frank, well argued and magnanimous ; it proved that Great Britain had no object whatever except to trade peacefully. with the Chinese people and to secure for British residents in China such protection for life and property as' they have an indubitable right to expect in any country which calls itself civilized. It is. being said here by many partisans of a policy of the "strong hand" that our Foreign Office has already failed ; that we have meekly put up with a rebuff ; that we have lost all the prestige which we had amassed as the result of firinness in previous generations ; and that if we do not wish for material as well as moral loss, we had better revert at once to a policy expressed in terms of ships and men.
We believe these complaints to be entirely unjustified. If there is any reality in Chinese nationalism—and there certainly is—we shall have to deal with it rationally and on fair terms sooner or later. Therefore, the sooner the better. There is a ferment of new ideas in old bottles throughout the East ; China is only going the . way of India and Turkey. The present British Government have been extraordinarily successful in meeting the new conditions in many parts of the world.- It was said that if we were not ready to back up our words with fleets and armies, we could do nothing whatever, but the fact is that somehow or other we have accomplished a great deal by reason and moral authority. There is no reason to think that our policy in China will not yield another honourable solution to add_ to the growing list.
At all events, if our policy is right, it cannot be wrong to give it a fair trial. The only thing that would be wrong would be to reverse it in answer to clamour. So far the signs—although there is, of course, much to cause deep anxiety and vexation--are not at all unfavourable. So far from the retirement from the Hankow Concession being a British "reverse," it was, to our thinking, a success of 'a kind that will win a place in history. The British defenders• of 'the Con- cession were not strong enough to protect all the British residents in Hankow, and they were carefully instructed that they must refrain from firing upon the Chinese mob or Chinese soldiers. Such an order demanded 'a wonderful exhibition of pluck and endurance. For hours the Marines, bluejackets' and British volunteers exposed themselves to a shower of missiles; by which many nasty injuries were inflicted. The utmost retalia- tion the defenders allowed themselves was the use of their fists. Their firearms had been laid aside. The consequence was that the riot ended quicker than would have been possible- if there had -been regular' fighting; and, above all, the dreaded' reprisals against defenceless foreigners were not provoked.'
Again, when Mr. Eugene Chen tried to restore the business -life of Hankow, the -British merchants were able to Ietteh him a. salutary lesson. They pointed- out that 'they eonld_ not. possibly - reopen "the banks. and' houses of business unless they were secured against another outburst of mob violence. Suppose the defenders of- the Concession had used their. firearms -and :many Chinese had been killed, Mr.. Chen Would 'simply have' used the facts for inflaming his followers against a fresh act of British "Imperialism." As it was, he was quietly but irresistibly compelled to- recognize- that China, like other countries, lives On its trade and get on without ,it. The whole incident was, the best proof that Mr. Chen has yet encountered that the .ways of concilia- tion are the only. real hope for China, and that the policy inspired from Moscow of hitting Great Britain anywhere and-anyhow by wrecking and destroying spells disaster.- In time these facts will sink in, but, of course, we must give them time. The diabolical promptings 'of the Soviet are still powerful. It is notoriously difficult to overtake a lie, but it will gradually become known even to the Chinese that during these past two years, while Great Britain has been denounced as the arch- enemy and as the peculiar champion of "Imperialism" she was really arguing with the Powers in' favour of a generous and progressive policy of renunciation' 'In China.
It is certain that the British Government mean to continue along their present lines, but here it unfit be pointed out that the problem of Shanghai is Very different from that of Hankow. At Hankow cireum_ stances were in command. Even if the use of force had been desirable-----which it was not—it would have been under the conditions an ineffectual, and therefore a mischievous, argument. It is not at all 'desirable, however, that the foreign residents in Shanghai, the commercial capital of China, should wait with folded arms to see whether the disciples of Bolshevism mean to inflict upon that great and rich city a large-scale reproduction of the Hankow rioting. Happily, it is not for Great Britain exclusively to decide. The head of the Shanghai Municipal Council is an American.
The hope of the British Government, so far as we understand the matter, is that the volunteer forces of Shanghai will be able to keep local disorder 'at arm's length. The right of self-defence against mob violence is inalienable. There must be no confusion between this right and the unwise argument that the Cantonese Government would be all the more amenable if they were treated to a little blood-letting by ships and troops in the old manner. In fine, the policy is, first, to avoid any conflict with the various armies engaged in the Chinese civil war ; secondly, to rely tentatively on Shanghai being able to look after its own safety from mob violence ; but, thirdly,' to have enough ships near by and ready, with landing parties if the peril at Shanghai should become worse than it seems likely to be.
Probably outside help will not be required unless the Cantonese troops enter the city. It is impossible, of course, to predict what may happen in that event. We should then be face to face with the embarrassing situation that we wish to avoid—direct conflict with one of the Chinese armies. Obviously Great Britain ought not- to be required to bear the whole responsibility of such a delicate situation, with all its contingent odium. It is sincerely to be hoped, therefore," that before the danger becotnes imminent there will be some agreement among the Powers in the sense that, if the mere necessary business of self-defence is transformed by circumstances into a " state of -war," the Powers should act together and not impede one another. Par- ticularly we hope for the co-operation. of the United States.- In the- meantime, no doubt, further efforts are being made to convince the Cantonese Government of what is the simple truth—that Great Britain is amdous to go very far indeed, along the road of conciliation, but that she cannot give what she is ready to give .if she is met with violence, unreason and intrigue. Mr. Chen is obviously impatient because, Great Britain does not recognize the Kuomintang as having established its title to rule all China. Yet even as we write it is stated- that the Cantonese troops have been checked by the - loss of the whole province of Chekiang. How foolish we should look if we recognized the Govern- ment at Hankow as the real Chinese Government, and found after a -few weeks or months that it had been overthrown! Whoever was the new ruler would accuse us of . having helped -his enemies, and we should have no answer. to make. All we are waiting for is sufficient proof that the Cantonese Government is actually what it professes to be. But Mr. Chen would do well to reflect that one of the surest proofs of supremacy is not only the power to control mobs, but the moral strength which enables Governments to place reason above sabotage.
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