Nasser Redivivus From MICHAEL ADAMS BEIRUT A FTER a confused
and confusing 1959, these first
A
weeks of the new year have seen a recog- nisable pattern emerging again in the Middle East. And the most striking single element is the astonishing revival in the fortunes of. President Nasser, who stands today at the highest point so far in his mercurial career.
In the middle of 1959, Nasser saw himself beset by difficulties on all sides. His flirtation with Mos- cow had ended in shrill accusations of breach of promise, in the disillusioning discovery that Com- munists were as prone as imperialists to interfere in the internal affairs of their proteges. His new Syrian subjects were blaming Nasser for all their difficulties, from the high cost of living to the second bad harvest in succession. His undisguised attempts to overthrow the regime of General Kassem in Iraq had ended in failure and in the persecution of the nationalist, anti-Communist elements in. Iraq. His campaign against King Hussein of Jordan had been equally unsuccessful, and after quarrelling with the government of every other Arab State except Morocco and the Yemen, Nasser had finally felt impelled to swallow his pride and, attempt a reconciliation with at least some of them. Jordan, albeit with reservations which King Hussein made no attempt to hide, had accepted the proffered olive branch. But President Botirguiba in Tunisia took a long, care- ful look at it,.and then returned it without so much as a kind word; and the new revolutionary government of General Abboud in the Sudan played possum and refused even to broach the urgent Problem of the division of the Nile waters, over which Naser needed an agreement with the Sudan before he could safely tackle his darling project of building a new high dam at Aswan.
All in alt, this was a discouraging picture, and it was only during the last three months of the year that it gradually dissolved, in a manner both familiar and disconcerting to students of. Middle Eastern _affairs, to be replaced by one totally different---Nasser, enthroned like some ancient pharaoh on one of the stylised bas-reliefs of Upper Egypt, loftily accepting the tribute of all those who wished to gain his favour.
Within (he first fortnight of the new year he had himself blown the charges which set on foot the construction of the high dam—with un- diminished Soviet aid, with an agreement with the Sudanese over the division of the Nile waters, and with the diplomatic representatives of East and West in dutiful attendance. He had seen the coun- tries of Western Europe and the United States apparently falling over each other to be allowed to share -in financing the later stages of the dam's construction. He had received the promise—four days after he had refused passage through the Suez Canal to a ship carrying an Israeli cargo— of a substantial loan from the World Bank for the improvement of that controversial waterway. In Syria he had taken the bold step of appointing an Egyptian viceroy, and when the showdown came with his Baathist critics he had forced their resig- nations and actually gained popularity amongst the Syrians as a result. In the rest of the Arab world the success of his 'neutralist' policy, and its material results, had so restored his prestige that by comparison Kassem, mouthing his obscure threats in the background, could safely be left in the care of his own devoted subjects, half of whom seemed to be primarily concerned with attempts to kill him.
It is amusing to notice how little the essentials of the game have changed since Nuri es-Said's day—except that the roles have been reversed. Then, it was Iraq, personified by Nuri, which was regarded as the bastion against Communism, and so as the candidate for all 'the favours of the West. Nasser, with his Migs and Ilyushins, and his frequent tore-a-terc with the Soviet ambassador, was the enemy, and in order to undermine the Western position in the Arab world, Nasser put all his energies into'subverting Syria and Jordan, with the ultimate aim of isolating Iraq from the rest of the Arab community. Now it is Kassem who employs the same tactics, with his promises of aid for the 'enslaved' people of Syria and his plan for an all-Palestine government to rule over the territories occupied by Egypt and Jordan after the Palestine fighting of 1948. But Jordan, with its Hashemite King, looks most unlikely to go the way of Iraq so long as it enjoys the full support of both Britain and America as well as Nasser's qualified approval; and in Syria Nasser will have no difliculty in holding his own while the alterna- tive to his rule, of association with the blood- stained regime in Iraq, presents such a frightening prospect.
For here lies Kassem's weakness and Nasser's corresponding strength. There are plenty of people in Egypt, in Syria, and in the surrounding' Arab countries, who resent some aspect of the Nasserist programme—the limitations on freedom of political expression, the indecisive economic policies, the aggressive propaganda of the 'Voice of the Arabs' which continually embroil the UAR in irrelevant quarrels, the favouritism shown to army officers, the restrictions on foreign travel— but of all Nasser's critics only the Communists have any reason to suppose that they would be better off tinder General Kassem, or indeed under any other regime at present in pOwer in the Middle East. The 'Communists are imprisoned, and sub- jected to what—by the mild Egyptian standards— is relatively severe treatment. But what of the non-Communists in Iraq? What of the massacres, the executions, the dragging through the streets, the farcical trials in the 'People's Court,' the un- certainties of 'everyday life under a regime where authority is exercised, not by the officially con- stituted government and its ministers, but by a group of unofficial advisers to a prime minister who will hear no criticism and whose equivoca- tions have exasperated every section of the com- munity?
The treason trial in the People's Court drags on, proving as much as anything that a large number of people were ready to risk their lives to take that of Kassem. Now even the Communists are quarrelling publicly among themselves. The evi- dent and continuing instability of Kassern's regime in Iraq, and its failure to provide any guarantee of security, let alone of prosperity for' Iraqis, con- stitutes the most potent argument for Nasserism in the Arab world today.
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