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If Seven Maids, with Seven Mops
From ROY JENKINS, MN
PARIS
IN January. 1957, upon his accession to the 1 Premiership, Mr. Macmillan announced that the central feature of his policy was to be the making of Britain's position in Europe. Mr. Maudling (assisted by Sir David Eccles, it must be allowed)' then spent twenty-three months achieving a situation in which we had fewer friends on the Continent than at any time since the Boer War.
At the end of 1958--when they could do nothing else—the Government reluctantly recog- nised that their scheme for a general Free Trade Area in Europe was at least temporarily dead. They then proceded to muster that heterogeneous Collection of countries now known as the 'Seven' and to prove to themselves and to the rest of Europe that it was possible to construct a free trade area, and to do it very quickly. But the value for us of this new European Free Trade Associa- tion (apart from its contribution towards sooth- ing the ruffled vanity of British economic minis- ters) is to be judged largely by whether it makes More likely a satisfactory arrangement between Britain and the 'Six.'
These were indeed the terms in which the EFTA was presented to the House of Commons in December. There was occasional confusion as to whether the Association was to be a bridge to- wards the 'Six' or a bludgeon against them; but that it was to be one or the other was not in doubt. This was even clearer from the facts of the situa- tion than from the words of Mr. Heathcoat Amory and Mr. Maudling. No one could believe that an arrangement which added only 35 million People to the British market could in itself be our answer to the economic challenge of the 160 mil- lion-strong Common Market. No one could be- lieve that a trading arrangement with countries as Peripheral as our new partners could in itself solve the problem of our political relations with Western Europe as a whole. The purpose of the `Seven' should be to aid negotiation rather than to serve as an end in itself.
The first fruits of this aid might have been expected to show themselves in Paris last week. The array of meetings was both formidable and numerically confusing. The 'Six,' with their effectively working European Commission, did not require a special meeting. The 'Seven' met on Tuesday morning in the British Embassy—the meeting place perhaps underlining the extent to which this is a group of one sun and six satellites. The curiously assorted Conference of Thirteen —the `Six' without Luxembourg, the 'Seven' without Austria and Norway, together with the United States, Canada and Greece—met on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday in the Hotel Majestic (which last figured prominently in the diplomatic news when Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour made it their headquarters during the 1919 Peace Conference). And the Council of the OEEC (eighteen European members plus the two North American associates) met in the Château de la Muette on Thursday.
The official British view is that we scored a substantial 'tactical' success during the week. The ground for this view is that the Americans and the Six' agreed, contrary to Mr. Dillon's original proposal, that relations between the 'Six' and the `Seven' should be remitted, not to another meeting of the Conference of Thirteen, but to a body of twenty (with the same mehibership as OEEC although not meeting under OEEC auspices), which is to convene in a couple of months' time. In an extremely limited sense this may have been a tactical success, but its existence is in no way incompatible with the strategic situation having hardened against us. The plain fact is that few things could be more inimical to the possibility of a special arrangement between the 'Six' and the 'Seven' than that the Americans should be present at a meeting held to discuss it. If the Americans are there they tend to dominate—and this is doubly likely if they are represented by a personality as able and forceful as Mr. Dillon. And there can be no doubt that the Americans are at present strongly opposed to such a special arrangement.
This is hardly surprising. In 1959 they had a foreign deficit of $4 billion. This is a rate of deficit sufficient to imperil within a few years even the vast gold reserves of the United States. In these circumstances they are naturally extremely suspi- cious of any discriminatory trade agreement. The `Six' they are prepared to accept, partly because it is too late for them to do much else, and partly because its political content gives it respectability in the eyes of a nation which is naturally favour- able to federal solutions. The 'Seven' are a different matter. Mr. Heathcoat. Amory was surely getting near to the borders of accuracy when he told the House of Commons in December : 'There is no question of any Artterican opposition or hostility to the "Seven."' The fact is that the American Government will subject the Stockholm Treaty to the most stringent examination when it comes before GATT, and will jump upon any infringements of the rules of GATT with a severity which they would not show towards the `Six.' And a new preferential arrangement between the 'Six' and the 'Seven' they will regard as out of the question.
The achievements of British policy towards Europe can therefore be measured in terms more meaningful than those of the tactical advantages of a committee of twenty rather than one of thirteen. What the Government has done has been to confront the 'Six' with the 'Seven' at the very ' moment when the Americans, impelled by their own balance of payments difficulties, have rushed back to the centre of European economic affairs. Their re-entry inevitably gives them the right of adjudication, and the reason for it makes it certain that their judgment will be given against us. The Six' in future will not have to burden themselves with the pertinacious Mr. Maudling. They can leave it to Mr. Dillon to do the job for them. Our alliance with the Swiss and Swedish skirmishers for European free trade hardly compensates for this. .
The community of interest between the United States and the 'Six' is based upon both parties appearing to accept what Mr. Maudling has rather apprehensively called 'the doctrine of the non- existence of Europe.' By this he meant the view that, within the Atlantic community, there is only room for two tiers of States. On the one hand there should be the 'Six,' and on the other every- one else—America, Canada, the United Kingdom, Greece—and that no one in this second group should have a closer relationship with the Six' than is enjoyed by all the other members. The `Six' are attracted by this approach because it leaves them freer to get on with the delicate task of building their own community; and the Ameri- cans like it because it limits discrimination to the unit they have already accepted. But it is a most disagreeable doctrine for Britain. The degree of tariff discrimination alOnst our trade might not be immense—the danger here has often been exaggerated and will grow less if (as now seems likely) the 'Six' move in a more liberal direction. The real dangers are that we will be cut off from the swift-flowing main stream of Euro- pean economic growth and may become an in- creasingly stagnant backwater; and that we will also become increasingly isolated politically from metropolitan Europe. The United States can, of course, sustain such relative isolation with impunity. As. leader of the Western alliance she would retain a special position and influence in Europe. But 1 do not think that Britain would be equally fortunate. Our influence in Europe would decline still faster than, it has done in recent years.
In view of the hard facts of the present situa- tion, how can we now avoid this happening? First, the Government should stop trying to soothe its own pride by superimposing a glow of success upon every failure. There is no advantage in handing out—as happened last week—to the British press a much more favourable account of what happened than is carried in the newspapers of any other participating country. Next, it should he recognised that the formation of the 'Seven' has given us very little negotiating advantage, and that we certainly cannot rely on the new 'unit to solve our problems for us. Nor are we likely to Win many friends by continuing to preach the old 1958 doctrine that it is immoral for a group of countries to discriminate against us, but perfectly desirable for a group, of which we are a member, to discriminate against others.
We should accept the 'Six' with a far greater shoW of enthusiasm than we have yet been able to muster; and should wish them well in the deli- cate task, on which they are currently engaged, of breaking through the barriers of French protec- tionism. At the same time we should recognise that until they are over the hump of that problem they have no desire to indulge in serious long-term negotiations with any outside power, and that we are in no position io force their hand. Our aim in any immediate negotiations should be to minimise the discrimination against us rather than to settle issues of principle. For our own part we should do what we can to harmonise our external tariffs (and those of our new partners) with those of the 'Six.' And we should see whether some of the construc- tive provisions of the Treaty of Rome could not be added to that excessively negative document, the Treaty of Stockholm. Then, in a few years' time, we might be able to undo some of the mistakes of the recent past and bring Britain back into Europe.
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