THE CZAR. T HINK of the position of the young Czar,
now just twenty-seven. We all of us think often of the German Kaiser, and watch his course sometimes with admiring interest, sometimes with amusement and sur- prise ; but even he has not been placed by fate on such a pedestal as his rival to the Eastward. Nicholas II. is at this moment by virtue either of alliances or of the European situation, Generalissimo of the French and Russian forces, naval as well as military, and could, by a despatch, hurl them almost without warning either on Germany or Great Britain. A great deal of ingenuity is expended in defining the precise form of the " alliance " which M. Hanotaux admitted to exist, but it is most of L., ingenuity . thrown away. So eager are Frenchmen for the prestige and power which the friendship of Russia gives them, that fulcrum, as M. Hanotaux called it, for their action in the future, that they place themselves at the Czar's disposal as if they were his subjects, and from the harbour of Kiel to the coast of China they humbly follow his lead. The strictest alliance conceivable can only produce obedience, and in their unwilling appearance at Kiel, as in their support of the Russian Fleet off Corea, the French are almost avowedly obeying the Czar. The response to his signal is not quicker in Odessa than it is in Paris. It is difficult to doubt that the alliance is formal as well as real, for it was after M. Hanotaux had used the word, that the Czar in the most formal and honorific manner forwarded to the French President the Russian Order of St. Andrew, a decoration reserved for Princes, and that the Russian Squadron in Kiel fused itself with the French one, the Russian Admiral yielding to Admiral Wnard the momentary command of both. That, however, is no matter, while the French place their ships at Russian disposal, raise loans to facilitate the Czar's projects in the Far East, and in every Court of Europe support his policy, even when, as in Constantinople, it is opposed to their tradi- tions. The amount of power, direct and visible power, thus secured to the Russian Court is almost stupefying. At this very moment the Japanese, in their hour of victory, though almost mad with baffled ambition, are receding before a Russian order, the conceited rulers of Pekin are giving up their financial independence to St. Peters- burg, the German Kaiser is seeking, — vainly we think, if we may judge by the wrath of his Press at recent Japanese incidents,—means of propitiating Nicholas II., and if the British Government is not regarding possible events in Egypt with something of trepidation, as well as earnestness, it is blind to the omens of the hour.
Whether the young man whose hand is now on all these springs of power, is, or is not, equal to his unprecedented position, we are unable, of course, to affirm. There is a con- spiracy of silence as to the Czar's character which indicates, we presume, that neither his own great subjects nor the Embassies at St. Petersburg have quite made up their minds. There are reports that he inherits his father's lofty conception of his position, with more than his father's intelligence, and that he can do what his father could not, trust the men whom he considers competent to govern. Alexander III., alike from his incurable self- distrust, and from his strong conscientious feeling, watched and therefore alarmed all around him, and in the end, despairing of other aid, relied solely as he would himself have put it, upon God and Russia and himself. Nicholas II. is more like other Sovereigns, and believes in several counsellors, one of whom, M. de Witte, the Minister of Finance, is said to stand first in his confidence and regard. M. de Witte is clearly a man of resource and energy, with a passion for big plans like the Chinese loan, and the new monopolies described else- where, and he may be destined to become, in form or in reality, the Chancellor of Russia. We can vouch for none of the stories, but this much at least is past all cavil. The new Czar, whether he relies on the resources of his own mind—and remember, he springs from a House which, though tinged or even tainted with melancholy, has been a competent one—or on the advice of a trusted counsellor, acts like a man who does not waste himself in reverie, but can take large and quick decisions. Look at the reply to the Zemstvos, when they asked for more represen ta- tion. Look at the removal of General Gourko, and the great change made in the tone of Polish administration. Look at this sudden recoil in Finland, where the old policy of separateness and comparative liberty has superseded the recent policy of Russification. Look at the decision, reported by the Tokio correspondent of the Times oa Thursday, to fight Japan rather than permit her even to begin building up a power upon the mainland of Man- churia. Look at the secrecy and rapidity with which this plot, for it was a plot, of the Chinese loan was carried out without warning or beat of drum. And, finally, look at the immense advance made towards an official recognition of the formidable alliance with France. Alexander III. always kept that in the shade, snubbed his French friends now and then, and probably hesitated to the day of his death be- tween his decision that the alliance was valuable, and his feeling that it was not for the first representative of autocracy on earth to be on a fraternal footing with the newest great Republic. Nicholas IT makes the interest of his great country, or his own political interest, as it may be, at once supreme over the interest of his caste, and avows that France is his ally.
We fear this change in St. Petersburg may yet become the first preoccupation of Great Britain. If the ally were other than France it might not matter so much, for Russian interests and English interests are not so incurably opposed as it has been, since the Crimean War, the custom to assume. The Czars would much rather partition Asia with us than fight for the Southern half, and have, as we believe, no wish to invade India, except to paralyse us, should we resist other and dearer projects of their own. If Nicholas I. had wanted India, he never would have offered us Egypt, through which we can reinforce India rapidly and at will. The fuss made about the desolate prairie called the Pamirs is due to the Asiatic Department, and not to the Sovereign; and a compromise with Russia might, under many circumstances, be not only possible, but easy. Russia, however, now desires to keep her ascend- ency over France, and that changes a great deal. 'Those who now rule France are almost as anxious to quarrel with Great Britain as with Germany, their idea being that we have jockeyed them in the race for Africa, and in particular, have obtained possession of Egypt by a gross breach of faith. They are almost passionately anxious to give England some great blow in return ; and have for years directed their diplomacy towards inflicting annoyances which might induce Englishmen to think that Egypt was not worth keeping. It is quite possible, therefore, that France may ask, as her reward for the support she is affording to Russia in the Far East and in Constantinople, support in regard to Egypt ; and that the Czar, though indifferent to Egypt, may think his French alliance and his future supremacy in Eastern Asia well worth the risk. In that case, the character of all his recent acts would seem to indicate that a decisive course would be pursued, that, in fact, a categorical demand would be addressed to the British Government to fix a date for the evacuation of Egypt. It would be impossible, in view of our obligations to the rest of Europe and to the Egyptians, and to our own position in the world, to accede to such a demand ; and the position would then become one of great difficulty and even danger. It is not certain that the French people, though they are less hostile than- their Government, would repudiate the idea of a war with England for what, they would be told, involved their honour, and the dominance of the Mediter- ranean. It is not certain that the Triple Alliance would regard such a struggle as anything but a just punishment on Great Britain for her selfish aloofness ; and it is not -certain that even Italy, when it came to the push, would prefer our alliance to that of the German Powers. We might be left to struggle with France and Russia single-handed, and though, if we devoted to it our whole resources, we might come out of the contest vic- torious, we should have incurred vast expense, should have endured great social misery at home, owing to the arrest of trade ; and should emerge decidedly poorer, and with the clock of improvement set back for half-a- century. It behoves us, therefore, to watch the "alliance" with the greatest care, to be ready at every point at which difficulty is possible—for how long, for example, could we feed Malta if we lost for six months the command of the Mediterranean ?-and to consider with open minds whether we can afford to continue a policy of isolation, or can consent to go on without a Government strong in a resolute Parliamentary majority. The crisis may not come, of course, affairs never quite taking the expected course ; but if it comes, we shall not, we may depend on it, have very much time given us for reflection. The French Government grows more and more bitter every month ; and, as we have tried to show, something has occurred in St. Petersburg—it may be the accession of a new Czar, or it may be the development of a new statesman—which has given to counsels there a perfectly novel energy, originality, and decision. A strong Czar, whether strong in himself or his advisers, is a portentous figure ; and this Czar, if he is strong, has for ally and instigator an embittered France, whose second object, at all events, is to reduce the consequence of Great Britain. There is in that fact, which .is past question, at least matter for meditation.
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