Traders in War By C. DELISLE BURNS
Ix the Committee Room of the Naval Affairs Committee of Congress not many years ago, I was shown by Mr. Britten, the chairman, some noble pictures of American battleships rushing through mountainous seas. I noticed, but .I did not point out to my guide, that in spite of the artist's high waves the gun-platforms on . the ships were perfectly hori- zontal. Unfortunately I have been on only one American cruiser at sea ; but I have been on several British cruisers, and I can swear that the sea upsets the best gunnery. How- ever, mythology is useful ; and indeed it would be difficult to undermine the faith of the true believer, either about what happens at sea or about what warships are " for."
War continues to be possible largely because of a traditional mythology which covers the facts with a fog of sentimentality.
National honour and vital interests are not the usual phrases today ; but " security" and " defence " are just as useful. And it makes no difference that the means by which security " is sought are the chief causes of insecurity, or that all " defence " is directed against what is only " defence."
The current mythology evades the truth about what happens on battlefields and in bombed towns ; but that evasion is not so important for public policy today as the half-conscious conspiracy of silence and false ideas about the preparations
for war. Therefore, all success to a new book about the trade in armaments. In Merchants of Death* two new
writers have put together much information drawn from recent sources, to show the actual pressure upon public policy exerted in most countries by the private manufacturers of armaments.
The authors very rightly assume that the trade in arms is a.result and not a cause of the danger of war. The appetite for gain. among traders in arms no doubt increases the
danger ; but it is unwise to exaggerate the importance of these traders. They would disappear in a . world properly organized for the judicial settlement of disputes and the improvement of civilized life. Their activities are merely incidental to the traditional anarchy in the relation between Governments. But so much having been admitted, it remains true that, in the world as it is, the arms trade is much more dangerous to us all than the trade in poisonous drugs. Not enough is known about it. In spite of the large
bibliography given in this new book, the majority of the citizens of Great Britain and the United States certainly have no idea of what is going on behind the official policy t,f preparing for a future war. In France there is a more general suspicion ; but in the Dictatorships, of course, no information inconvenient for the established system is avail- able. Opposition to policies tending towards war, however, is strengthened by any publication anywhere of the facts about the trade in arms.
In Merchants of Death we have very full details of names and _figures and facts. Some historical evidence is drawn from the lives of Krupp and Maxim ; and very recent events are usefully analysed, such as the rearming of Germany and the preparations in Japan for the Manchurian adventure. This book is therefore valuable and important. It contains rather_ the material for an argument than the argument itself ; for one feels overwhelmed by the number of the instances given in which public policy in one country or another is affected by the desire for larger profits on the part of the manufacturers of arms. There are amusing episode's *Merchants of Death. By H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen. (Routledge. is. 6d.)
too : the patriotism of Krupp, for example, and the innocence of Mr. Bardo, the employer of the notorious Shearer. In the Senate Commission Report on the Shearer ease there is abundant comedy, some of which has already been used by Professor Beard in his book, The Nary, Defence or Portent I But the authors of this new book, although they deal chiefly with American evidence, have collected evidence affecting all the chief States. Thus we have the interesting develop- ment of the arms trade in Japan and figures to show the profits drawn from political uncertainty. The authors write quite calmly and simply, without rhetoric or sarcasm. They state a case and indicate at the end the very feeble efforts which have so far been made to resist the growth of a great evil. But perhaps the book is most useful in giving support to a policy which some of us have been trying to make intelli- gible to politicians in power.
That policy is the resistance to the tendency towards war by control of the preparations for it. Modern war, as this book implies, cannot he carried on unless " possible enemies " assist one another to wage it. During the Great War the Allies and the Central Powers had to assist their enemies by providing them with material lacking on one side or the other : and so iron passed through Switzerland from Germany to France and nickel passed through Holland from French colonies to Germany. Before every great war, each side arms the other : and, of course, " neutrals " make good profits.
That is precisely what is happening now. In the interests of the " balance of trade," another myth, the exports of war material are assisting the " balance of power," to which we are returning for another trial of the weights. Germany, for example, would be quite helpless to wage war or even to rearm, as she claims to have the right to do, unless the traders of her future opponents were assisted by their Governments in rearming her. For modern war, " autarchy " is impossible. But, of course, the case for a policy of peace cannot be based upon assuming any particular villainy of one nation or another. Every nation is hard at it—making peace impossible by increasing the profits in preparing war. In such a situation, to propose that we should have " Sanctions " and promises to fight if anyone else begins it is rather like presenting two lunatics with revolvers and then threatening to attack which- ever of them uses his revolver first. That is called the policy of " Security " ! The policy of peace would be preventive. It would indeed contain many other elements besides control of the private manufacture of arms : but unless it contains at least this, it is futile. Governments will make the most lofty professions of love for peace. More Resolutions have recently been passed at Geneva, declaring that somebody ought to do something sooner or later. But if any definite proposal is made, each Government says that it must wait for the other to begin ; and meantime, the current sets towards war.
So long as the arms trader can keep the Ship of State in that current, it does not matter in what direction the prow is pointing. And ignorance of the unnoticed current beneath the surface waves of diplomacy allows the future victims of war to sleep on deck while the ship is drifting on to the reef. Is it not possible to have an agreement at least between the " democratic " nations who. are the chief traders in arms ? The Dictatorships may be planning war, but it is the so-called Democracies which are selling to them the means to wage it.
Previous page
