DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC

By STRATEGICUS

ITH the landings in Borneo the Allied deployment in the Pacific has been carried a step further. The operation took ace against the customary background of widespread attacks. here were fresh visits to the Kuriles and bombardments of Truk, he former Japanese naval base in the Carolines, while the fierce ampaigns in the Solomons, New Guinea, the Philippines and inawa were being pressed on with vigour and skill. The Japanese ave not the strength, particularly the air strength, to be on the lert everywhere ; and in Borneo they appear to have conformed to he prevailing pattern of the Far Eastern war-and contented them- elves with attrition tactics.

The real meaning of this formula has been shown in the Okinawa mpaign. The Americans landed there, after carrying out nearly amphibious operations, on April 1st. At the present moment they eem to be turning the last page of the bloodiest chapter of the acific fighting. The Tenth Army and all the forces in the Ryukyus re under the command of Admiral Nimitz and the conduct of the ampaign has roused much severe criticism in the United States. scarcely appears to be justified by the-facts. It must have been bvious that the fighting, always desperate against the Japanese, uld become more terrible as the Allies approached the area of

apan itself ; and at Okinawa they are only 325 miles distant. More- ver, This island, so near the home bases, is not far short of Soo quare miles in area and must provide a very useful base for attacks ver a 'considerable range of objectives, including Japan proper. It , of course, reasonable to suppose that a time will come when the perations will require co-ordinating control on the spot. But up to

he present Admiral Nimitz has always operated under the co-ordina- on of Washington; and it is probable that he and General MacArthur ill continue to exercise their independent commands for some time. Formalists will insist that the operations should be controlled by ne commander on the spot ; but the range of the operations is such at, in any case, the commanders will before long exercise direction ver larger and more widely scattered forces than ever before in the istory of war. Okinawa will stand out only for a short time for the itterness of the fighting. In the foreground now lie vistas of perations in Japan proper, or against the great armies in China, which ill see this desperation perhaps developed to even greater lengths. ew means of coping with such resistance have been invented ; and e flame-throwing tank is doing something already to reduce the

atio of casualties and the length of the campaigns. It is, however, important to note the emergence of this problem ; for it must, as ar as one can see, condition the later stages of war in the Far East.

In Borneo the resistance has so far been slighter merely because e Japanese have retired to positions inland. When they were developing their campaign to overrun the Netherlands East Indies they contented themselves with occupying only the outer rim of such islands. But there were at that time no considerable forces on them. The garrisons were limited to the occupation of strong tactical positions 'and the main Japanese problem was easy. Now they have

s taken root, inter-married and made themselves to a great extent

0 self-supporting.- The Allied problem may, therefore, be more diffi-

r cult. But in one respect the difficulty has been very considerably used. The Allies long ago took the.measure-of the Japanese. They 1. confronted, in Guadalcanal, the sort of fighting they are now facing ; and they have had to adapt theMselves to it. They have learned to fight with material, wherever they 'can, rather than with men ; and i the framework of the Pacific fighting has been built from an astonish- ing versatility and ingenuity of resource.

General MacArthur said that the Atistralian landing was a " fault- less operation," and it has certainly gone with a swing. The men Ire veterans of Tobruk and Alamein, and there are no finer troops in the World.. Already the Labuan airfield is in use ; and this operation Which was for a short time an end is now like its pre- decessors, merely a means to further ends. It benefited itself from the Taralclia landings, and both of them afford cover for operations

further afield. With it taken as complete, the Allies now hold a string of bases stretching 1,5oo miles from Okinawa. This long series of positions, moreover, has depth as well. as length ; and it is but a momentary arrest in the onward march. But we can recognise what it means as it stands. From Borneo the Allies can give long- range fighter cover as far as Saigon and Singapore. Their bombers can fly almost up to the limits of the aircraft in Burma. The longest- range aircraft can now threaten almost all the enemy-held territory. They can bomb Manchuria, Japan and, down the string of bases, most of the territory still held in China.

The Borneo base is of exceptional importance in this respect. It can cover operations up to Sumatra and Singapore, and the Nether- lands Indies are all within medium or long range. The importance of this extension is not so immediately confined to landings on other territory. The command of the sea, which has invested the Allied troops with a new mobility, certainly draws new strength from it, and, indeed, without such assistance could not be complete. But the bases in North-Western Borneo also give positions from which effective reconnaissance can be maintained continuously and from which the Japanese communications with all the southern part of her co-prosperity sphere can be severed. They have been threatened and made most precarious from Okinawa ; but determined seamen will brave such threats when necessary, and in Borpeo the Allies have applied the scissors further south. Most of all, however, this fresh base serves notice on the Japanese in this area that their time is about to come.

Nothing can write off these great advantages ; and, if impatience makes us restive in awaiting the next step, we can rest assured that no time will be lost. But on the other side of the picture we have to note that in driving the Japanese from some of their bases, and taking advantage of their inability to be strong everywhere, we have compelled them to concentrate. President Truman pointed out this fact, and it deserves to be carefully weighed. If there is a chance of ordered surrender, it will depend upon successful operations against the main Japanne armies and probably against japan itself. We can see our way to clearing the conquests on the periphery, though it may occupy a long time and cause heavy casualties. But, while we have created the conditions for this clearing up of outlying garrisons, we have as a consequence compelled the enemy to con- centrate in the vital areas.

The Japanese fleets we may disregard. We have now, or shall have very shortly, an overwhelming number of warships of all the various types needed for the invasion of China and Japan. We cannot expect the situation to be as easy so far as shipping is con- cerned ; and in both cases the air arm is of overwhelming importance. We have seen the desperate attacks by Japanese airmen, and we have been compelled to note that the casualtim they have inflicted are far from negligible. Moreover, if shipping is as necessary as I suggest, these all-out attacks have a fresh Importance ; for it is evident that the Allies must concentrate extraordinary amounts of material in the Far East if they hope to keep down the casualties. In the European campaign the Americans transported 68 millions of tons across the Atlantic, and the Germans could never deploy as many men in the West as the Japanese may in the East. Shipping is essential, and without cover it cannot operate effectively.

It is for these reasons that the position in the air has a cardinal bearing on the campaign. If we examine the figures we may tend to think that the air arm of Japan is being " shot out " as was the Luftwaffe. The results of such an achievement would be vital ; but we have to remember the new air tactics adopted against Okinawa. The Japanese pilots are now only of poor quality, but their aircraft are being closely adapted to the desperate tactics which arc recog- nised as now required. Add to this the fact that our very successes must compel the enemy to concentrate most of his aircraft in the home area, and we have some reason to view even the official figures with caution. It is estimated that the Japanese have some 4,000 combat planes, and that is an impressive figure. Nevertheless, it has been stated on good authority that their losses in April exceeded the replacement rate by 13 per cent.

Moreover, the current airplane production of Japan is estimated at between 1,25o and 1,5oo per month, whereas the production figure of the United States is over 6,000 per month. When the disparity is as great as that a considerable amount of dispersion can still be indulged in without preventing the Allies being very much stronger at the vital point. This is to ignore the fact that the Royal Air Force are adding their strength to that of the United States. In Burma their squadrons have now taken over completely from the United States command, which until recently supplied about half of the aircraft operating in that theatre. The damage that can be done to industrial installations has been seen in Germany. It will be much worse in Japan ; and, even if we have to depend upon Allied aircraft for the security of every operation now impending, nothing can prevent Japan being reduced to a desolation beyond imagination. It is upon that process developing Pari passe with the deployment of the ground resources the Allies depend for victory.