The question of Singapore is admittedly one of great nicety
in the political balance. For ourselves we still incline to the view, which we have expressed on former occasions, that the necessary expenditure cannot be justified. There is only a limited amount of money which can be spent in Imperial defence. Therefore, we have to ask, Can the millions which would be expended at Singapore be better employed in other forms of security ? In our opinion they can be, and especially in developing our Air Force. It is not a question of selfishness, or of panic about London, as Mr. Amery seemed to think, but of the stream of tendency in armament. It may well be that during the time which must elapse before Singa- pore is finally equipped, it will have become very difficult —perhaps impossible—to protect the naval bases and fleets in narrow waters from aerial attack, except by the provision of superior air forces at, or close to, the bases in question. We can, for example, easily conceive cir- cumstances in which the cities of New Zealand and of the Australian littoral would be much more easily pro- tected by air than by water. ?text to the question of what it will cost, comes the question of general policy. Here, again, we are not convinced that the development of our base at Singapore would give us the key of the Pacific.
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