THE OTHER SIDE.

M. POINCARE'S POLICY RESTATED.

BY JULES SAUERWEIN.

(M. Jules Sauerwein is the Foreign Editor of the " Malin," and is not only one of the. best' known and ablest of French journalists, but is peculiarly in the political confidence of M. Poincare. When one reads a statement of M. Poincares opinions by M. Sauerwein, one may feel assured that it is written with the fullest authority. It has virtually the same value that the statement would have if it were written by M. Poincare himself. Indeed, as will be seen, M. Sauerwein is able to quote, in his most important passage, the enact words which M. Poin- care used when describing his policy only a few days ago. We trust that in translating M. Sauerwein's article we have done no injury to his lucid French, or to the value of his arguments.)

BEFORE I describe the policy of M. Poincare, it is essential that I should make two remarks upon the past. When these have been made I shall have finished with retrospective recriminations, which arc always academic, and I shall concentrate my attention on the present situation without trying to lay the responsibility upon anyone in particular. None of the present impediments to security would have existed if there had been in the Treaty of Versailles a little paragraph expressed thus :— " This Treaty is inseparable from the pact of guarantee which has been signed by the plenipotentiaries—American, English and French—and the Treaty will be modified if the pact is not ratified."

Similarly, so far as reparations are concerned, we should not be where we now find ourselves if there had been in the terms of the Armistice and in the Treaty of Versailles the stipulation that there should be payments by imme- diate instalments under adequate guarantees. The Germans expected that. The German Ministers told me io at Weimar in July, 1919. The money was actually ready.

Now, I will speak no further of the past, but I beg my readers not to forget those two little historical observa- tions. The truth is this : France was and still is in the presence of a beaten enemy, but an enemy who has declared that he was not responsible for the War, who has asserted that he has not been beaten, and who consequently conceives himself to have the right not merely to refuse to carry out the Treaty, but even to regard it as a duty to prepare for revenge. Let no one say that these are mere French assertions. There are in Germany 200 associations whose business is what is called " The Propaganda of Innocence," that is to say, the business of finding in the innocence of Germany the moral foundations of a policy of passive resistance in all its forms, and of preparing cunningly and actively for a new war. Lording it at the head of the movement are the respected professors and the reverend heads of the Churches. In their due order, as subaltern officers, come the professors of colleges and of the public schools. All these people inculcate among the youth of the country and among the faithful hatred and the will to vengeance. Then comes the army of executive officials under the most various names : salvage men, physical instructors, old soldiers, wounded soldiers, and so on, until one reaches the criminal associations of Heidelberg and of Carlsruhe, of which M. Poincare only the other day revealed the detailed organization in a letter addressed to Lord Crewe, the British Ambassador.

Far be it from me to pretend that all the German people share these sentiments. But the elements which I have described, supported as they are by the heads of industrial life, served by a Nationalist Press and strengthened by unceasing work in the factories, arc unhappily strong enough to sweep off their feet an amorphous population who (unlike the British popula- tion) possess none of that individuality that permits a man to judge for himself. On the other side, I see France herself (who has no doubt made mistakes in her methods, for where is the people which has not made mistakes ?), in face of this unceasing danger and in the tragic disillusionment of having lost 1,700,000 men without having been able, even so, to ensure peace for the future and her own financial and economic prosperity. " You have not troubled to tax yourself enough ! "—so say our English friends to us. That is true, but it is the first time in history that it has not been possible to exact the payment of indemnities of war and of reparations from a conquered people. The transference of territory and even of capitals was easy between agricultural States in the past. The transference of money between industrial States which form part of a coherent economic world raises problems that have not yet been solved. The Allied negotiators of 1919 who spoke light-heartedly of hundreds of milliards little foresaw the immense diffi- culties. When M. Clemenceau left the hall of Versailles, where Count de Brockdorff-Rantzau had just proposed an indemnity of 100 milliards of gold marks, he was plunged in profound thought. The old statesman had never really understood finance, but nevertheless the sum mentioned seemed something worth having. President Wilson, however, had his own fixed idea. " What an impertinent offer ! " he exclaimed, angrily ; and Mr.

Lloyd George agreed with him. The heads of the nations thus judged that the offer was derisory and almost insulting. No one, then, has the right to blame the French Government because it has not discovered the solution of these huge problems. The English Govern- ment has not discovered it better than anybody else. For if it had done so, Great Britain would not now have 1,200,000 unemployed.

M. Poincare took office in January, 1922, after the famous Conference of Cannes, which M. Briand was compelled to abandon because he was blamed in secret by the President of the Republic and by the majority of his own colleagues. This Conference was the conclu- sion of a period of mental intoxication among the leaders of the two countries. It is necessary to recall how it had its genesis after an evening passed at Chequers by M. Loucheur, the Minister of the Liberated Regions.

There Mr. Lloyd George, while smoking his cigar and sipping his coffee, had constructed before the astonished gaze of his interlocutor the miraculous palace of a restored Europe. Reconciliation of nations, fraternization with Soviets, practical and loyal co-operation with Germany !

Germany was then, by the way, represented by a magician as persuasive as Mr. Lloyd George himself, though one more stable—Dr. Walter Rathenau. M. Loucheur, and in his turn M. Briand, were spellbound when they arrived in the Riviera. Spellbound, but none the less a little puzzled. " Where do we come in, then ? Is our security assured ? " they demanded of Mr. Lloyd George. And with a sympathetic wink the jovial Welshman handed them a little paper which he had written. It was the Pact of Guarantee destined to replace that which the American Senate had condemned to death. England would undertake to support France in the event of German aggression, but she undertook to do so for ten years only, without reciprocity, without any military conven- tion, indeed without any clause envisaging the possi- bility of Germany setting out to destroy the Allies in Poland and in Czecho-Slovakia, instead of attacking French frontiers directly.

This draft proposal, added to the disquieting series of world conferences, alarmed the practical and intelligent mind of M. Millerand. Briand fell from power before he could even get a vote from the Chamber. After the Celt, we had the tenacious Lorrainer—representative of a region devastated by wars so long as it had existed, a man little inclined to the make-believe of human brotherhood, a man understanding the German, not in the person of Dr. Walter Rathenau, but through the humilia- tions which Germans have inflicted on the soil of Lorraine, a man moreover sceptical about the redeeming virtues of Bolshevism. That man was M. Poincare.

One can understand M. Poincare and his policy only if one remembers that his access to power was a reaction deliberate and deep, conforming to the mistrust inspired in the French bourgeois and the French peasant of the experiments that had been proving to France that she would he flouted and duped.

The first thing that M. Poincare did was to examine the Pact of Guarantee proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. I will reproduce for you his reasoning. On this point he has never changed. What he said to Mr. Lloyd George when they had their first interview on January 15th, 1922, he said to me On March 8th this year, at his Saturday reception :- " A pact of guarantee with England !' repeated M. Poincare, ' Why, nothing is more desirable ! The whole European situation would be modified in the happiest manner. All the same, it is necessary that this pact should be practical and effective. Other- wise it is a deception, and upon a deception one could only build up fragile and unsound arrangements. It is necessary, in the first place, that the Treaty should be bi-lateral, primarily in the interests of our dignity, and next because it is essential to assert the principle that aggression against us or our Allies is as dangerous for England as for France. In the second place, it is necessary that the Treaty should cover a sufficiently long period, instead of being like the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George for ten years only—that is to say, for a shorter time than that of the occupation of the Rhine, as provided for in tho Treaty of Versailles. In the third place, it is necessary that the Treaty should be strengthened by an agreement between tho General Staffs. It is not a question of a military alliance. It is a question simply of knowing what, in the event of a conflict, will be the part of each nation—the exact role of the naval, air and military forces of each nation, the place and the moment of their entry into action. I have proposed, in fine, that in the event of a German attack against Poland, there should be immediate concerted action ; that is absolutely essential. If Germany means to take her revenge she will begin by attacking Poland. By virtue of having become a frontier neighbour of Soviet Russia she will have entirely changed the European equilibrium, and she will then be able to turn her attention to the great game, that is to say, an attack against France."

Such are the ideas of M. Poincare on the question of security as he has often expounded them to me. He by no means wants to defend the French frontier by perman- ent territorial occupation. He considers that the support of England is worth more than an army, but on condition that all arrangements are made with precision in advance. He is the man, let us not forget, who two days before the unchaining of the world catastrophe, wrote to the King of England, begging him to intervene. It was he who had made the military arrangements, thanks to which General Joffre knew that he could reckon at a given moment upon the co-operation of British forces, forces all too weak, but none the less precious, for reinforcing the left wing of the French armies. He is a man of great experience, who has borne at the gravest moments supreme responsibility, and this is how he sees things. If he has this guarantee of security, if, as I hope he will be able to do, he makes the situation plain to Mr. MacDonald (whom I know to be a sincere and loyal man), depend upon it M. Poincare will not in any way desire to maintain French regiments in German territory an hour longer than is necessary for our defence. When he reckoned up the credit side of the situation in January, 1922, with respect to the essential article, " Security of France Assured by the Treaties," he was obliged to write at the foot " Zero." He has been reproached with having continually repeated the same thing. In the matter of security, however, he could only have as his policy the motto of the House of Orange, " Je maintiendrai." It was not for him graciously to propose various combina- tions ; it was for others ; he was alone. The French policy was to stood upon our positions. As for reparations, the facts, although-much less simple, have an analogous character. France has advanced nearly 60 milliards of francs for the devastated' regions. She will have to expend almost as much again for their complete restoration. The German Government has made no effort to meet these charges. How could she have done so, indeed, at the very time when she was unloosing that vast and complicated propaganda to prove the innocence of the Empire ? No doubt the tone of the German rulers has varied, but the kit motif has always been the same.

During the year 1922 M. Poincare again tried the plan of inter-Allied Conferences. First with Mr. Lloyd George, then with Mr. Bonar Law, he reopened again and again the problem in all its aspects. Without any result. The failure was not surprising. The problem was of a moral rather than a financial order. It was a question of prevailing upon Germany to pay at all and not of suggesting to her the means of paying, for as to the means her experts knew much better than we did. For the financial competence of Germany is not in any doubt.

When a nation has been able to spend 5 milliards of gold marks for passive resistance in the Ruhr, when it has been able—although nominally ruined—to replace the coal of the Ruhr which it lost by English coal at 30s. a ton, when it has been able to declare itself bankrupt, and then to re-establish a gold currency which has remained stable for several months, allow me to believe and to say that such a nation could easily have hit upon the fiscal methods and the ways of raising money necessary for the moderate payments that were expected.

All that became plain in the months which followed. In London in December, 1922, in Paris in January, 1923, when M. Poincare said " Germany can pay ! " Mr. Bonar Law and his experts of the London Treasury looked at him with pain, much as one looks at an irresponsible lunatic. In very truth, yes—Germany was able to pay, since she has subsequently done things more difficult and more costly than paying, and since the international experts have been unanimous in saying that a country which is as richly equipped and as productive as the Reich, and which is relieved of all debt, could easily carry the necessary mortgages for meeting reparations.

Has M. Poincare been intransigent ? One cannot possibly say so. Here are the successive concessions of France : (1) She renounced her claim to be repaid the expenses of the War, more than 100 milliards. (2) In May, 1921, she passed the sponge over the payments which ought to have been made before that date, and that meant a renunciation of more than 6 milliards on our part. (3) She consents to renounce all payments beyond the sum of 26 milliards of gold marks, if by that means she can regulate inter-Allied debts. This means that she will bear the burden of pensions, of allocations and even, if the franc rises, of a part of the cost of restoring the devastated regions.

It seemed to M. Poincare, as also to the great majority of Parliament, that in order to emerge from the inter- minable and academic discussion it was necessary to take a pledge of value in the shape of German territory. We therefore occupied the Ruhr. We did not dream of carrying on an administrative enterprise in that district, of exploiting its customs, its taxes, and its railways, for our own advantage. If the experts produce a generally satisfactory arrangement there will no longer be any signs in the Ruhr of the French mortgage, except the presence of some troops who will not interfere in any way with the administrative and economic life of the country ; and that, as the German Minister, Herr von Misch, admitted, does not trouble Germany at all, except in her feelings. In the same way hr the Rhineland; we shall not seek to derive trade benefits if an arrangement as to reparations is forthcoming. The French Govern- ment has been accused of supporting the Separatists. It is scarcely a serious accusation', for I sincerely trust that if in this district, where there are 100,000 French troops, the Government had really supported the Separatists, the Separatists would have succeeded in establishing their power instead of failing and being massacred. If M. Poineare had wished to conduct a Separatist move- ment, he would not have kept at the head of the French troops General Degoutte, who- is notoriously hostile to the movement. He would have sent generals who believed in Separatism, who would have had prestige among the population, and would have known how to go about the job—such men as General Mangin.

There ought to be no more misunderstandings between France and England. Our Government desires neither the military hegemony nor the economic hegemony of Europe. It is ready to arrive at a satisfactory arrange- ment as regards reparations, to enter into all the plans devised by the experts, on condition that it does not forfeit thereby the means of exercising pressure upon the Reich. It is ready to modify its own military guarantees of security on condition that a real entente with Great Britain makes such a renunciation possible and does not require the Government to be faithless in its obligations to a country which has been devastated and twice invaded in half a century.

The way is open to men of good will. It is only neces- sary to make a serious effort to understand the aims of France instead of conducting a campaign against her currency. It is not merely that the interests of France are not opposed to those of British commerce and indus- try, which have been so gravely affected by the War ; I would go so far as to say that every solution that is good for one country is, by the same token, the best solution that there could be for the other country. If one gives to France by reasonable methods her security and reparations, You restore a Europe which will be for Great Britain a sound and profitable market, and you will obliterate that kind of Chinese wall which the present unsettlement raises round your national productions.