UNEASY ALLIANCE
SIR,—If Mr. Critchley's article on the Uneasy Alliance is an example of the 'wisdom' lacked by the US Administration, it is fortunate that the Admin- istration has intelligence in place of such wisdom.
Mr. Critchley concedes that Britain and France have built nuclear forces, not to defend themselves against a Soviet attack on them alone, but in an attempt to give themselves some control over Ameri- can policy.
He describes the V-bomber force as our trigger to the American deterrent. As Cuba showed, the V-force gives us negligible influence over American policy; one can no longer believe that the US would desist from a course upon which it had determined because of British pressure. Therefore, the Government's in- tention must be to force an unwilling US to take action in defence of British 'vital interests' (Suez, for example, or the Middle East oilfields?). Does he really believe that the US could be so coerced? It is much more likely that, rather than accept a Russian counter-city strike on grounds not of her own choos- ing, she would simply declare her neutrality. Those people in this country 'whose political raison d'être is the Anglo-American alliance' had best admit once for all that, unless America is on our side, we cannot rely on her help. Surely this was made clear enough in 1956.
Strategically, on the contrary to Mr. Critchlcy's views, the adoption of counterforce and graduated response is much more likely to have been an attempt
by the Administration to make the US deterrent seem credible as an instrument to be used in resolving a local European conflict, even though the Adminis- tration must have realised that a counterforce strategy is more unstable vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact powers than a counter-city strategy, say. in the form envisaged by Dr. Wiesner.
Presumably, Mr. Kennedy decided that, since he
could not rely on the intelligence of his European allies, he had better rely on that of Mr. Khrushchev and attempt to contain N-country instability at some cost in bipolar stability. This attempt has clearly failed and one might predict an American shift to counter-city posture in the near future.
Mr. Critchley seems incapable of distinguishing between independent national nuclear forces and in- dependent or interdependent conventional forces as deterrents to attack on Western Europe, thus failing to appreciate the dangers of escalation. He goes on to propose a course of action which can only accen- tuate the N-country problem. Both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev recognise the seriousness of this problem and the urgent need to solve it. Unless we adopt Mr. Critchley's second proposal—ridding ourselves of nuclear weapons—there is no hope that other countries will show any restraint, and the pro- liferation of small deterrents with its manifold dangers will be upon us in this decade. Only by adopting this course can we provide Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev, as well as U Thant, with the lever they need and want to exert pressure on the French.
In short, sir, Mr. Critchley writes as if the world were permanently polarised, while the will of Western Europe carried divine authority. Our defence think- ing must emerge from this pre-nuclear condition be- fore it- is too late.
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