FUEL AND THE MINES
HE fuel-rationing controversy has died down to a strange quiescence. No one quite knows how things stand. The eridge scheme has been withdrawn for reconditioning or cement—the decision between the two has apparently not been made—and when it or some other plan is produced to• the gauntlet of the Conservative 1922 Committee's criticism e are to be coupled with it proposals for the reorganisation of industry. No phrase could be more indeterminate. It might anything from complete nationalisation to an extension of s or merely the creation of new machinery to deal with teeism. No doubt the vagueness was deliberate. The vernrnent does not yet know its own mind, or did not when announcement about postponement. of the question till after Whitsuntide recess was made. In response to the Beveridge eme for a reduction of consumption a considerable section of House and of the country has pressed instead for an increase production, and there is so much apparent reason behind the d that the Government could not well ignore it, though the t obvious method of securing the increase, the recall of miners the army or the munition-works, is a strange expedient to ocate at a moment ween the case for a European offensive, all the drain it would involve on men and munitions, is g put more strongly every day.
The truth, no doubt, is that both increase of production and ease of consumption are needed, the latter certainly, the former far as it can be achieved without recourse to devices which r on political or industrial or military grounds would raise e controversy than they are wofth. There are arguments in our of nationalising the mines—so at least the Labour Party and other people think—and the first step in that direction has taken by the acquisition by the Stare of mineral royalties. to introduce as an emergency measure a Bill providing for would not be practical politics. It may be excluded from the bilities. So, though less emphatically, may be the proposal lengthen the hours of work in mines. The Labour Party would se it bitterly, and at a time when the mines are being worked ly by middle-aged men an increase in hours would impose physical strain that might well result in an actual decrease of ction. As for the recall of miners from the forces, that old only be done, in this critical year, if the coal situation is rate and no practical alternative exists. That is not the case y. Production can to some extent be increased by the adop: of various minor measures, and consumption can be reduced any extent which the national interest dictates. Absenteeism responsible for much of what is wrong, and the absentees are the main younger men who, being without family responsi- ties, can well afford to take days off when they feel disposed, do, with a reprehensible disregard of the nation's necessity. That is the situation with which the Government, if it is con- ring reorganisation seriously, has to deal. The need for action is the result of nervelessness in the past ten years. For all t the and longer successive Governments have tried to take the ous steps essential if anything like maximum efficiency in the ustry was to be secured. Bill after Bill providing for amalgama- S and the closing of uneconomic pits was introduced and with- or so modified that it was hardly Worth putting on the rilte-book. Chief opposition has always come from the owners, resist strenuously every attempt to deal with the industry a national basis, in the matter of wages or anything else. The fion manifestly arises whether it can be treated on any basis at a time like this, when the output of coal is fficient to meet national needs. It is not surprising that in Quarters, both inside the Government—which otherwise would not be talking about improving the organisation of the industry—and outside it, plans for firm action on a national scale should be under discussion. The justification for such action would be its probable effect on production. If there were ground for believing that the effect would be great, then the Government might properly deal with the mining industry with the same decision it displayed in the case of the railways, which it has leased for the period of the war (at a figure considerably less than last year's earnings). How far the effect would in fact be considerable can only be broadly estimated, but there are no doubt some data on which estimates could be based. One of the causes of short pro- duction is absenteeism, one is lack of mobility of labour, one is reluctance in some cases to concentrate on the best seams for the sake of immediate results to the detriment of long-term pro-. duction plans in individual pits. How far the assumption of national control now (on the model, presumably, of the national control that was established in the last war) would affect absen- teeism may be questioned. Figures given by the Secretary for Mines on Tuesday showed that in the year ending March, 1942, the estimated percentage of absenteeism was 9.46, as compared with 6.43 in the year ending March, 1939. That is an increase of nearly so per cent., but some part of it certainly comes under the category of "unavoidable." In spite of this, moreover, the average output for all classes of mineworkers in 1941 was 301 tons (per man per year) as against 297 tons in 1938.
The theory that Government control would increase output is not borne out by the experience of Government control as imposed in the later stages of the last war. Here, as in most such cases, there is some conflict of statistics, but none can be adduced to show an increased output ; as between 1917, when control began, and 1920, its last full year, there was, according to the Mining Association's figures, a heavy, and, according to others from less directly interested sources, a slight, drop in total output. It is possible, of course, that Government control might be more effective today than it was twenty-five years ago. In particular the amendment of the Essential Works Order to enable labour to be drafted wherever it could be used most productively might have very beneficial results. But this step, with the finan- cial consequences necessarily accruing from it, could not be taken while individual pits are in private ownership and control. Pool- ing would become necessary, and that postulates Government control, which would at the same time facilitate compulsory amalgamations, the promotion of the ablest managers to key- positions anywhere, common use of power-plants and other steps making for economy of working and stimulation of output. Such a project clearly has a strong prima facie claim to consideration.
But there must be no confusion between the immediate and the ultimate. Nor, as to the immediate, must the Government make reorganisation plans an excuse for simply shelving the Beveridge scheme. Reduction of consumption is at least as important as increase of production—in some respects more so—though it is likely enough that as the needs of munitions- works grow recourse to both methods will be necessary. As to the ultimate, there can be no question at all that the complete reorganisation of the coal industry after the war will be impera- tive, and that it will have to take the form of State control in one shape or another. There are obvious dangers in that, in view of the number of miners' representatives and spokesmen for the owners in the House of Commons. While therefore ultimate control must rest with Parliament, management must be com- pletely divorced from it, if the public interest, not sectional interests, is to be paramount. That points clearly to the creation of some form of Public Utility Corporation analogous to the London Passenger Transport Board, the Port of London Authority, the Central Electricity Board and many similar bodies which are working admirably, and under which the consumer is assured that his interests are considered and the staff that it is not working simply to increase shareholders' dividends. The moral and psychological importance of such a step is not to be ignored. The demand that all great public services shall be run primarily in the public interest, with representatives of public in ultimate control, is growing, will go on gro.wing can be resisted only at the risk of grave national dissension. all industries, of course, lend themselves to this treatment, the mines and the railways are among those that do, and it is the first importance that any emergency measures taken in matter of the mines now should conform to, not conflict with larger objective.
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