IF THE WORST COMES- I T is still by no means
impossible that at the last moment a compromise will be reached at Washington—one which will make it quite clear to the rest of the world that America has no intention of turning down the Treaty, and thereby giving a lead in repudiation to the States provisionally included in the League of Nations. The Americans, like their English forbears, are great hands at compromising, and especially at a compromise which will allow them just to catch the train in the last one and a half minutes. But if the worst comes to the worst, and no compromise is arrived at, what is to be done ? We have no doubt as to the answer. The wise thing, the necessary thing, is not to abandon the League in a fit of anger or despondency, but to maintain it, and to allow America, owing to her very special circumstances, geographical and Constitutional, to put in as many reservations as she likes.
In truth, and though there is no clause to this effect, it must always have been understood during the deliberations at the Paris Conference that each State that accepted the League accepted it in effect " subject to the particular provisions of the Constitution of each constituent State." No other acceptance was possible. When a man makes a contract in business it is always understood that his pledge is subject to his not having agreed to do something illegal in his own country, something which by some other contract he is bound not to do. In the same way, a country's representative cannot pledge his nation except according to law." No doubt, if the reservations made by America had to be regarded as clear indications of American policy in the future, it might be necessary to take a gloomy view of the League's chances. But there is not the slightest reason to regard the reservations in that light. For ourselves, we do not doubt that they are only a rest-house on the road, and that, as a matter of fact, America will ultimately not only abandon them but be found to be the Power which will want to enlarge and not to diminish the authority of the League. 'While we are on the question of the reservations, it is very necessary to remember that in a sense none of the specific reservations of the Senate matter very much, except that, as we have said, they must be regarded as indicating national intentions. And for this essential reason. They are one and all dominated, and indeed put out of court, by the great all-embracing reservation contained in the existing Constitution of the League. The provisions by which every member of the Council has what we may call a liberum veto on the actions of the League give America in general all that the Senate's reservations give her in particular. As the Council can only act if unanimous, any member can completely paralyse the League by refusing its consent to any proposed action. America cannot be bound except by her own act. With that fact staring us in the face in Article 15, the American reservations are almost all unnecessary. In our opinion, then, we must go forward with the League whatever the policy momentarily adopted by America. The real danger of America's action does not concern herself. It consists in the fact that other nations, great and small, in whom ambition is beginning to awaken, may make the American reservations an excuse for abandoning the League. In all probability the American Senators do not fully realize the enormous dynamic force which America now exercises in the European world. It is not too much to say that if the Senate had passed the Treaty without reservation, no European State would have dared to consider the possibility of breaking away. With America apparently only hanging loose on the League, all the Machiavellis, petty and great, of Europe are inclined to say : " Why should we tie our hands if America won't tie hers ? Let us be as free as she is." If that evil counsel were to prevail, Europe would indeed be in deadly peril. Whether then the Americans are able to help us at the moment or not, the rest of the Great Powers, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and such smaller States as they can influence, must go forward with the League. We detest the idea of exposing ourselves to the charge of exaggeration in such a matter as this, but the truth must be spoken even at the risk of being thought sensational. If the League of Nations were to be abandoned, the world would be exposed to dangers greater than it has ever before encountered.
We must take from America as much as she can give us, and—for we are certain we can do this safely—trust to hex " making good " at a later date. If she cannot at present give us a sealed bond, we at any rate may find in her history, and in the character of her people, guarantees as firm in reality, though not in appearance, as her plighted word. The League must be made a living thing, and if any difficulty should arise the Powers that compose it must, without any false shame or sense of amour propre, appeal to America, if she remains outside, to help them in supporting it. They would not, we are sure, make such an appeal in vain. Those who are inclined to think that the League, with America not committed to it, will be of no use, and so had better be thrown over at once, should consider how infinitely easier it will be to carry out the general wishes of mankind if such an organization as the League exists. Take the trouble of the moment. There is no country in the world, certainly not Russia, which does not passionately desire to stop the fighting which is now going on in North-Eastern Europe, to end Bolshevik tyranny, and to give the people of Russia whatever Government the majority of tliem desire. If the League of Nations were in existence, its Council would be just the body which could handle the situation in Russia effectively, which could tell the warring parties and nations to put up their swords—which, in fine, could make an end of the agony of a continent. Before Europe and America gathered under one banner even the astutest and most self-confident of Bolshevik tyrants must fear and tremble.
We have one more word to say by way of postscript. Though generally we do not take a tragic but only a serious view of the reservations, there is one point on which we agree that serious damage has been done by the Senate. The reservations in regard to Article 10 do not by any means kill the League. The real trouble is found in the reservation under which America will not agree to the limitation of armaments. Here is the crux. If America will not agree to this limitation, it is to be feared that many of the small States will follow her example, for we can hardly say to them, though it is the truth : " America is far more likely to let her armaments go to seed than any other country in the world, and therefore she can safely be allowed the luxury of insisting on this reservation. You cannot." If we are not able to do something to limit armaments and to prevent the old deadly competition, how is it possible that Europe should ever heal her wounds ? The mitigation of armaments, though admittedly the most difficult point under the League, is also the point of most practical importance. We can hardly survive unless we beat our swords into ploughshares. But in the present unrest and distrust, how can we accomplish that process unless there is a firm stand against competition in armaments, and some machinery for preventing ambitious nations from sacrificing the material interests of their people in order to have the opportunity some day of practising that system of international brigandage which we hoped to have destroyed for ever when we destroyed the Prussian tyrants ?
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