Tough—or bluff?

DEFENCE LAURENCE MARTIN

After last week's meeting of NATO defence ministers, Mr Healey told a press conference that the 'rot had been stopped.' Having used precisely the same metaphor in the SPECTATOR a few weeks ago to characterise the proper response to Czechoslovakia, it would be un- grateful of me not to welcome the flurry of announcements that accompanied the talks. But there are one or two curiosities about British policy that invite comment.

In the first place, there is something of a con- trast between the official British line that the strictly military situation in Europe has not deteriorated, and General Lemnitzer's repeated assurances that it has. Of course, the General has to acquire armed forces and the Govern- ment has to pay for them. But since Britain is, in fact, taking credit for increasing its contribu- tions, it is either more alarmed than it admits or has other motives. One suspects that motives are actually very mixed. There is probably not a little substfice in lzvestia's suggestion that

Britain's forward policy is intended to buy her way a little farther into Europe.

Certainly the mood of refurbishment in NATO comes at a time when British defence officials

see closer western European cooperation in planning and procurement as the solution to many British problems. Moreover, the Medi- terranean, where the Russians are obligingly creating a conspicuous threat, is a convenient place to put naval units which %% ill very soon

have lost their original raison (retie as a result

of the retreat from East of Suez. There is more than a little irony, however, in the fact that analysts of Soviet intentions are inclined to believe that the Russians will catch the West at its greatest disadvantage when they penetrate to the Gulf and Indian Ocean A vigorous British Mediterranean policy may be partly intended to disarm criticism of the retreat farther east.

It is Mediterranean policy, however, that gives rise to another query. Going back to Gibraltar, and perhaps later on to Malta, has a nostalgic

note and there are plenty of old allies to wel- come the White Ensign back. But is return

wholly consonant with the move toward Europe? This seems a genuinely open and de- batable question. The Europe the British gov- ernment wants to join is that of Germany, not that of Greece and Turkey. Defence schemes that talk of a 'European caucus' do not embrace an invitation for the Greeks and the Turks. In- deed, many who are most anxious to build a European defence community, and ultimately achieve a European security system with the East, would be only too glad to let the incon- venient and turbulent southern flank become an American responsibility.

On the other hand, France is a Mediterranean power and so is Italy. Russian policy there shows slight signs of disturbing French equa- nimity. Could offering help in the Mediterranean allow Britain to forge an unexpected link with the Common Market countries and begin the process of turning the Six outward again towards a less parochial foreign policy? It is possible, but it might not be wise to put much money on it. The central front is the absorbing one, the interests endangered by the Russians in the Mediterranean may very well not be directly European ones, and France and Britain have scarcely ever met in the Mediterranean except to quarrel.

What call for far more serious thought about the recent NATO meetings are the ostentatious if

in the end slightly muffled warnings to the Rus-

sians not to misbehave in eastern Europe. That the NATO powers should stand conspicuously

united and delineate with dire warnings the line between their territory and that of the Warsaw Pact is unquestionably right. But is this the time to extend the western alliance's sphere ambigu- ously or to revive the notion of 'rollback'?

For what are we really prepared to do in the way of military action? If the Russians invade Rumania, almost certainly nothing. If they at- tack Yugoslavia it is possible that the United States would extend some air cover, though much would depend on the occasion and the Russian pretext. There would be strong argu-

ments against the wisdom of such action and a high probability of dissension in NATO. To inter-

vene in such cases would do much to confirm the belief of Russian hawks that they face a western campaign to demolish their defensive

glacis. It would also blur the essential line in Europe that must above all be kept clear, that around the North Atlantic allies.

If we are not likely to act forcibly against the Russians in eastern Europe—indeed, if we are

anything less than certain to act—tough-sound- ing declarations may well serve only to degrade all our utterances. For to talk tough and then do nothing will reduce the credibility of the warnings we do mean. Thus when Mr Rusk says Austria and Yugoslavia are part of NATO's 'area of security interest,' he does as much to reduce the value of being part of NATO as to en- hance the safety of the countries outside.

Of course, we can plausibly threaten diplo- matic sanctions; we can also threaten to rearm. One of the advantages of the present repairs to the NATO structure is their concrete illustration of such a process to the Russians. This does not apply to issuing threats of military action we know we will not take. In a curious phrase a Times editorial last week suggested that the 'Sixth Fleet might guarantee the Adriatic or at least deter the Russians.' Deterrence that rests on less than a guarantee is presumably a bluff. Bluff has its place in policy but it is a dangerous game in an era of deterrence. For once one bluff is called, the task of making deterrence credible is made immensely more difficult. The blessing of Czechoslovakia was that, being clearly out- side our sphere, its fate has not called our deter- mination into question. It seems dubious wis- dom to embrace marginal areas now.

The truth is that, lulled by détente, we had forgotten the price of stability. It is abstention from helping many whom we would like to help and considerable exertion to protect ourselves.